Christopher C. Raymond

In _Nicomachean Ethics_ 4. 9 Aristotle gives two arguments for why _aidōs_, or a sense of shame, is not a virtue. The chapter has puzzled readers: both arguments seem to conflict with things he says elsewhere in the _NE_, and neither is persuasive in its own right. This paper reconstructs Aristotle’s position on _aidōs_ by drawing on the ancient commentary tradition, relevant passages from the _Eudemian Ethics_, and the analysis of ‘civic’ courage in _NE_ 3. 8. It is shown that Aristotle has stronger reasons for denying that _aidōs_ is a virtue than at first appears, given his distinction between acting from the fear of disrepute and acting for the sake of the fine. The paper concludes by arguing that his view is nevertheless untenable, since it ignores the fact that even a virtuous person can be subject to disrepute. This criticism stems from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary in _Ethical Problems_ 21.

This chapter interprets Nietzsche’s account of the value of tragedy as a response to Socrates’ challenge in Book 10 of the _Republic_: ‘to prove that there’s more to it than mere pleasure—that it is also an agent of cultural health and ‘metaphysical consolation’. According to the author, Nietzsche is the first major figure in the tradition to respond to Socrates by rejecting the terms on which his challenge is set. Tragedy has value, according to Nietzsche, precisely because it does not benefit us in the way Socrates’ challenge demands.