Christopher Framarin

A number of passages in the Mahābhārata draw the distinction between bodily pain (śārīraṃ duḥkham) and mental pain (mānasaṃ duḥkham). The notion of bodily pain in these passages seems more or less straightforward. The notion of mental pain, however, is at least initially obscure. My thesis in this paper is that mental pains are states like dislike, dissatisfaction, disappointment, and so on—states that are sometimes referred to as “attitudinal pains.” This analysis is consistent with all four of the criteria of mental pain cited in the Mahābhārata. Additionally, it serves to highlight features of mental pain that are easily overlooked. Finally, the interpretation helps to explain the common claim that life is pervaded by duḥkha.

Vasiṣṭha claims both that all four _āśramas_ are equal and that the householder is the best of the four _āśramas_. This apparent contradiction would be resolved if either of these claims could be dismissed. Vasiṣṭha's claim that the four _āśramas_ are equal seems entailed, however, by his endorsement of the original formulation of the _āśrama_ system. His claim that the householder is superior, in turn, seems supported by the surplus of arguments that he offers in favor of the householder. Patrick Olivelle takes Vasiṣṭha to advance this surplus of arguments for the householder only to bolster the more modest claim that the householder is _equal_—and therefore not inferior—to the celibate _āśramas_. If this right, then Vasiṣṭha's claim that the householder is superior might be understood in the same way. If the balance of evidence weighs in favor of one claim or the other, however, it seems to weigh in favor of the superiority of the householder, rather than the equality of the _āśramas_. An alternative interpretation takes Vasiṣṭha to evaluate the householder in relation to two distinct metrics. The four _āśramas_ are equal, he says, in their ability to attain the highest heaven. The householder is superior to the other three _āśramas_, however, in his unmatched contributions to the general welfare.

In the Bhagavadgītā K a advises Arjuna to act without desire. He also describes the nikāmakarmin as possessed of perfect equanimity. Some scholars have argued that K a's advice is a contradiction. Because action requires desire, desireless action is impossible. Others have claimed that this fact only suggests that K a's prohibition is against a subset of desires and not desire as a whole. These ‘subset’ positions, however, are not consistent with the equanimity requirement. The conclusion that K a's advice is a contradiction can be avoided however. The word ‘desire’ in English is ambiguous. In one sense it means ‘whatever motivated’, and in another sense it means a ‘desire proper’ in contrast to beliefs and other mental states. If it is possible that not only desires proper motivate, then it is possible to act desirelessly in this sense. This distinction, I will argue, makes the best sense of K a's advice.

This book argues that the standard arguments for and against the claim that certain Hindu texts and traditions attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants are unconvincing. It presents careful, extensive, and original interpretations of passages from the Manusmrti (law), the Mahābhārata (literature), and the Yogasūtra (philosophy), and argues that these texts attribute direct moral standing to animals and plants for at least three reasons: they are sentient, they are alive, and they possess a range of other relevant attributes and abilities. This book is of interest to scholars of Hinduism and the environment, religion and the environment, Hindu and/or Buddhist philosophy more broadly, and environmental ethics.

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve