Christopher Janaway

This paper assesses the common assertion that Arthur Schopenhauer holds a position similar to David Benatar’s anti-natalism: (1) Never-existing is preferable to coming into existence as a human individual; (2) There is a moral duty not to bring human individuals into existence. Evidence of Schopenhauer’s acceptance of (1) is fairly strong. However, a possible reading of Schopenhauer calls this into question. The ‘highest good’ of negation of the will may constitute a higher good than never-existing. Schopenhauer rejects (2). In his view, there cannot be a general moral duty not to procreate. Compassion provides a reason not to procreate, but the potential for one’s eventual offspring to reach salvation through will-lessness provides a contrasting reason to procreate. The paper questions the assumption that Schopenhauer’s sole standard of evaluation is hedonic: that individuals will suffer is not necessarily the decisive factor in whether it is good to bring them into existence. Suffering is instrumentally valuable towards negation of the will. We should see Schopenhauer as writing perspectivally, presenting points of view for and against anti-natalism. For contemporary readers who dismiss Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the anti-natalist strand becomes salient; but Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is for him a higher standpoint and is not decisively anti-natalist.

This chapter raises questions concerning Nietzsche's positive evaluative ideal of greatness for a human being. On the one hand he offers as a highest ideal the capacity to affirm one's life to the fullest extent possible, as tested by the thought experiment of the ‘eternal recurrence’. It is argued that while Nietzsche holds this degree of life-affirmation to have positive value, it could be a normative ideal only for rare individuals, in Nietzsche's eyes. On the other hand, Nietzsche sometimes talks of greatness in terms of properties of, and relations between a human being's drives or instincts: necessary conditions for greatness include the strength of drives, their multiplicity, and their being in conflict but held in a unity. The nature of drives and instincts is explored, and it is argued that some drives and instincts may be culturally acquired and lost. Morality is both a symptom of, and a danger to, healthy states of the drives: hence consciously held beliefs and other attitudes can impair or enhance greatness. The question is raised: how does the ideal attitude of self-affirmation relate to greatness conceived in terms of the drives? It is suggested that self-affirmation can both be symptomatic of greatness in that sense, and can be a facilitator of it.

This paper assesses the common assertion that Arthur Schopenhauer holds a position similar to David Benatar’s anti-natalism: (1) Never-existing is preferable to coming into existence as a human individual; (2) There is a moral duty not to bring human individuals into existence. Evidence of Schopenhauer’s acceptance of (1) is fairly strong. However, a possible reading of Schopenhauer calls this into question. The ‘highest good’ of negation of the will may constitute a higher good than never-existing. Schopenhauer rejects (2). In his view, there cannot be a general moral duty not to procreate. Compassion provides a reason not to procreate, but the potential for one’s eventual offspring to reach salvation through will-lessness provides a contrasting reason to procreate. The paper questions the assumption that Schopenhauer’s sole standard of evaluation is hedonic: that individuals will suffer is not necessarily the decisive factor in whether it is good to bring them into existence. Suffering is instrumentally valuable towards negation of the will. We should see Schopenhauer as writing perspectivally, presenting points of view for and against anti-natalism. For contemporary readers who dismiss Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the anti-natalist strand becomes salient; but Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is for him a higher standpoint and is not decisively anti-natalist.

Suffering figures in a number of related and sometimes overlapping themes throughout Nietzsche's works, from The Birth of Tragedy to the works of his last productive year: representing suffering artistically so as to affirm life, undergoing suffering, inflicting it, witnessing it, inflicting it on oneself, seeking redemption through it, interpreting it retrospectively and giving it significance in one's life, wanting to prevent it in others and resisting that desire, allowing it to happen to oneself and to others, and seeking it out as a challenge to overcome. The article argues that when we examine the diverse contexts in which Nietzsche discusses suffering, we should conclude that asking after the value of suffering for Nietzsche is mistaken. Part of Nietzsche's contention against the ‘morality of compassion’ is the very assumption that there is such a thing as the value of suffering. Nietzsche espouses what has been called normative contextualism: whether any instance of suffering has positive, negative, or indifferent value will vary according to context or the relations it stands in to other events and attitudes. According to Nietzsche's method of perspectival inquiry, we understand suffering better by engaging with ways in which suffering calls upon a range of affective responses.

This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ the reader about the subject, but requires them to engage philosophically with the text. A pedagogical resource developed in the classroom by the authors at the University of London.

_Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject, this concise anthology brings together key texts in aesthetics and the philosophy of art._ Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject. Presents two contrasting pieces on each of six topics. Texts range from Plato's famous critique of art in the 'Republic' through Nietzsche's 'The Birth of Tragedy' to Barthes' 'The Death of the Author' and pieces in recent philosophical aesthetics from a number of traditions. Interactive editorial commentary helps readers to engage with the philosophical train of thought. Explains the argumentative and historical context in which each piece was written. Includes questions for debate and suggestions for further reading.

_Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject, this concise anthology brings together key texts in aesthetics and the philosophy of art._ Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject. Presents two contrasting pieces on each of six topics. Texts range from Plato's famous critique of art in the 'Republic' through Nietzsche's 'The Birth of Tragedy' to Barthes' 'The Death of the Author' and pieces in recent philosophical aesthetics from a number of traditions. Interactive editorial commentary helps readers to engage with the philosophical train of thought. Explains the argumentative and historical context in which each piece was written. Includes questions for debate and suggestions for further reading.

This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ the reader about the subject, but requires them to engage philosophically with the text. A pedagogical resource developed in the classroom by the authors at the University of London.

Western aesthetics and art theory begin with Plato; Christopher Janaway not only gives an understanding of Plato's criticisms of the arts in the context of his own philosophy, but also locates him in today's philosophy of art. Images of Excellence gives a new and original view of a famous issue in the history of ideas, arguing that Plato presents a more coherent and profound challenge to the arts than has sometimes been supposed. Janaway provides accessible and illuminating discussion of such topics as beauty, emotion, representation, ethical knowledge, artistic autonomy, and censorship; he writes not only for readers working in ancient philosophy, but for all who are interested in aesthetics, art theory, and literary theory.

Patrick Hassan's book traces Nietzsche's engagement with pessimism from its onset prior to the writing of BT, through the change of HH, and into his later works. The book's governing aims are to clarify what the term "pessimism" applied to in German intellectual life of the 1860s to 1880s and to establish that Nietzsche's understanding of and reaction to pessimism is not all about Schopenhauer. As the progenitor of philosophical pessimism, Schopenhauer naturally figures prominently in the book, but Hassan urges us throughout to remember that Nietzsche was living in the world of Eduard von Hartmann, Julius Bahnsen, Olga Plümacher, Agnes Taubert, Phillip Mainländer, and Eugen Dühring, that he read all these sources... Read More.

This article questions a common reading of Section 230 of Beyond Good and Evil as containing a canonical statement of Nietzsche’s naturalism. The section cannot be read simply as the programmatic statement of an investigative task, and is relatively vague as to its nature. Nietzsche’s aim is aporetic. He presents the naturalist task as involving mental self-cruelty and a struggle with unconscious vanity, suggesting that thinkers have found no way to justify why they choose this task, unless they invoke self-descriptions which are false and belong to a metaphysical conception of truth and inquiry that naturalism must resist. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche revisits this theme and announces his task as that of calling into question these justifications of naturalist inquiry.

This article questions a common reading of Section 230 of Beyond Good and Evil as containing a canonical statement of Nietzsche’s naturalism. The section cannot be read simply as the programmatic statement of an investigative task, and is relatively vague as to its nature. Nietzsche’s aim is aporetic. He presents the naturalist task as involving mental self-cruelty and a struggle with unconscious vanity, suggesting that thinkers have found no way to justify why they choose this task, unless they invoke self-descriptions which are false and belong to a metaphysical conception of truth and inquiry that naturalism must resist. In the Genealogy, Nietzsche revisits this theme and announces his task as that of calling into question these justifications of naturalist inquiry.

The central claim of Schopenhauer's metaphysics is that the thing in itself is will. He arrives at this by way of an observation about self‐knowledge: I can know myself only as willing or active, not as subject of knowledge. He claims that this unique knowledge gives access to my essence, and moves from this to the claim that the world in itself is will, of which the plurality of empirical things is an objectification. The chapter examines the problem of knowing the thing in itself at all. It is argued that Schopenhauer's conception of the thing in itself as will is a response to questions familiar in post‐Kantian philosophy, and there is a brief comparison with Schelling's conceptions of will and nature.

Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without needing to identify oneself as an object in the world. He also provides a prototype of the thought that the ‘I’ cannot be conceived wholly as a disembodied or transcendental pure subject, but must be an active and embodied agent. Schopenhauer's dichotomy of subjective and objective viewpoints is argued to be parallel to the conceptions developed by Thomas Nagel.

Schopenhauer's philosophy was formed during the years 1810–18. This chapter looks at the influences that shaped it, principally Kant, but also Plato, and the Upanishads. Schopenhauer aimed at a synthesis of these influences. Although indebted to Kant for the framework of his thought, he developed a conception of metaphysics and a ‘better consciousness’ of objective reality that would be free from the limitations imposed by Kant. Schopenhauer's antagonistic relationship with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is also mentioned.