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32Logic Oughtn't be NormativeDisputatio Philosophica 22 (1): 3-10. 2021.Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logically is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in fa…Read more
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27Qualia ain't out here eitherThink 19 (54): 31-35. 2020.What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.
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Areas of Specialization
Conceptual Engineering |
Metaphilosophy |