Christopher Ketcham

This chapter explores the debate about the debate and two procedures that US senators use to extend and close the debate: filibuster and cloture. I first outline the history of the filibuster and cloture. Within the debate about the debate are two controversies: the senate as an exclusive deliberative body, and the meaning of majority rule. I show how the exclusive deliberative body theory envisioned by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington has devolved to where the Senate has become more like the House. Majority rule, because of changes made to cloture, has become more like what the framers of the Constitution likely envisioned: simple majority rule.

Title descriptionInspired by Marcelo Dascal’s theory of controversies, this volume includes studies in the theory of controversies, studies of the history of controversy forms and their evolution, and case-studies of particular historical and current controversies. The purpose of this volume is to identify a taxonomy of controversies and also to sense a line of development for the phenomenon of controversies itself. At the same time, we want to ask ourselves about the impact and the spread of controversies in the contemporary world, eminently intended as a heuristic element facilitating knowledge. For all these reasons, the fundamental aim of the volume is to provide the reader with a selection of current theoretical and practical perspectives on controversies, and to offer a broad picture of the complex range of definitions, meanings and practices connected to them.Short descriptionInspired by Marcelo Dascal’s theory of controversies, this volume includes studies in the theory of controversies, studies of the history of controversy forms and their evolution, case-studies of particular historical and current controversies.

Can we discover morality in nature? Flowers and Honeybees extends the considerable scientific knowledge of flowers and honeybees through a philosophical discussion of the origins of morality in nature. Flowering plants and honeybees form a social group where each requires the other. They do not intentionally harm each other, both reason, and they do not compete for commonly required resources. They also could not be more different. Flowering plants are rooted in the ground and have no brains. Mobile honeybees can communicate the location of flower resources to other workers. We can learn from a million-year-old social relationship how morality can be constructed and maintained over time.

This paper brings Gabriel Marcel and Emmanuel Levinas into dialogue through a consideration of the notion of the spirit of abstraction in Marcel and the notion of the infinitely different other in Levinas. We abstract meaning from Mona Lisa‘s smile from her physical portrait. It is appropriate to abstract from the baby‘s sound whether he or she seems to be happy or sad, but it is when we begin to abstract humans from their humanity that the spirit of abstraction is engaged. My thesis is that the spirit of abstraction is a form of cognitively dislocated reason. This cognitive dislocation begins with the idea that people can be abstracted into characteristics and traits and that these traits can be assigned arbitrary superiority or inferiority e.g., big nosed people have superior intellects; small nosed people do not. Marcel suggests that the spirit of abstraction can turn persons into impersonal targets that are accorded fewer or reduced rights as if they were other than other human. The result can be that inferior persons are accorded one set of rights and superior persons are accorded another set of rights. A most drastic form of the spirit of abstraction occurred during the Holocaust, when the Nazis dehumanized the Jews. Drawing on the work of Robert Solomon, I suggest that if we begin to understand that reason and passion are interchangeable, we can stand back to reconsider attitudes that produce arbitrary abstractions. The spirit of abstraction is cognitively dissociated reason because it redirects someone from the self-evident notion that this other is human, to this other is other-than-human, and even less-than-human because of some arbitrary condition, e.g., being small nosed.ion is a necessary intellectual exercise to achieve what one intends—differentiating an edible mushroom from one that is poisonous by its color. The spirit of abstraction, on the other hand, is cognitively dislocated reason because it is a form of expediency that pre-categorizes persons without considering the individual who, for example, stands before me. What Marcel and Levinas ultimately ask us to do is to recognize this cognitively dislocated reason and turn the discourse from abstracting humans into categories deserving of different human rights toward a conversation that asks which human rights should apply to all humans.