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36Moral PropertiesIn Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 141-188. 2019.I argue for a realist conception of moral properties in general, and first-order moral properties in particular. Properties are abstract, platonic universals which may or may not be instantiated, or instantiable, in concrete or abstract particulars. The concept of a possible world—an imaginary ordered-set of compossible properties—is used to elucidate a realist conception of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties. On our view, truth—including first-order moral truth—is truth relative to …Read more
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27Truth, Facts, and PropertiesIn Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 105-140. 2019.The meaning of propositional truth is captured by William Alston’s T-scheme: “the proposition ‘that p’ is true iff p.” Truth is determined by the “way the world is,” whether in non-moral or moral contexts. True propositions express facts, but false propositions do not. Facts are states of affairs that obtain, and true propositions expresses such states of affairs. Thus, ‘It is wrong for Smith to strike Jones’, if true, expresses a state of affairs that obtains, namely, that it is wrong for Smith…Read more
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19Propositions and the First-Order MoralIn Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 69-103. 2019.Propositions are abstract entities that express the content of declarative sentences, and serve as truth-bearers. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is propositional, hence is neither true nor false, while moral cognitivists hold that first-order moral discourse is propositional. Commonsense morality is cognitivist, as is the metaethical theory to which it is committed, viz., moral realism. I argue that moral realists are correct. First-order moral discourse mirrors mos…Read more
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37The Metaphysics of Moral RealityIn Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 189-252. 2019.The general conceptual features of ordinary, commonsense morality are revisited, after which a detailed version of moral realism is developed based upon the specific findings of earlier chapters: moral truth and moral facts are rooted in a non-constructed metaphysical moral reality, exhibited by the actual world. This version of moral realism is then employed to reject the leading contemporary versions of moral antirealism: various moral non-cognitivisms, moral nihilism, and moral relativism in …Read more
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34Why Metaphysics and Morality?In Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 1-21. 2019.Commonsensically, we think we know many moral truths—that rape is wrong, that it is praiseworthy to return kindness with kindness, etc. Moral skeptics disagree. Epistemic moral skeptics think that even if there are moral truths, we can’t know them; metaphysical moral skeptics think that there is nothing to know—at least no “objective” moral truths. This book deals with metaphysical moral skepticism. Commonsense morality is committed to objective moral truths and facts, but many metaethical theor…Read more
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24Ordinary Morality and Its DetractorsIn Metaphysics of Morality, Springer Verlag. pp. 23-67. 2019.Ordinary moral thought is committed to non-relative moral truth, moral facts, and objective first-order properties like rightness and wrongness—in short, is committed to moral realism. Many metaethical theories deny all or some of these commitments. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is either true or false. Moral nihilists hold that first-order moral discourse is false because there are no moral properties. Moral relativisms—sociocultural, radical subjectivist, pragmat…Read more
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2Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral KnowledgeLexington Books. 2020.This book is staunchly anti-skeptical. It develops a theory of moral realism—there are indeed objective moral truths—and a broadly commonsense theory of moral knowledge: although we are certainly liable to error, we nevertheless often possess moral knowledge.
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The End of Epistemology: Dewey and His Current Allies on the Spectator Theory of KnowledgeTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 31 (1): 218-223. 1995.
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John Dewey, "The Later Works, Vols. 15 and 16" (review)Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 27 (2): 250. 1991.
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2John Dewey and the Spectator Theory of KnowledgeDissertation, Vanderbilt University. 1986.John Dewey's philosophical work has enjoyed a resurgence of interest of late, largely because of its iconoclastic stance toward traditional philosophy in general, and traditional epistemology in particular. In this dissertation I examine critically the anti-epistemological project which occupied Dewey throughout the first half of this century. In common with many other commentators, I understand Dewey to have held that the central, fatal flaw of traditional epistemology is its commitment to what…Read more
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74Realism/Antirealism and Epistemology (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1997.This landmark collection of essays by six renowned philosophers explores the implications of the contentious realism/antirealism debate for epistemology. The essays examine issues such as whether epistemology needs to be realist, the bearing of a realist conception of truth on epistemology, and realism and antirealism in terms of a pragmatist conception of epistemic justification. Richard Rorty's essay provides a critical commentary on the other five.
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135Dewey, Indeterminacy, and the Spectator Theory of KnowledgeModern Schoolman 67 (3): 207-221. 1990.
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75The end of epistemology: Dewey and his current allies on the spectator theory of knowledgeGreenwood Press. 1992.Kulp provides a thorough examination of John Dewey's influential arguments against traditional theories of knowledge; in particular against the thesis that knowing is fundamentally a passive "beholding" relation between the knower and the object known and ultimately, he finds them deficient. He also lays the basis for a defense of a spectator theory of having knowledge, a basis that incorporates important considerations about introspective knowledge.
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126Moral Intuitions: seeming or believing?Synthese 200 (2): 1-18. 2022.There is not agreement among moral intuitionists on the nature of moral intuitions: some favor a doxastic interpretation, others a non-doxastic interpretation. This paper argues that although both interpretations have legitimacy, the doxastic interpretation is preferable. The paper discusses three salient roles for moral intuitions:Role 1: To serve as a test for moral theories.Role 2: To provide a particularist grounding for moral judgment.Role 3: To stop a vicious infinite regress of justified …Read more
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66Metaphysics of MoralitySpringer Verlag. 2019.This is a book on metaethics—in particular, an inquiry into the metaphysical foundations of morality. After carefully exploring the metaphysical commitments, or lack thereof, of the leading versions of moral anti-realism, Kulp develops a new and in-depth theory of moral realism. Starting with the firm recognition of the importance of our common sense belief that we possess a great deal of moral knowledge—that, for example, some acts are objectively right and some objectively wrong—the book goes …Read more
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129Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to InferentialismReview of Metaphysics 55 (4): 847-848. 2002.This is a book on semantics, centered on developing an inferentialist theory of concept content and use—a theory that contrasts sharply with the dominate representationalist theories that are the legacy of Russell, Carnap, and Frege. It is intended as an introduction to and elaboration upon themes developed in Brandom’s earlier book, Making It Explicit.
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42Knowing Moral Truth: A Theory of Metaethics and Moral KnowledgeLexington Books. 2017.This book is staunchly anti-skeptical. It develops a theory of moral realism—there are indeed objective moral truths—and a broadly commonsense theory of moral knowledge: although we are certainly liable to error, we nevertheless often possess moral knowledge.
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121Disagreement and the Defensibility of Moral IntuitionismInternational Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4): 487-502. 2016.This paper takes up the Disagreement Objection to Moral Intuitionism, which is roughly this: If moral intuitions conflict, there must be falsehood somewhere. But there is no respectable way to resolve such conflict because there is no respectable way to choose between intuitions. Therefore, moral intuitions cannot serve their intended role of grounding justified moral belief and knowledge. This paper rebuts the Disagreement Objection: it recommends a doxastic interpretation of moral intuitions a…Read more
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123The pre-theoreticality of moral intuitionsSynthese 191 (15): 3759-3778. 2014.Moral intuitionism, once an apparently moribund metaethical position, has seen a resurgence of interest of late. Robert Audi, a leading moral intuitionist, has argued that in order for a moral belief to qualify as intuitional, it must fulfill four criteria: it must be non-inferential, firmly held, comprehended, and pre-theoretical. This paper centers on the fourth and seemingly most problematic criterion: pre-theoreticality. The paper begins by stipulating the defensibility of the moral cognitiv…Read more
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Moral facts and the centrality of intuitionsIn Jill Graper Hernandez (ed.), The New Intuitionism, Continuum. pp. 48--66. 2011.
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114Dewey, the Spectator Theory of Knowledge, and Internalism/ExternalismModern Schoolman 86 (1): 67-77. 2009.