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    Spinoza's Argument for Substance Monism: Why There Is Only One Thing interprets and defends Spinoza's God/Nature argument using speculative metaphysics as a method and illustrates the practice and potential of metaphysics at work. These features work together to strengthen Spinoza's argument that only one substantial being exists.
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    Aristotle, Spinoza, and Burnside on Infinite Space
    Southwest Philosophy Review 39 (2): 23-26. 2023.
    Aristotle argues that the world is populated by real and distinct physical substances; Spinoza that there must and can only be one physical substance. Aristotle’s view carries considerably intuitive appeal, but Spinoza’s logic can, under the right interpretation, seem awfully convincing. Andrew Burnside (2023) helps us to explore what occurs when Aristotle’s unstoppable intuitive appeal meets Spinoza’s impeccable logic. Burnside’s project, as I understand it, has two aims: to show that Spinoza’s…Read more
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    Immanence and Causation in Spinoza
    In Andre Santos Campos (ed.), Spinoza: Basic Concepts, Imprint Academic. pp. 14-24. 2015.
    I defend an expanded reading of immanent causation that includes both inherence and causal efficacy; I argue that the latter is required if God is to remain the immanent cause of finite modes.
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    The Framework of Essences in Spinoza's Ethics
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3). 2008.
    (2008). The Framework of Essences in Spinoza's Ethics. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 489-509. doi: 10.1080/09608780802200489
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    The Substantial Essence in Spinoza's Ontological Argument
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (4): 705-726. 2020.
    descartes appears to intentionally distance his a priori argument for God from the conceptual orientation of earlier arguments by insisting that God's true and immutable nature is something that is real whether he conceives it or not. I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures.1 Des…Read more
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    Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (2): 269-287. 2010.
    Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan …Read more
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