Christopher Martin

Di Bella and Schmaltz write in their introduction that the early modern problem of universals originates largely in a turn away from ancient and late-medieval problems. The modern problem, they suggest, investigates universals by asking what it means to include them as contents of our thoughts. The collection of essays that follows demonstrates persuasively, however, that we should resist the impulse, no matter how heuristic, to regard each era as having its own—much less a single—problem of universals. Despite the variety and interest of other contributions to the collection, I focus here on essays that display greater continuity among the eras, and on two essays addressing thinkers whose position on...

Spinoza revises his early Cartesian arguments for God in three important respects. By defining God in terms of conceptually distinct attributes, he has an argument for God’s actual possibility. By defining God in terms of conceptual independence, he has an argument for the mind independence of God’s nature. By including reason and power as features of God’s nature, he provides a mechanism by which God’s nature necessitates God. Each of these address important objections to Descartes’ ontological argument. Given his similarities with Descartes and familiarity with these objections, Spinoza may have had Descartes’ critics in mind, and regardless, Cartesians may benefit by examining Spinoza’s ontological arguments more closely.

Aristotle argues that the world is populated by real and distinct physical substances; Spinoza that there must and can only be one physical substance. Aristotle’s view carries considerably intuitive appeal, but Spinoza’s logic can, under the right interpretation, seem awfully convincing. Andrew Burnside (2023) helps us to explore what occurs when Aristotle’s unstoppable intuitive appeal meets Spinoza’s impeccable logic. Burnside’s project, as I understand it, has two aims: to show that Spinoza’s argument for one extended substance is a better account of physical reality than Aristotle’s arguments against an infinite body and, second, to support this claim by defending Yitzhak Melamed interpretation of Spinoza as genuinely dividing reality into substances and modes. I would like to press Burnside on the usefulness of comparing Aristotle and Spinoza with respect to an infinitely extended physical thing and then raise several question for his reading of Spinoza.

descartes appears to intentionally distance his a priori argument for God from the conceptual orientation of earlier arguments by insisting that God's true and immutable nature is something that is real whether he conceives it or not. I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they may not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing; for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not my invention but have their own true and immutable natures.1 Descartes's idea of a triangle, for instance, is a conception of a true and immutable nature that may be conceived whether any actual triangles do or ever have existed, and that is neither invented by nor dependent on his...

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.