Christopher Paone

In his singular treatise the _Tattvopaplavasiṃha_ (_Lion of theDestruction of Principles_), Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (ninth century CE) argues against all major philosophical views of his day. The goal of his ambitious work is nothing less than the complete destruction of all philosophical systems. Such an effort may seem impossible, but Jayarāśi targets a foundational concept upon which his opponents’ systems are built. This concept is the _pramāṇa_ (knowledge source). Knowledge sources are processes that reliably produce true beliefs about reality. They provide an answer to the question, “How do you know?” because that knowledge is secured by means of a knowledge source. For centuries philosophers of classical India from various traditions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, debated the number and definitions of knowledge sources. The most important of these are perception, inference, and testimony, but others were also proposed. Philosophers continuously contested and refined the definitions of knowledge sources. Indeed, this task was vital to their philosophies because without true definitions of knowledge sources they cannot distinguish genuine knowledge from counterfeits. Hence, Jayarāśi’s destructive arguments target the definitions of knowledge sources, showing that, given the concepts and arguments available in his opponents’ systems, all definitions of knowledge sources are failures, and with those failures their philosophical systems are destroyed.

This essay develops an intercultural approach to the skeptical way of life through an interpretation of two classical traditions: the Pyrrhonian tradition of ancient Greece and the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition of classical India. The skeptical way of life is characterized by several important features, including a goal of tranquility or of freedom from disturbance and suffering, a philosophical strategy of dialectical argument that terminates in the suspension of judgment or the abandonment of views, a purgative philosophic therapy, and life without belief. A constellation of practical questions that emerge from the skeptical way of life are also considered, including the skeptic’s character, conformity, and care. One of the principal aims of the essay will be to develop this intercultural account of the skeptical way of life and to show by way of this illustrative example how our understanding of skepticism and ancient philosophy is enhanced through an intercultural approach.

A long-lived and lively tradition of materialist philosophers flourished in classical India and in classical Greece. Due to the condition of their texts, however, they do not often receive close study. This essay compares the views of the classical Indian materialists, the Cārvākas, and the classical Greek materialists, the Epicureans. The first section introduces their philosophies. The second outlines their doctrines of empiricism and materialism. The third and fourth turn to two comparative topics in Cārvāka and Epicurean ethics: their views on eliminating irrational fears caused by superstition and their understanding of pleasure as the goal of human action and life.

Against the traditional reading of Cynic cosmopolitanism, this essay advances the thesis that Diogenes’ world citizenship is a positive claim supported by philosophical argument and philosophical example. Evidence in favor of this thesis is a new interpretation of Diogenes’ syllogistic argument concerning law (nomos) (D.L. 6.72). Important to the argument are an understanding of Diogenes’ philanthropic character and his moral imperative to ‘re-stamp the currency’. Whereas Socrates understands his care as attached specially to Athens, Diogenes’ philosophical mission and form of care attach not to his native Sinope but to all humanity. An important result is that Diogenes’ Cynicism provides an ancient example of cosmopolitanism that is philanthropic, minimalistic, experimental, and utopian.