Christopher Roser

This book provides a collection of essays representing the state of the art in the research into argumentation in classical antiquity. It contains essays from leading and up and coming scholars on figures as diverse as Parmenides, Gorgias, Seneca, and Classical Chinese "wandering persuaders." The book includes contributions from specialists in the history of philosophy as well as specialists in contemporary argumentation theory, and stimulates the dialogue between scholars studying issues relating to argumentation theory in ancient philosophy and contemporary argumentation theorists. Furthermore, the book sets the direction for research into argumentation in antiquity by encouraging an engagement with a broader range of historical figures, and closer collaboration between contemporary concerns and the history of philosophy.

Plato sharply contrasts Socrates’ dialectical manner of argumentation to the rhetorical way of using arguments. The upshot of this contrast seems to be clear: the dialectical use of arguments is epistemically valuable, while the rhetorical use is epistemically deficient. What is less clear, however, is how Plato justifies this sharp contrast. In this paper, I consider seven different ways scholarship has tried to answer this question. I argue that none of them manage to explain Plato’s clear-cut distinction. This has two important consequences. First, it shows that the distinction between the rhetorical and dialectical use of arguments is considerably more delicate and multi-layered than is commonly thought. Second, it also shows that the commonly accepted definitions of dialectic fail to sufficiently distinguish dialectic from rhetoric. That does not mean, however, that there is no essential difference between them. Rather, I suggest, Plato distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic by following a paradigm-based approach: he points to paradigmatic differences between them and, in so doing, he reveals what is essential about each of them.