Christopher Wolfe

Natural Law Today: The Present State of the Perennial Philosophy explains and defends various aspects of traditional natural law ethical theory, which is rooted in a broad understanding of human nature. Some of the issues touched upon include the relation of natural law to speculative reason and human ends (teleology), the relationship between natural law and natural theology, the so-called naturalistic fallacy (deriving “ought” from “is”), and the scope of natural knowledge of the precepts of the natural law, as well as possible limits on it. It also takes up certain historical and contemporary questions, such as the various stances of Protestant thinkers toward natural law, the place of natural law in contemporary U.S. legal thought, and the relationship between natural law and liberal political thought more generally. It brings together a number of the leading exponents of a more traditional or classical form of natural law thought, who claim to root their arguments within the broader philosophy of Thomas Aquinas more deeply than other major representatives of the natural law tradition today.

Natural Law Today: The Present State of the Perennial Philosophy explains and defends various aspects of traditional natural law ethical theory, which is rooted in a broad understanding of human nature. Some of the issues touched upon include the relation of natural law to speculative reason and human ends (teleology), the relationship between natural law and natural theology, the so-called naturalistic fallacy (deriving “ought” from “is”), and the scope of natural knowledge of the precepts of the natural law, as well as possible limits on it. It also takes up certain historical and contemporary questions, such as the various stances of Protestant thinkers toward natural law, the place of natural law in contemporary U.S. legal thought, and the relationship between natural law and liberal political thought more generally. It brings together a number of the leading exponents of a more traditional or classical form of natural law thought, who claim to root their arguments within the broader philosophy of Thomas Aquinas more deeply than other major representatives of the natural law tradition today.

The myside bias in written argumentation entails excluding other side information from essays. To determine the locus of the bias, 86 Experiment 1 participants were assigned to argue either for or against their preferred side of a proposal. Participants were given either balanced or unrestricted research instructions. Balanced research instructions significantly increased the use of other side information. Participants' notes, rather than search patterns, predicted the myside bias. Participants who defined good arguments as those that can be “proved by facts” were more prone towards the myside bias. In Experiment 2, 84 participants of high and low argumentation ability read a text called “More Than Just the Facts” designed to contradict this fact-based argumentation schema. For high argumentation ability participants, the intervention reduced the myside bias, but for low ability participants it increased. The roots of the myside bias are underdeveloped argumentation schemata leading to misconceptions about research and argumentation.