Chrysoula Gitsoulis

The concept of justice and the relationship between the individual and the State is a core theme in the philosophy of Socrates and Dr. Martin Luther King. Both made deep and important contributions to discourse on this theme, yet, it appears as if their ap proaches and views diverged significantly. For Dr. King, the legitimacy of a law is de termined by its adherence to moral principles and its alignment with the fundamental values of equality and human dignity. He clearly believed we have a moral duty to resist unjust laws, even if it means breaking them, in order to expose the flaws and contradic tions of an oppressive system—his philosophy of civil disobedience was rooted in this idea. In his “Letter from Birmingham Jail, he famously wrote that “an unjust law is no law at all.” On the other hand, it seems as if Socrates believed that we have a moral duty to always follow the laws of the State - that it would be immoral to ever violate them, even if they are deemed unjust. In this essay, I will explore this seeming disparity and offer evidence from Plato’s Crito, as well as passages from the Republic and the Apology that, contrary to appearance, we have more reason than not to believe that Soc rates’ views do in fact converge with Dr. King’s.

Cantor’s proof that the reals are uncountable forms a central pillar in the edifices of higher order recursion theory and set theory. It also has important applications in model theory, and in the foundations of topology and analysis. Due partly to these factors, and to the simplicity and elegance of the proof, it has come to be accepted as part of the ABC’s of mathematics. But even if as an Archimedean point it supports tomes of mathematical theory, there is a question that demands clarification: What, exactly, does Cantor’s proof show? One of few places where this question is addressed is Appendix II of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. This essay is devoted to clarifying Wittgenstein’s remarks in that section.

In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of following-a-rule, and not the conclusion of an independently developed argument in §§243ff of PI, as most commentators take it to be. In this work, I assess Kripke’s skeptical argument both in its own right, and as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI. In its own right, I try to show that it is critically flawed. However, as an interpretation of the rule-following sections of PI, I try to show that it is essentially correct. I do this by showing that Kripke’s interpretation squares with and supports the meta-philosophical framework developed by Wittgenstein in §§107-136 of PI, which immediately precedes his remarks on following-a-rule. (Oct 16, 2008. Committee: Paul Horwich, Galen Strawson, Stephen Neale, Michael Levin)

There are two aspects to Wittgenstein’s method of deconstructing pseudo-philosophical problems that need to be distinguished: (1) describing actual linguistic practice, and (2) constructing hypothetical ‘language-games’. Both methods were, for Wittgenstein, indispensable means of clarifying the ‘grammar’ of expressions of our language -- i.e., the appropriate contexts for using those expressions – and thereby dissolving pseudo-philosophical problems. Though (2) is often conflated with (1), it is important to recognize that it differs from it in important respects. (1) can be seen as functioning as a direct method of ‘proof’ (i.e., attempt to convince the reader of some thesis), and (2) as an indirect method of ‘proof’ -- proof by reductio ad absurdum. This essay will be devoted to clarifying (2) by forging an analogy with surrealism in art.