In this article, I present different characteristics of de jure coreference, including an
epistemological one and a logical one. Then, I present the semantic relation of coordination as what
explains or grounds the phenomenon of de jure coreference. And I compare two theories of relational
semantics, Fine’s (2007) and Taschek’s (1995a, 1995b, 1998), with respect to two famous puzzles in
the philosophy of language, Frege’s puzzle and Kripke’s puzzle about belief. Lastly, I briefly discuss coo…
Read moreIn this article, I present different characteristics of de jure coreference, including an
epistemological one and a logical one. Then, I present the semantic relation of coordination as what
explains or grounds the phenomenon of de jure coreference. And I compare two theories of relational
semantics, Fine’s (2007) and Taschek’s (1995a, 1995b, 1998), with respect to two famous puzzles in
the philosophy of language, Frege’s puzzle and Kripke’s puzzle about belief. Lastly, I briefly discuss coordination between empty terms.