Cindy Friedman

One characteristic of socially disruptive technologies is that they have the potential to cause uncertainty about the application conditions of a concept i.e., they are conceptually disruptive. Humanoid robots have done just this, as evidenced by discussions about whether, and under what conditions, humanoid robots could be classified as, for example, moral agents, moral patients, or legal and/or moral persons. This paper frames the disruptive effect of humanoid robots differently by taking the discussion beyond that of classificatory concerns. It does so by showing that humanoid robots are socially disruptive because they also transform how we experience and understand the world. Through inviting us to relate to a technological artefact as if it is human, humanoid robots have a profound impact upon the way in which we relate to different elements of our world. Specifically, I focus on three types of human relational experiences, and how the norms that surround them may be transformed by humanoid robots: (1) human-technology relations; (2) human-human relations; and (3) human-self relations. Anticipating the ways in which humanoid robots may change society is important given that once a technology is entrenched, it is difficult to counteract negative impacts. Therefore, we should try to anticipate them while we can still do something to prevent them. Since humanoid robots are currently relatively rudimentary, yet there is incentive to invest more in their development, it is now a good time to think carefully about how this technology may impact us.

The paper argues that we should grant negative rights to humanoid robots. These are rights that relate to non-interference e.g., freedom from violence, or freedom from discrimination. Doing so will prevent moral degradation to our human society. The consideration of robot moral status has seen a progression towards the consideration of robot rights. This is a controversial debate, with many scholars seeing the consideration of robot rights in black and white. It is, however, valuable to take a nuanced approach. This paper highlights the value of taking a nuanced approach by arguing that we should consider negative rights for humanoid robots. Where a lot of discussion about robot rights centres around the possibility of robot consciousness which would warrant robots being protected by rights for their own moral sakes, the paper takes a human-centred approach. It argues that we should, at least, grant negative rights to humanoid robots for the sake of human beings and not necessarily only for the sake of robots. This is because, given the human-likeness of humanoid robots, we relate to them in a human-like way. Should we, in the context of these relations, treat these robots immorally, there is concern that we may damage our own moral fibre or, more collectively, society’s moral fibre. Thus, inhibiting the immoral treatment of robots, protects the moral fibre of society, thereby preventing moral degradation in our human society.

This paper considers ethical concerns with regard to replacing human relations with humanoid robots. Many have written about the impact that certain types of relations with robots may have on us, and why we should be concerned about robots replacing human relations. There has, however, been no consideration of this issue from an African philosophical perspective. Ubuntu philosophy provides a novel perspective on how relations with robots may impact our own moral character and moral development. This paper first discusses what humanoid robots are, why and how humans tend to anthropomorphise them, and what the literature says about robots crowding out human relations. It then explains the ideal of becoming “fully human”, which pertains to being particularly moral in character. In ubuntu philosophy, we are not only biologically human, but must strive to become better, more moral versions of ourselves, to become fully human. We can become fully human by having other regarding traits or characteristics within the context of interdependent, or humane, relationships (such as by exhibiting human equality, reciprocity, or solidarity). This concept of becoming fully human is important in ubuntu philosophy. Having explained that idea, the main argument of the paper is then put forward: that treating humanoid robots as if they are human is morally concerning if they crowd out human relations, because such relations prevent us from becoming fully human. This is because we cannot experience human equality, solidarity, and reciprocity with robots, which can be seen to characterise interdependent, or humane, relations with human beings.