Success conditions on theoretical understanding are notoriously difficult to pin down. Yet epistemologists broadly agree that there is a grasping condition on understanding and that this condition distinguishes understanding from propositional knowledge. Currently, representation manipulability is the most common expression of this condition. In this paper, I argue that representation manipulability is only a surface-level condition on the highest form of grasping. I propose that grasping a theo…
Read moreSuccess conditions on theoretical understanding are notoriously difficult to pin down. Yet epistemologists broadly agree that there is a grasping condition on understanding and that this condition distinguishes understanding from propositional knowledge. Currently, representation manipulability is the most common expression of this condition. In this paper, I argue that representation manipulability is only a surface-level condition on the highest form of grasping. I propose that grasping a theory admits at least three levels: theory formation, theory comprehension, and theory competence. I argue that the highest level, which I call ‘theory competence,’ corresponds to representation manipulability and imposes the following necessary conditions on an individual’s representation: (a) it is well-integrated into a theory, (b) it is encoded into the individual's long-term memory, and (c) it regulates the individual's occurrent thinking by being easily retrievable and by dispositionally attuning the individual to features of the object and the theory that are contextually relevant. When an individual meets these conditions, they can manipulate their representation in the way epistemologists often argue they must if they understand.
