Clara Sandelind

Many affluent states seek to discharge their responsibilities to refugees through extraterritorial policies, which limit the number of refugees that they admit whilst contributing to protection in a third country. Is this morally permissible? I argue that under non-ideal circumstances, where states’ non-compliance with their duties to refugees are persistent, such policies can be permissible. However, extraterritorial protection must satisfy two conditions. First, it must come about through bilateral or multilateral agreements. Second, the protection provided must allow for full integration in a new society. I argue that the lower the costs a state bears for admitting refugees to its territory, the higher its contribution to extraterritorial protection must be. This notion of costs is illustrated by exemplifying how refugee admission may impose costs to the self-determination and equality of the hosting state.

Liberal egalitarians tend to be committed both to generous asylum policies and generous, universal welfare states. Yet there may be political, social and economic reasons why there is a conflict in realising both. Asylum seekers may create economic pressures to the welfare state, or undermine national solidarity supposedly necessary to support redistribution. In this paper, I discuss how political theorists should approach these empirical concerns. I take issue with the view that theorists can simply move between ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’ by accepting more or less of reality. Instead, political theorists should seek to offer a critical description of the conflict, which can reveal structures of power that ought to be subject to normative scrutiny. To this end, I discuss two accounts of how the welfare state may justify asylum restrictions in relation to the case of Sweden, a universal welfare state that has recently introduced restrictions on asylum to protect the welfare state. I argue along these accounts that the welfare state is both an important source of political and social order and a foundation of the personal moral experience. Yet a critical analysis also illustrates how these claims weaken as underlying methodological nationalism and bias towards existing power structures are brought to light. Asylum restrictions cannot be justified if they contribute to perpetuating these power structures, which cause some of the conflict with the welfare state in the first place.