Claudia Appolloni

This paper examines the role of and limits to the sensitive power in the epistemology of Richard Brinkley, drawing on the recent discovery of his complete Lectura super Sententias. Preserved in Florence (BNCF, Conv. Soppr. G.III.367, ff. 47rA–137rA), the commentary substantially expands Brinkley’s available theological corpus and makes it possible to examine the intersection of theories of sense perception, epistemology, and theology in his work. Focusing on quaestio 1 of the Prologue, the article shows that Brinkley considers sense cognition to be unreliable as, in his view, even the proper sensibles and optimal conditions do not preclude error. Brinkley grounds assent to Christian doctrine in intellectual evidence, which is understood as propositional apparentia, and distinguishes natural reason, which is limited to a partial knowledge of appearances, from human reason as illuminated by the divine light. Thus, Brinkley’s model indicates a theologically motivated limitation of natural reason and a possible use of skeptical argumentation in service of a theory of illumination.

This paper delves into the role that theologians and philosophers of the late Middle Ages (13th–14th centuries) attribute to language in shaping religious, social, and political communities. Beginning with the religious community, I highlight the sacrament’s function as a cohesive force and underscore the significance of linguistic knowledge in disseminating the Christian message. Subsequently, I explore texts of political philosophy where established languages contribute to social cohesion and the formation of communal identity within linguistic and ethnic communities. Lastly, I explore how language, in the commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics, while facilitating education and persuasion, falls short in fostering political stability and order, revealing its limitations in constructing and maintaining a political community.

The aim of this chapter is to examine Peter John Olivi’s theory of the signification of words and the role it plays within the conservation of a community. In the Quaestiones logicales and in the Quid ponat ius, Olivi distinguishes the individual act of signification in which the meaning of words is multiplied by every single user from a habitual signification, which is shared in common by speakers and carries normative value. Such normativity is grounded on the ontological nature of signs as relational entities linking a will and its object. In particular, the habitual side of signification stems from an original pact of meanings agreed upon by the collective intention of a people, a community. For such a social role, speakers are normally expected to respect habitual meaning and avoid the deceptive use of signs as to do so is an act of lying that undermines the stability of the whole community.