This paper offers a new way to interpret the rational part in vicious souls in the Republic. I challenge the orthodox view that the rational part in vicious souls is corrupted, desiring what lower parts desire qua good. Against this ‘corruption model’, I propose the ‘enslavement model’: the rational part in vicious souls is enslaved but not corrupted. When enslaved, it does not desire qua good what the ruling part desires. I argue that this interpretation better fits the text and offers interpre…
Read moreThis paper offers a new way to interpret the rational part in vicious souls in the Republic. I challenge the orthodox view that the rational part in vicious souls is corrupted, desiring what lower parts desire qua good. Against this ‘corruption model’, I propose the ‘enslavement model’: the rational part in vicious souls is enslaved but not corrupted. When enslaved, it does not desire qua good what the ruling part desires. I argue that this interpretation better fits the text and offers interpretative advantages, providing a new way to understand Plato’s psychology in the Republic.
