Pontifícia Universidade Católica Do Rio Grande Do Sul
  •  21
    Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism
    Philosophia 49 (1): 113-131. 2020.
    Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similar…Read more
  •  10
    Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility
    Synthese 188 (2): 197-215. 2012.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske’s lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure mane…Read more
  •  2
    Guest editorial
    Synthese 188 (2): 143-143. 2012.
  •  5
    What Moore's Paradox Is About
    Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 33-58. 2001.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-parad…Read more
  •  6
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem (edited book)
    with Peter Klein and Rodrigo Borges
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
  •  24
    Editorial preface
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 141-141. 2005.
  •  5
    What Moore’s Paradox Is About
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 33-58. 2001.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-parad…Read more
  •  75
    Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder
    with J. R. Fett
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1): 152-169. 2016.
    For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put fo…Read more
  •  113
    Closure, defeasibility and conclusive reasons
    Acta Analytica 22 (4). 2007.
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.
  •  144
    Epistemic closure, skepticism and defeasibility
    Synthese 188 (2): 197-215. 2012.
    Those of us who have followed Fred Dretske's lead with regard to epistemic closure and its impact on skepticism have been half-wrong for the last four decades. But those who have opposed our Dretskean stance, contextualists in particular, have been just wrong. We have been half-right. Dretske rightly claimed that epistemic status is not closed under logical implication. Unlike the Dretskean cases, the new counterexamples to closure offered here render every form of contextualist pro-closure mane…Read more
  •  1
    Russell on Meaning and Denotation: The Argument of 'on Denoting'
    Dissertation, Mcmaster University (Canada). 1992.
    The aim of the thesis is twofold. Firstly, it is argued that Frege's theory of meaning and denotation is the first successful non-psychologistic response to what has been called 'the puzzle of identity' and that, where Frege's theory differs most significantly from the theory of meaning and denotation developed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics and in his unpublished manuscripts on logic of 1903-1905, Russell was right. Secondly, it is shown that Russell was again right when he claimed…Read more
  • Klein, Skepticism, Epistemic Closure, and Evidential Underdetermination
    In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein, Springer Verlag. 2019.
  •  102
    What Moore's Paradox Is About
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1). 2001.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-parad…Read more
  •  3
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem (edited book)
    with Rodrigo Borges and Peter D. Klein
    Oxford University Press. 2017.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
  •  68
    Closure, Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons
    Acta Analytica 22 (4): 301-319. 2007.
    It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or epistemic rationality ) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate
  •  23
    Guest editorial
    with Stephen Hetherington
    Synthese 188 (2): 143-143. 2012.
  •  134
    What Moore’s Paradox Is About
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 33-58. 2001.
    On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore’s paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-parad…Read more
  •  47
    Racionalidade epistêmica e o Paradoxo de Moore
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 48-73. 2009.
    G. E. Moore identified a peculiar form of epistemic irrationality. Wittgenstein called it “Moore’s Paradox”. Neither of them knew exactly what he was talking about. And yet, the vast literature on the problem leaves no room for doubt: the paradox is deep; its resolution, elusive. But, up until now, we haven’t been in a position to appreciate its importance for contemporary epistemology. This paper puts forward an epistemological solution to the paradox. It also seeks to show that the paradox yie…Read more