Claudio Cormick

In this article, we try to argue, against McIntyre’s proposal in How to talk to a science denier, that there is a relevant difference between various forms of science denialism. Specifically, we contend that there is a significant distinction to be made between those forms of denialism which deny the existence of an expert consensus (the model of which is the strategy of the tobacco companies in the 1950s) and those which deny the probatory value of such expert consensus (on the basis, e.g., of conspiracy theories involving scientists). While McIntyre and others advocate for the value of communicating consensus as an effective and perfectly rational strategy against those forms of denialism which deceivingly deny the existence of scientific agreement, we argue that this approach becomes question-begging against those which deny its probatory value. Accordingly, then, we object to McIntyre’s characterization that “all science denial is basically the same” and suggest a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon.

En este trabajo, se propone una clasificación epistemológica teórica para el discurso astrológico a partir de evidencia empírica a fin de abordar el problema de cómo determinar específicamente qué es lo que lo hace ilegítimo. A partir de esta clasificación, se diseñó una intervención didáctica, enmarcada en el enfoque de Enseñanza de las Ciencias Naturales en Contexto (ECNC), con el objetivo de fomentar, en estudiantes de nivel secundario, la capacidad de distinguir enunciados cognoscitivamente ilegítimos -por infalsables o por falsos- respecto de aquellos que pueden constituir genuino conocimiento científico. La secuencia didáctica se implementó con un grupo de 51 estudiantes de 14 a 17 años. Se evaluó su impacto por comparación entre un pretest y un postest. Los resultados mostraron que su capacidad de discernimiento entre enunciados falsables y no falsables se incrementó apreciablemente.

En este artículo realizamos un relevamiento exhaustivo de las publicaciones de Médicos por la Verdad, uno de los principales grupos antivacunas de Latinoamérica, en la red social Twitter durante la pandemia de COVID-19. Clasificamos sus tipos de razonamiento y el contenido de sus mensajes y mostramos que las propuestas existentes de análisis de discursos anticientíficos no pueden aplicarse a este caso particular. Proponemos, en consecuencia, una nueva categorización y su aplicación focalizada en las herramientas disponibles para comunicadores de la ciencia, por un lado, y público no especializado, por el otro.

In this article, we tackle the phenomenon of what seems to be a misunderstanding between science education theory and philosophy of science−one which does not seem to have received any attention in the literature. While there seems to be a consensus within the realm of science education on limiting or altogether denying the explanatory role of scientific laws (particularly in contrast with “theories”), none of the canonical models of scientific explanation (covering law, statistical relevance, unification, mechanistic-causal, pragmatic) lends any support to this view of laws. We will reconstruct three different versions of this demotion of laws (i.e., laws are merely descriptive; laws are explanatory only of singular events, not of laws; laws are explanatory but only in a “superficial” way), propose possible grounds for them and illustrate why these perspectives pose a conceptual challenge as they contrast with epistemological approaches to the problem of explanation. We will also suggest the potential negative outcomes that would arise from science teachers adopting these approaches in the classroom when aiming to assist students in moving beyond mere description and towards explanation.

In recent years, several strategies have been proposed to tackle social controversies about topics in which science is settled, among which one of the most influential is that of Elizabeth Anderson, who argues that any lay person with access to the Internet and basic education can reliably assess the acceptability of various claims involving expert knowledge. In particular, the author shows that this procedure can be successfully applied to the case of anthropogenic global warming. In this article we will try to argue why, even if we concede that Anderson's proposal is satisfactory in that particular case, it fails to generalize when applied to other controversies. In this article, we illustrate it with the cases of flat-Eartherism and anti-vaxxerism.

This article discusses Rik Peels's response to Williams's argument against voluntary belief. Williams argues that voluntary beliefs must be acquired independently of truth-considerations, so they cannot count as beliefs after all, since beliefs aim at truth. Peels attempted to reply by showing that in cases of self-fulfilling beliefs, a belief can indeed be voluntarily acquired in conditions which retain the necessary truth-orientation. But even if we make two crucial concessions to Peels’s proposal, his argument ultimately fails. The first concession is that beliefs can be weakly voluntary-namely, we can acquire them at will though we do not preserve them at will but on the basis of evidence. Conceding this, however, only lands us in the “acquisition problem”: how a belief can be acquired qua belief when we still do not think we have justification for it. This leads us to the second concession: that knowing in advance that a certain belief is self-fulfilling provides us with such a justification. However, this concession lands us in the ultimate obstacle: that, precisely because such a justification is available both before and at the moment of forming the belief, the cognitive perspective of the subject is identical at both moments, which obscures what it even means to say that at a certain moment she started to have a belief.

It does not seem particularly daring to say that one objective of science education is to enable students to understand different phenomena in the world in their mutual relationship. This is roughly equivalent to promoting knowledge of scientific explanations, which involve resorting to regular relationships between certain phenomena and which, certainly, is different from knowledge of this or that type of event taken in isolation. In this text, we will draw attention to two opposing tendencies that, however, tend towards the common result of hindering the achievement of such an objective. On the one hand, we find characterizations of scientific explanation that assimilate it to argumentation and, therefore, lose sight of what specifically makes explanations explanatory; that is, they ask too little of a scientific explanation. On the other hand, those that consider paradigmatic cases of scientific explanation −such as those achieved by subsuming phenomena such as tides to Newton's laws− do not really constitute explanations but merely descriptions; it is about asking too much of an explanation here. We will therefore point out that a greater attention to the elaborations provided by the philosophy of science about the notion of explanation is crucial to better serve educational purposes.

According to Merleau-Ponty, psychologism, sociologism, and historicism, all of which describe human consciousness as “conditioned”, would be incompatible with any claim to knowledge. However, the reason why knowledge would require a postulate of the autonomy of consciousness remains little explored in the specialized literature. Therefore, in our work we try to separate different aspects of the skeptical problem analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and show that the conditioning of thought is associated, successively, with the possible opaque character of the foundations of our own grasp of the position; the possible ephemeral character of the objects of knowledge; and, finally, of the possible relativity of knowledge to our historical period. In other words, we see that Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, far from being monolithic, calls for three different solutions concerning the “crisis” of knowledge and that, in turn, the very problem that these are trying to solve is described by the phenomenologist in three different ways. We will also see that Merleau-Ponty’s own position during this period can be described as an internalist and universalist position.

In his last book, Le complexe des trois singes. Essai sur l’animalité humaine (2017), the French philosopher Étienne Bimbenet accuses “sensocentric” (« pathocentristes ») animal ethics of committing a performative contradiction: according to Bimbenet, these theories of animal rights — among which he focuses on the case of Zoopolis (2011) by Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka — would undermine themselves by means of declaring reason a “non-essential” feature of human beings, while at the same time those theories themselves can only be understood as a highly rational human endeavour. As we will try to point out, the alleged performative contradiction does not actually take place. First of all, Donaldson and Kymlicka only describe reason as “non essential” when it comes to describing moral patients, not moral agents, and particularly not moral theoreticians. In the second place, Zoopolis presents itself explicitly as an effort in “articulating moral reasons” — not as a renouncement of reason as such.

The article presents a brief reconstruction of naturalized epistemology, understood as a methodological approach. Three emblematic positions within naturalized epistemology are distinguished: rejection of apriorism inepistemology, favoring the use of the results of empirical science; attribution of an instrumental normativity to epistemology; and the thesis of the empirical assessability of the epistemic norms or principles. The text addresses the way in which, historically, these features are presented in the foundational works of Quine and Laudan. Furthermore, it studies how this project is applied by three authors: Howard Sankey, who links naturalism to the debate of epistemic relativism; and Louise Antony and Elizabeth Anderson, who make use of these ideas as a foundation for feminist epistemology. Through these “applications”, it is possible to appreciate that naturalizedepistemology does not lead to the elimination of normative aspects, as was feared by early critics of Quine. It is also possible to appreciate that the approach of Sankey is naturalized because it is empirically informed, but it still depends on a priori arguments. On the contrary, appropriations by feminist epistemology carry out the naturalization project in a deeper sense, that is, they introduce a set of epistemological premises that are themselves empirical.

RESUMEN Intentaremos continuar en este trabajo la propuesta de una solución a la paradoja de McTaggart a partir de la retoma de una línea de análisis que se remonta a Dummett, y su complementación con ciertas tesis de la fenomenología merleaupontyana. Para ello tendremos que profundizar las posiciones del autor de Truth and other enigmas en el sentido de la objeción contra una «descripción completa» de la realidad y que favorecen, por el contrario, de una pluralidad de «descripciones máximas». Nuestro intento no debe, sin embargo, adoptar un «pluralismo» que se exponga a las objeciones de Nicholas Smith, a quien replicaremos a su vez apelando a la noción fenomenológica de «síntesis de transición». Concluiremos que el «pluralismo» de descripciones temporales que nos permite escapar a la paradoja de McTaggart no resulta incompatible con el requisito de «componibilidad» planteado por Smith.PALABRAS CLAVE TIME, MERLEAU-PONTY, MCTAGGART, DUMMETT, SMITHABSTRACTIn this paper we attempt to continue the proposal of a solution to McTaggart’s paradox on the basis of a return to a line of analysis traceable back to Dummett, and its implementation with certain tenets of Merleau-Pontyan phenomenology. With this aim, we have to deepen the positions of the author of Truth and other enigmas which point towards an objection against one “complete description” of reality and favour, on the contrary, a plurality of “maximal descriptions”. Our attempt must not, however, adopt a “pluralism” which can be targeted by Nicholas Smith’s objections, to whom, in turn, we reply by turning to the phenomenological notion of “synthesis of transition”. We conclude that the “pluralism” of temporal descriptions that allows us to escape from McTaggart’s paradox is not incompatible with the requisite of “compossibility” laid out by Smith.KEYWORDS TIME, MERLEAU-PONTY, MCTAGGART, DUMMETT, SMITH.

In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our beliefs must be argumentative practice−declares that the only “ideal presupposed by discourse” is “that of being able to justify your beliefs to a competent audience”. We will consider two texts from 1971, -surprisingly neglected in most approaches to the debate-, in which Habermas did include such a “competence condition” to elucidate the notion of truth. We will discuss whether there are good reasons to relinquish such a condition and to refer, instead, only to the formal or procedural properties of argumentative exchanges, as Habermas does in presenting the notion of “ideal speech situation”. As we will try to argue, there are no such good reasons.

G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been raised to have them, this discovery does not modify what we believe. This seems to be irrational, but acknowledging that fact would entail that irrationality is much more widespread than we are, in principle, willing to accept. In this article we will focus on the solution proposed by Federico Penelas (2007), according to which the paradox can be dissolved by appealing to Rorty’s “ethnocentrism”. We will try to argue that this solution can work insofar as what supports our choice to retain our “convictions” is not theoretical in character, but practical. The reason why we can continue to support certain positions that lack neutral evidence in their favour is that it would be too costly not to do it—a condition which does not, nonetheless, make it any more probable that the positions in question are theoretically acceptable.

In this work, we will try to state the opposition between two approaches to the problem of the overall reliability of human knowing capacities, and a possible solution to that conflict. On the one hand, as we will point out, there exist a number of approaches that fall under the broad term of “evolutionary reliabilism” and according to which the reasons that we have for believing in the reliability of human cognition are empirical in character. Namely, the adaptive success of our species in a biological environment characterised by the survival of the fittest provides us with a reason to believe that our belief-forming mechanisms are truth-tracking; if they were not, we would have gone extinct. On the other hand, nevertheless, we find analyses—of which we will focus on the case of Ernest Sosa—according to which the tenet that our knowing capacities are reliable cannot be empirically based, and thus contingent; on the contrary, they point out that we need to presuppose—without need of a proof—that such capacities are trustworthy. Given this conflict between an “empirical” defence and a defence “in principle” of our knowing capacities, we will consider two possible objections against Sosa’s proposal and try to answer them.

En este trabajo nos referiremos al debate entre internismo y externismo epistemológicos a partir del episodio que constituye el debate entre Michael Williams y Alvin Goldman, que se expresa en el intercambio de trabajos presente en el volumen del año 2016 Goldman and his critics. Enmarcaremos esta discusión señalando que, mientras una serie de autores (en particular Laurence BonJour y, siguiendo su influencia, Jennifer Lackey y Fernando Broncano) extrae del debate internismo/externismo la consecuencia “dualista” de que el conocimiento no puede analizarse según un único eje, sino que hallamos al menos dos -el de la razonabilidad subjetiva y el de la conductividad a la verdad-, Goldman se presenta como un externista de “línea dura” para el cual el internismo es simplemente insostenible y la justificación epistémica ha de comprenderse exclusivamente en términos confiabilistas. Sobre este trasfondo, analizaremos la propuesta de Williams, quien por un lado busca probar que las críticas de Goldman al internismo quedan restringidas a una versión “mentalista” o “subjetivista”, y, por el otro, busca ratificar una epistemología internista moderada apoyándose en el señalamiento de que el conocimiento humano es indisociable de consideraciones de responsabilidad (accountability). Buscaremos probar que la réplica de Goldman, que se centra en denunciar una presunta confusión por Williams entre el problema del “estar justificado” y el del “justificar”, no hace justicia a la amplitud del problema de la justificación epistémica, una vez que este es abordado, no a partir de presuntas “intuiciones” sobre el significado de “conocimiento” en el lenguaje ordinario, sino a partir de las prácticas en las que nociones como esta pueden hacerse funcionar.

In a provocative, yet scarcely discussed, argument at the end of Knowing Full Well, Ernest Sosa has attempted to determine what kind of evidence we possess in support of the belief that our cognitive capacities as human beings are reliable. According to Sosa, we can appeal to considerations of coherence to prove that such capacities are reliable. However, Sosa also declares that such considerations are not “determinative, ultima facie” reasons−which is to say, they are to be regarded as defeasible. As we will try to point out, this overall strategy is ultimately incoherent. Furthermore, as we will argue, Sosa fails in attempting to provide us with an analogy between the case of doubting the reliability of the cognitive faculties of an individual and doubting such reliability in the case of the species.

Analizaremos aquí el intento de Richard Rorty y Michel Foucault de sobrepujar, desde una concepción del conocimiento como un hecho, la noción de “crítica de la ideología”. Intentaremos demostrar que incurren en una incomprensión de la “filosofía del sujeto” que los hace ignorar antecedentes de sus propias tesis, y que el materialismo extrae, de esta conciencia de la facticidad del pensamiento, consecuencias críticas que —por el contrario— en Foucault sucumben ante la indiferenciación total producida cuando se identifican facticidad y validez, y en Rorty son invertidas en un dogmatismo que exime de crítica los presupuestos que encuentra en su pensamiento.

Resumen: Ofreceré un análisis de la célebre crítica de la fenomenología de Merleau-Ponty en términos de una presunta oscilación entre “positivismo” y “escatología”. Como intentaré demostrar, atribuir al fenomenólogo francés una reducción “positivista” de la epistemología equivaldría a pasar por alto su insistencia en que nos apartemos de la autocomprensión que las ciencias empíricas ofrecen de sus propios resultados; esto es, a pasar por alto sus objeciones fenomenológicas a los marcos ontológicos ingenuos del “pensamiento objetivo”. En cuanto al cargo de “escatología”, al parecer en virtud de sus deudas con el pensamiento marxista, intentaré probar que, no se puede sostener una vez que se toma en consideración el carácter matizado de su aceptación de ciertos aspectos del materialismo histórico.: I will attempt to analyze Foucault’s famous critique of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in terms of an alleged oscillation between “positivism” and “eschatology”. As I will try to prove, attributing to Merleau-Ponty a “positivistic” reduction of epistemology would amount to overlooking his insistence on moving away from the self-interpretations that empirical sciences offer of their own results; that is to say, overlooking his phenomenological objections against the naïve ontological frames of “objective thinking”. As for the charge of “eschatology”, presumably applied to the phenomenologist by virtue of his debts to Marxist thought, I will try to show that -either understood in a strictly epistemological sense or in connection with an alleged Merleau-Pontyan adhesion to a philosophy of history- it proves untenable once we take into consideration the nuanced character of his acceptance of certain aspects of historical materialism.

Intentaremos completar el análisis de la relación entre Merleau-Ponty y distintas posiciones escépticas -típicamente restringido a textos más “canónicos” - a partir de su conferencia sobre Le primat de la perception. El fenomenólogo argumenta allí contra la “inducción pesimista” según la cual podemos, a la luz de la refutación de las hipótesis científicas pasadas, prever que las actuales son también falsas: invirtiendo la conclusión de esta inducción, afirma que las transformaciones de nuestro conocimiento son un proceso autocorrectivo, tal que ninguna hipótesis es abandonada sino en la medida en que otra aparece como mejor. Esto nos hará problematizar la noción de refutación científica en Merleau-Ponty, quien ofrece como modelo del progreso epistémico la mutua sustitución de creencias perceptivas, que no involucra la consideración consciente de criterios racionales. Según señalaremos, este punto de partida no puede extrapolarse al caso de hipótesis sopesadas según sus respectivas virtudes.

Se busca establecer una relación, no satisfactoriamente explorada, entre la fenomenología merleaupontiana del tiempo y un problema central de la “theory of time” analítica, la paradoja de McTaggart. Al clarificar, en polémica con Priest (1998), el auténtico sentido del “subjetivismo” merleaupontiano con respecto al tiempo, se señala cómo establecer una confluencia entre el acercamiento fenomenológico y las tesis desarrolladas por Michael Dummett como respuesta a la mencionada paradoja. Con los señalamientos de Dummett y la interpretación de Bimbenet acerca del “perspectivismo” merleaupontiano, se intenta una solución “situacional” a la paradoja.

Se busca establecer una relación, no satisfactoriamente explorada, entre la fenomenologia merleaupontiana del tiempo y un problema central de la "theory of time" analítica, la paradoja de McTaggart. Al clarificar, en polémica con Priest , el autêntico sentido del "subjetivismo" merleaupontiano con respecto al tiempo, se senala cómo establecer una confluencia entre el acercamiento fenomenológico y las tesis desarrolladas por Michael Dummett como respuesta a la mencionada paradoja. Con los senalamientos de Dummett y la interpretación de Bimbenet acerca del "perspectivismo" merleaupontiano, se intenta una solución "situacional" a la paradoja. The article seeks to establish a relationship that has not yet been explored satisfactorily between Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of time and a central issue of analytical "theory of time": McTaggart's paradox. By clarifying the authentic meaning of Merleau-Ponty's "subjectivism" regarding time, against Priest's interpretation , the article points out a convergence between the phenom-enological approach and Michael Dummett's theses developed in response to the abovementioned paradox. A "situational" solution to the paradox is attempted on the basis of Dummett's ideas and Bimbenet's interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's "perspectivism". Pretende-se estabelecer uma relação, não satisfatoriamente explorada, entre a fenomenologia merleau-pontiana do tempo e um problema central da "theory of time" analítica, o paradoxo de McTaggart. Ao esclarecer, em polémica com Priest , o autêntico sentido do "subjetivismo" merleau-pontiano a respeito do tempo, indica-se como estabelecer uma confluência entre a aproximação fenomenológica e as teses desenvolvidas por Michael Dummett como resposta ao mencionado paradoxo. Com as indicações de Dummett e a interpretação de Bimbenet sobre o "perspectivismo" merleau-pontiano, tenta-se uma solução "situacional" ao paradoxo

In the present work we try to return to the problem of Merleau-Ponty’s historic and political evaluation of action in the light of his accounts in Humanism and Terror and their updating in the last years by commentators such as Alexandre Hubeny, Leonardo Eiff and Jérôme Melançon. We will present some arguments against two very close related theses by Merleau-Ponty: that of the “objective” evaluation of action, which holds that the subjects behavior can be described as constituing a “betrayal” or a “crime” independently of any attribution of intentions to the agents and the thesis of the “objective” responsibility of the agent, that is, the tenet that affirms that the historic and political subjects can be “responsible” or “guilty” for an outcome of their actions, that they cannot have foreseen or can be the exact opposite for what they intended.