Claudio Michelon

Courts use inferences to the best explanation in many contexts and for a variety of purposes. Yet our understanding of lawyers’ uses of this inferential form is insufficient. In this article, after briefly introducing this inferential form, I set out to: (i) explain the structure of such arguments by reference to an argument scheme; (ii) clarify the types of claims courts support by deploying such inferences while attempting to justify acting in accordance with explanatory principles (inferences to the best explanation—principles, or IBE-Ps); (iii) offer an account of the ‘explanatory’ relationship on which IBE-P is predicated; (iv) explain what precisely can count as part of the explanandum in an IBE-P; and (v) discuss criteria that might be used to adjudicate which is the best among rival explanations.

This short piece is the introduction to the Special Issue on ‘Virtue and the Law’ published by Jurisprudence in March 2019 (vol 9, issue 1). It explains the scope of the project and its place in the unfolding of virtue jurisprudence that has occurred in the past few decades, as well as introducing the topics addressed in the volume. In the first couple of pages the authors/editors outline a very brief genealogy of virtue jurisprudence and of its relation to both legal theory and virtue theory. The rest of the text presents the contributions to the volume in turn, identifying some of the substantive issues addressed by each of them and their place in the investigation of the interface between virtue theory and legal theory.

The ability to identify all legally salient properties within a complex situation is a subjective trait necessarily possessed by a lawful person. This ability is better explained as a type of perception. The paper puts forward an account of the perception of legally salient properties in which perception affords a preliminary ordering of the total information received while allowing for the formation of a remainder that explains the peripheral legal perception experienced legal practitioners develop over time. After this account of legal perception is in place, the paper considers the relationship between this aspect of subjectivity and complete virtue, in particular, practical wisdom and lawfulness.

Successful accounts of analogy in law have two burdens to discharge. First, they must reflect the fact that the conclusion of an argument by analogy is a normative claim about how to decide a certain case. Second, they must not fail to accord relevance to the fact that the source case was authoritatively decided in a certain way. We argue in the first half of this paper that the common view of the structure of analogical arguments in law cannot overcome these hurdles. In the second half we develop an original account that aims to succeed where others failed.

This paper argues that the positive allocative decisions paradigmatically carried out by the application of legal rules are a necessary condition for arguments about particular justice (i.e., distributive and commutative justice) to make sense. If one shifts the focus from the distinction between distributive and commutative justice to what the two aspects of particular justice are for, namely, providing criteria to judge the allocation of goods, it becomes clear that the distinction is conceptually unstable. The paper argues that stabilizing the distinction is worthwhile and that this can only be accomplished by the introduction of positive allocation schemes