Claudio Rozzoni

From a Platonistic perspective, ideas are eternal and unchanging, constituting the foundation of reality. An idea itself does not change; it is a principle, immutable in essence. This approach inherently establishes a hierarchy, valuing the world of ideas—understood as objective truth—over the sensory world—seen as deceptive and unstable. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the nature of musical ideas as they emerge from Marcel Proust’s work, exploring their potentially antiplatonistic implications and the philosophical insights they inspired in influential 20th-century thinkers.

The publication of Husserliana XXIII "Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung" in 1980 and John B. Brough's translation of it in 2005 increased interest in Edmund Husserl's philosophy of depiction. This volume is the first comprehensive book collection in English that provides a systematic reading of Husserl's theory of depictive image consciousness. The book explains the meaning of various concepts in Husserl's philosophy of depiction-such as f - and examines the range and limits of the application of Husserl's depictive image consciousness to various art practices and media, and to other mental acts, e.g., phantasy, memory. The book discusses, among other topics, empathy, symbolic presentation and the aesthetic experience of depictions. Additionally, the book compares Husserl's theory of depiction with that of other philosophers, notably Franz Brentano, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Roman Ingarden, Leopold Blaustein and Jean Baudrillard. Husserl on Depiction will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in phenomenology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of art, aesthetics and pictorial representation.

As early as 1905, Husserl made clear that, when it comes to aesthetic consideration, our “interest” is not directed toward the existence of the object as such, but rather toward the object’s way of appearance. Husserl’s famous letter to Hofmannsthal (1907) goes as far as to suggest that any existential concerns are potentially even a menace to the purity of aesthetic experience. This position clearly echoes Kant’s account of aesthetic judgment presented in the third Critique, notably as regards the notion of disinterestedness. However, this is not tantamount to claiming that aesthetic attitude implies the suspension of all interest: this paper aims to show that it would be more appropriate to discuss it in terms of a change of interest: from an existential interest to an axiological one.

L’« artification » peut être conçue comme un processus entraînant « le passage du non-art à l’art ». Selon une perspective phénoménologique (notamment husserlienne), ce passage semble impliquer deux mouvements neutralisants qui le constituent et que l’on pourrait nommer « imagification » et « esthétisation ». D’une part, une telle neutralisation est l’indice d’une suspension de tout intérêt, à la fois de l’artiste et du spectateur, pour l’existence ou la non-existence de « l’objet artifié » (Husserl reprend et relance ici une ligne kantienne). D’autre part, ce désintéressement ouvre en même temps l’expérience, pour l’artiste et pour le spectateur, à un intérêt diffèrent, à savoir un intérêt axiologique visant à une saisie de valeurs.

Our environment is changing rapidly, as is the spectrum of possible relationships we can entertain with it. Against this background, one important task emerging in contemporary philosophical discussion concerns defining the status of contemporary images and the "iconic spaces" we encounter with ever-increasing frequency in their various forms. Within this context, the dimension of perception seems to be losing its primacy over the image, making a philosophical description of the relationships between image and reality all the more necessary. Among images, the classical distinction between documentary and fiction has been drastically called into question, and along with it the nature of the emotions and values we experience in these two domains. Rozzoni promotes a phenomenology of the image, that is, a return to a description of images that starts from their essential features while avoiding simplistic dichotomies. By elucidating images’ intimate relationship with phantasy and aesthetic experience and their role in shaping our experience of "reality," this book develops a perspectival notion of "truth" intended to shed light on our contemporary interactions with images and the events, emotions, and values we experience through them.

This monographic section of “Itinera” develops some of the questions which were raised at the summer school “Aesthetics, Technique and Emotion”, held in June 2020 at the Lake Como School of Advanced Studies (https://aeat.lakecomoschool.org/). The summer school was organized by the University of Milan in collaboration with the European Seminar of Aesthetics (https://sites.unimi.it/eu_aesthetics/). The aim of the school was to investigate the meaning of aesthetics today, in light of the different changes that are occurring in our aesthetic perception of the world. How is technology transforming the way we view the world and art, and what role do emotions still play in this context? What is the value of the performing arts in facing these new challenges, and how is aesthetic experience related to the current issues of morality and politics? These are some of the problems that were raised at the school and this issue seeks to develop them further.

L’espace esthétiqueLe « renversement du cartésianisme » chez Deleuze et Merleau-PontyCet essai se propose de développer le rapport entre Deleuze et Merleau-Ponty à partir de la tentative des deux philosophes français d’aller au-delà du courantde pensée qu’on pourrait qualifi er, comme le fait Merleau-Ponty lui-même, de « cartésianisme ».Nous commençons notre itinéraire avec la critique que les deux philosophes adressent à la notion cartésienne de « ligne » – passage obligé pour penser, à travers Leibniz et sa notion de « point », la ligne en tant qu’« ensemble de points ». On cherche ensuite à penser une ligne qui ne serait plus tracée dans un espace objectif présupposé, mais plutôt qui « se trace » dans un « espace expressif ».Un tel renversement de la « ligne cartésienne » produit, comme on le verra, des effets qui intéressent également la représentation de la ligne du temps. Émanciper cette dernière du modèle cartésien signifi e la penser par-delà toute référence chronologique, toute dépendance du temps de Kronos. On peut lire dans ce sens la tentative des deux philosophes pour penser le temps de l’événement, le temps de l’Aion. On verra enfin comment, d’un espace et d’un temps anticartésiens, doit naître, pour Merleau-Ponty et Deleuze, une nouvelle grammaire porteuse d’une nouvelle compréhension de la métaphore. Ni l’idée de métaphore proposée par Merleau-Ponty, ni le concept de devenir créé par Deleuze ne concernent une ressemblance fondée sur une identité donnée. Si la métaphore merleau-pontienne et le devenir deleuzien doivent être en mesure de restituer l’essence d’une chose, une telle essence se trouve, ou mieux se crée,à partir d’un mouvement vers « ce que la chose n’est pas ». C’est précisément dans ce sens que Merleau-Ponty lit la métaphore proustienne et que Deleuze cherche à rendre compte des ressemblances créées dans l’oeuvre de Gombrowicz.The Aesthetic SpaceThe “Reversal of Cartesianism” in Deleuze and Merleau-PontyThe present essay proposes to explore the relationship between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty from the attempt they make to go beyond the current of thought thatwe may qualify, like Merleau-Ponty does it himself, as Cartesianism. We begin our itinerary with the critique that both philosophers direct at the Cartesian notion of the line. The passage through the Cartesian notion of the line is “obligated” in order to think – by means of Leibniz and his notion of point -- the line as a “set of points.” The Cartesian passage is obligated moreover in order to think a line which could no longer be drawn in a presupposed objective space but, rather, which would be “drawn” in an “expressive space.” Such a reversal of the Cartesian line, as we shall see, produces effects that concern also the representation of the line of time. To emancipate the line of time from the Cartesian model means we must think beyond all chronological references, beyond all dependence on the time of Chronos. We are able to read, in this way, both philosophers’ attempt to think the time of the event, the time of Aion. Finally we shall see how, for Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, a new grammar carrying a new understanding of the metaphor must be born from an anti-Cartesian space and time. Neither the idea of metaphor proposed by Merleau-Ponty nor the concept of becoming created by Deleuze speaks of a resemblance founded upon an identity that is given ahead of time. If Merleau-Ponty’s idea of metaphor and Deleuze’s concept of becoming must be able to produce the essence of a thing, such an essence finds, or better, it iscreated on the basis of a movement toward “what the thing is not.” It is precisely in this sense that Merleau-Ponty reads Proust’s metaphors and that Deleuze will seek to give an account of created resemblances in the work of Gombrowicz.

The œuvreof Portuguese photographer Jorge Molder can be construed as a series of series. These series are filled with a wealth of absent presences, of possibilities that arise and fade without ever reaching actualization or confirmation, thereby contributing to create a ‘detective-story’ atmosphere. This also proves to be true as regards Molder’s own body. Indeed, his face, his hands are recurrent “subjects” running through his 40 years of work. Even so, when we ask who the man is that we see in Molder’s series, the answer is problematic. On the one hand, we know it is “him”, insofar as he himself is the model for his iconic “constructions”. On the other hand, Molder’s images are not “self-portraits” aiming to reveal the essence of his self, but rather “self-representations” creating a peculiar “character” who is and yet is not him: a double.

The sublime is a concept that has never ceased to attract and to fascinate scholars. In its classical formulation, it dates back to the eighteenth century, but some of the issues that characterize its origin – such as the border between representation and the unrepresentable, or between form and formless, pleasure and terror – return strongly in contemporary thinking. In this regard, opinions are divided. Is the sublime an already outdated notion that can only be discussed from a historical point of view? Or does it also contain important elements for the current philosophical debate? Moreover, have the transformations that the sublime has undergone in the contemporary world substantially distorted it, or have they instead brought to light some new possible implications of this concept? This issue of "Itinera" is dedicated to these and other similar questions, starting from the traditional definitions of the sublime between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, until its most recent interpretations.

Haneke’s 1997 adaptation of Franz Kafka’s Das Schloß is thus far his last work for television[1]. Although «the Austrian film almanac lists» it «as a feature film» and it «was released in Austrian cinemas before its television première» [2], Haneke has always professed The Castle to be a TV film adaption, «an honorable enterprise» aimed at «bring[ing] literature closer to an audience» [3]. This is a significant remark, as it conveys a belief that this specific double status – qua TV product and qua adaption of a literary work –prevents film adaptation from being considered «autonomous art». For one, he states, a work destined for TV by definition «serves audience expectations». For another, as an adaptation, a work is necessarily dependent upon its original source. [1] Before being well-known as a very influential film director, Michael Haneke began working for television in 1967. His first TV film, i.e., After Liverpool, was released long before his first feature film, Der siebente Kontinent, which was issued in 1989. This should not come as a surprise, since «practically every German-speaking filmmaker» at that time «started out directing films for television, taking advantage of the relatively generous system of subsidies and the general openness of German and Austrian state television channels to aesthetic innovation». In any case, Haneke later specified that directing for television was not solely a matter of opportunity, but also a fitting milieu in which to develop his own style. [2] However, that reportedly happened against Haneke’s will: «The Castle, for example, was in fact made for television, even though it will now be shown in movie houses as well. In my view, film adaptations are not genuine works of art. And I don’t really know of any film adaptation that really worked very well». Later he will confirm this point: «I would not have dared to turn The Castle into a movie for the big screen». [3] Let us note that this does not imply that Haneke feels a work formally presented as an adaptation cannot result in a great feature film. However, properly speaking, such a film could no longer be called an adaptation, since «it is not possible to serve two masters at the same time». Haneke is quite categorical on this point: «Thus one has to decide. Either I use a book as a quarry for ideas for something that I want to create myself, then it is a failed project as a film adaptation, or it is to be a film for a television program that has a commitment to cultural standards».

Starting from Arthur Danto’s The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, we take into consideration two works of art – Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain and Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box – where the notion of interpretation, according to the American philosopher, plays a prominent role in the process of creation. By focusing on the legacy of Duchamp’s and Warhol’s works, in the light of the Deleuzian notions of Humor and Irony, this paper shows that the two artists can be considered as the first promoters of the “aesthetics of surfaces”. Particularly, Warhol seems to listen to the “superficial claim” of the artificial, that is to say a copy of a copy, that can be brought «to the point where is reversed into the simulacrum».

In un panorama come quello contemporaneo, in cui gli studi sulla nozione di immagine proliferano attraversando molteplici ambiti disciplinari, questo volume propone un'analisi fenomenologica dell'immagine volta a descriverne le strutture essenziali e a indagarne il rapporto con la realtà. Più in particolare, a partire dagli scritti husserliani sulla fantasia e sull'immagine, il testo mira a mostrare come le distinzioni fatte emergere dall'occhio fenomenologico possano risultare decisive per la caratterizzazione dell'esperienza estetica, nella quale sembra messo fuori gioco l'interesse per l'esistenza delle cose e nella quale ci è dato di cogliere, sentendolo, un peculiare «valore». Tale aspetto viene qui sviluppato non solo su un piano prettamente teoretico, ma anche mediante un confronto con artisti le cui opere non cessano di sollevare questioni che sondano il confine fra realtà e finzione.

The œuvre of Portuguese photographer Jorge Molder can be construed as a series of series. These series are filled with a wealth of absent presences, of possibilities that arise and fade without ever reaching actualization or confirmation, thereby contributing to create a ‘detective-story’ atmosphere. This also proves to be true as regards Molder’s own body. Indeed, his face, his hands are recurrent “subjects” running through his 40 years of work. Even so, when we ask who the man is that we see in Molder’s series, the answer is problematic. On the one hand, we know it is “him”, insofar as he himself is the model for his iconic “constructions”. On the other hand, Molder’s images are not “self-portraits” aiming to reveal the essence of his self, but rather “self-representations” creating a peculiar “character” who is and yet is not him: a double.