Claus Asbjørn Andersen

The single most important motif in Formalist literature, from the beginnings of the Formalist tradition in the early fourteenth century until the adoption of Formalist discussions into the Cursus philosophici of Early Modern Scholasticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the assumption of a plurality of different kinds of distinctions. John Duns Scotus’s formal distinction, of course, plays a crucial role in, and indeed lends name to, this whole literature. Some early Scotists, however, were not content with discussing this peculiar metaphysico- theological invention of Scotus, but rather felt motivated to ask themselves whether there may not in fact be still other ways to distinguish among various aspects of reality. From the very outset, two models competed for acceptance: the model of Francis of Meyronnes (1285–1328) with four kinds of distinctions, and the elaborate doctrine of Petrus Thomae († 1340) with no less than seven different kinds. Though Meyronnes had his followers (known as Maronistae) in the fifteenth century, in the long run Peter’s model was more successful: It remained a topic of critical discussion until as late as the eighteenth century, long after its inventor’s name was forgotten. Even authors critical of the idea that we do indeed need seven different kinds of distinctions in order to grasp reality continued to discuss Petrus Thomae’s distinctions, albeit often with Meyronnes’s modal distinction added on top of them. In this present article, I argue that the long-term success of Petrus Thomae’s doctrine was owed to two extremely influential Scotists active in Paris in the 1480s, Étienne Brulefer (1450/55–1496/99) and Antoine Sirect († ca. 1510). While Brulefer was in favour of a return to a more parsimonious economy of distinctions, Sirect opted for a revised version of Petrus Thomae’s doctrine. In this present contribution, I shall briefly outline Petrus Thomae’s original doctrine, articulated in his Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum; I shall then investigate how the two Renaissance Scotists responded to the individual parts of the doctrine, i. e., the seven kinds of distinctions; finally, by way of conclusion, the consequences drawn by Brulefer and Sirect from their concern with the seven distinctions, and some later reactions, are considered.

This introductory chapter sets the frame for the volume Distinction and Identity in Late-Scholastic Thought and Beyond. Distinction theory, along with its ontological implications, was in the focus of a special literature that developed from the early fourteenth century onwards. The concepts of identity and distinction were thus under special scrutiny in the so-called Formalist treatises that had roots in Late-Medieval scholasticism, especially in the works of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus († 1308) and his early followers. This literature enjoyed vast diffusion during the Renaissance and still played a significant role in textbooks of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Formalist tradition has never before been the subject matter of a collective volume. While the scope of the present book is much wider than just the Formalist tradition and its peculiar literature, the contention of the book – and certainly of this introduction – is that this particular tradition within late scholasticism had an enormous impact both on contemporary and later thought. Much of the development, external to Formalism properly speaking, in philosophical and theological discourse concerning distinctions and identity may be viewed as – immediate or more remote – repercussions exactly of the Formalist tradition.

This volume aims to document the historical emergence of the various types of distinctions in medieval philosophy, highlighting in particular the emergence of the Formalist tradition that had its roots in the works of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus († 1308) and his early followers. This literature enjoyed vast diffusion during the Renaissance and still played a significant role in textbooks of scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It framed the early-modern debates about the distinction between body and mind or matter and extension. This book provides an important case for a much-needed revision of the relationship between “Medieval” and “Early Modern” philosophy – these categories are too often used to signal some fundamental divide in intellectual history, where in fact there was continuity. It deals with many figures who have been little studied to date as well as canonical thinkers such as Francisco Suárez and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

John Duns Scotus famously differentiates between an intuitive kind of cognition of objects which are present to the mind “in their own existence” (i.e., not owing to a representing medium) and an abstractive kind of cognition which is indifferent to its objects’ existence or non-existence and presence or non-presence. There is scholarly agreement on the historical importance of this differentiation; in Stephen D. Dumont’s words, it is “by all accounts one of the most influential philosophical contributions of Duns Scotus,” and according to Katherine H. Tachau, “the history of medieval theories of knowledge from ca. 1310 can be traced as the development of this dichotomy.” Accordingly, these and other scholars have uncovered both the historical background to Scotus’s doctrine in the discussion over the scientific status of theology in the generation preceding Scotus and its immediate, i.e., early 14th-century, reception. Besides the overwhelming, positive as well as critical, response to Scotus’s differentiation in late medieval discussions of theological epistemology, his doctrine also has an important long-term Wirkungsgeschichte in post-medieval scholasticism. This latter fact has slipped the attention of most historians of scholastic philosophy, if for no other reason than general neglect of the long continuation of the Latin scholastic tradition well into the Early Modern period. The present study falls into three parts. The first part explores Mastri’s and Belluto’s discussion of intuitive and abstractive cognition in their Disputations on De anima, being a preparation for the second part which focuses on Mastri’s dealing with the relationship between this theme and that of distinctions and precisions in his Disputations on Metaphysics. The third part undertakes a short appreciation of Mastri’s and Belluto’s influence in subsequent Scotist discussions of intuitive and abstractive cognition, especially in the context of distinction theory. Authors discussed are: Sebastian Dupasquier, Crescentius Krisper, Alipius Locherer, Marinus Panger, and Kilian Kazenberger.

The Disputationes Theologiae from 1655 of Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) is structured after the model of the medieval commentaries on Peter Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences and hence has a large section in the first part on divine knowledge. Within this section, called Disputation on the Divine Intellect (Disputatio de Divino Intellectu), Mastri’s long and nuanced discussion of divine foreknowledge merits particular attention. In the time of Mastri, the theological issue of divine foreknowledge and its relation to human freedom had gained particular prominence, with the Jesuits and the Thomists each opting for their particular doctrine on this subject as well as the related topics of grace and predestination, thereby competing to establish the definitive Roman Catholic reaction to the Protestant and Reformed views on these matters. Mastri, entering the debate at a rather late stage (almost half a century after Paul V’s famous attempt in 1607 to call off the controversy De Auxiliis by prohibiting any further polemics on the subject of grace), sets out to locate a clearly Scotist position in this rather peculiar historical landscape called Early Modern theology. This article discusses Mastri's contribution to the debate and highlights its coherence with other aspects of Mastri's doctrine of divine knowledge.

2024 marks the 400th anniversary of the publication of Theodor Smising’s giant volume De Deo Uno (printed in Antwerp in 1624), which was soon followed by a second volume, De Deo Trino (printed in Antwerp in 1626). Smising’s work was the first printed output of what developed into a specific tradition within early modern thought, the Louvain tradition of Scotism, itself but one part of the broad Scotist tradition that build upon the thought of John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266–1308). This Louvain tradition was primarily based in the Franciscan Convent of the Holy Trinity in the famous university town. The convent itself was much older, dating back to around 1230, when the Franciscan Order was in its very beginnings and long before the University of Louvain was founded (in 1425). In 1607 a second Franciscan Convent was founded in Louvain, St. Anthony’s College, one of a series of convents established by the Irish Franciscans as a result of their persecution in their homeland by the English Protestant rulers. The Irish Franciscans in Louvain, and in their other convents on the European continent, also cultivated the intellectual heritage of Duns Scotus, editing and commenting on his works and writing new works “ad mentem Scoti.” Both of the Franciscan convents in Louvain were closed in the turmoil after the French Revolution. The buildings of St. Anthony’s College still exist, whereas the older “Minderbroedersklooster” (on our exhibition poster) completely vanished from the cityscape. In recent decades, the Maurits Sabbe Library has acquired a large fund of Franciscan books, mostly from various houses of the Franciscan Order in Belgium that have closed their doors. Our exhibition “Scotism Made in Louvain – The Scholastic Culture of the Franciscans in Belgium” explores this material, complemented by material from the KU Leuven Central Library’s Special Collections and two manuscripts from the archives of KADOC (Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum voor Religie, Cultuur en Samenleving). The exhibition tells the story of a significant local scholarly tradition which is placed in the context of the broader Scotist tradition of the Early Modern Period. Whereas Scholasticism as such is often seen as an exclusively medieval phenomenon, our exhibition highlights one important aspect of early modern scholastic culture. The three brief articles included in this catalogue provide an introduction to John Duns Scotus’s thought, investigate the institutional background of Louvain Scotism, and explore some of the most important aspects of the scholastic output of the Franciscans in Louvain. The numbers attached to the images refer to the annotated list of all exhibits. A virtual exhibition with additional photo material will accompany, and last beyond, the library exhibition.

The Formalist tradition in late-scholastic philosophy has gone unnoticed in standard historiography. This article’s overall objective is to add the Formalist tradition to what we know about Renaissance philosophy. I first show how the Formalist tradition was born out of some innovative considerations of hierarchies of distinctions in the wake of the Franciscan John Duns Scotus’s teaching on the formal distinction in the beginning of the fourteenth century (especially Francis of Meyronnes’s model of four distinctions and Petrus Thomae’s more elaborate doctrine of seven kinds of distinctions). I then trace how Formalist literature developed from being an exclusively Franciscan affair to becoming a much more widespread phenomenon. Thus, from the decades up to 1500 and onwards, authors from various late-scholastic schools (Thomism, Lullism, Averroism, and others) produced Formalist literature, i.e., treatises on multiple kinds of distinctions. I highlight particularly how one Franciscan philosopher of the sixteenth century, Jean Du Douet, proposed to view the Formalist preoccupation with distinctions as a discipline in its own right, a proper scientia formalitatum. I finally argue that while this proposal met with dismissive reactions, Du Douet’s idea does in fact reflect the role Formalism played in the scholastic curriculum in the late sixteenth century, at least in Franciscan milieus.

The ontological status of esse cognitum was at the center of complex debates throughout the Scotist tradition (Alnwick vs. Aesculo, Mastri vs. Punch). This article investigates the Scotist Angelo Volpe’s discussion of esse cognitum enjoyed by possible creatures in the divine intellect. Volpe responds to two religious warnings, one against assuming any eternal real being for merely possible creatures, and a second against depriving God’s eternal knowledge of a corresponding object, since that would endanger this knowledge itself. Volpe opts for a solution that allows possible creatures the status of beings of reason (entia rationis) due to their own ontological merit, and the status of real beings (entia realia) due to God’s knowing that they as possibles are not in opposition to real existence. He rejects the view that esse cognitum is a kind of being that holds a middle position between real being and being of reason. Volpe’s historical significance is emphasized.

The year 2021 saw the publication of Sven K. Knebel’s new book on Middle Knowledge. It is an exceedingly important research publication which deserves scholarly attention. The book contains a long introduction (consisting of various studies) and an edition of the fourth book of the Irish Jesuit theologian Luke Wadding’s incomplete work on scholastic theology. This present review article first recapitulates the origins and historical significance of the doctrine of Middle Knowledge. Then Knebel’s book as well as the career of Luke Wadding are introduced. I then discuss the place of Wadding’s work in the Jesuit discourse of ‘concordia’ and its relation to Molinism. In the subsequent sections, I investigate various doctrines defended by Wadding. These include his view of disjunctive necessity, his variant of the doctrine known as ‘connectionism’, and his use of various kinds of distinctions in theology. The study concludes with a critical assessment of Knebel’s publication. Despite all praise, I disagree with Knebel’s all too pessimistic view of the research landscape: We will soon be pondering over why Early Modern scholasticism has received so much attention in recent scholarship, rather than why it did not do so in the past.

Bartolomeo Mastri’s Disputations on Metaphysics is the single most important work on metaphysics produced in the Scotist school during the Early Modern period. This contribution guides through the work by highlighting a selection of key passages that convey an impression of its historical-literary context, its subject matter, its main motifs and scientific aims, but also its limitations. Especially, we see Mastri emphasizing the theological aspect of theology, though he in the end refrains from exploring this aspect of metaphysics within his work on metaphysics. I suggest that this discrepancy between Mastri’s concept of metaphysics and his work on metaphysics showcases the difficulty of organizing this discipline during the phase of transition from the traditional commentary format typical of medieval scholasticism to the Early Modern scholastic Cursus philosophicus literature.

This chapter uncovers a less investigated aspect of the relationship between the two most important scholastic schools of the Renaissance, Thomism and Scotism: the influence of Scotist literature on distinctions as seen in some sixteenth-century Thomists. The chapter has a primary focus on Chrysostomus Javelli’s engagement in his discussion of divine attributes with the Scotist doctrine of distinctions, but also considers other Thomist sources. First, the beginnings of the highly specialised Scotist literature on distinctions are traced back to the start of the fourteenth century; I show how some early followers of Duns Scotus, in particular Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae, systematised Scotus’ ontology of the various grades of being by compiling lists of subtle distinctions to be applied to various levels of reality. I give some indications as to the later reception of these models of distinctions in the Scotist school. Special attention is paid to Étienne Brulefer, since his summary of Petrus Thomae’s model of seven distinctions was Javelli’s source for the Scotist doctrine. I then investigate how Javelli worked with Brulefer’s summary, and how he sought to integrate the Scotist doctrine into his own discussion of divine attributes. Thomists traditionally allowed only a rational or mental kind of distinction among divine attributes, and between them and the divine essence. Javelli, however, endeavours to show how the Thomist position may be reconciled with the Scotist doctrine of a formal or ex natura rei distinction. He did not always endorse this conciliatory approach; I hypothesise that he changed his mind on the subject over time. Finally, I show how other Renaissance Thomists reacted to the Scotist system of distinctions; in particular, I draw attention to the Thomists Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, Bartolomeo Manzoli, and Mattia Gibboni da Aquario, who all wrote treatises on Thomist distinction theory modelled on the Scotist system of distinctions. In some of this literature, lists of distinctions based on Thomist metaphysics were compiled in order to replace the Scotist system. I argue that Javelli’s approach is more conciliatory and, in fact, has some overlap with the concordist thought of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who himself considered Scotus and Aquinas to be in fundamental agreement as regards the distinction between divine attributes.

The Cistercian Jaume Janer († after 1506) was the most prolific student of Pere Daguí, the first professor in the Lullist Studium on Majorca, and became himself, by royal privilege from the Crown of Aragon, the leader of a similar institution in Valencia. Janer’s and Daguí’s brand of Lullism embraced elements from Scotism. In particular, Janer in three of his works discussed the system of distinctions put forward by Peter Thomae, one of Duns Scotus’s early followers. This preoccupation with Scotist distinction theory remained a doctrinal centerpiece of eclectic Lullism at least until the second half of the seventeenth century.

This essay argues that what is provoking about Ibn Rushd today is not his stance on such topics as the eternity of the world, God's knowledge of singular things, or the immortality of the soul. It is rather his radical philosophical elitisim, i.e., his view that every religion has room for philosophy, but only for the few - the majority must simply follow holy writ and leave all questioning and allegorical interpretation to those few individuals who possess sufficient training in apodictic thinking. I start out with chapters on Salman Rushdie and his view of Ibn Rushd in the novel Two Years, Eight Months and Twenty-Eight Nights and the reception of Ibn Rushd in the Latin scholastic tradition. I then switch to Ibn Rushd’s biography and the context of his work in Almohad Andalusia. I provide an overview of the development of Islamic philosophy up until Ibn Rushd. I then, in five chapters, offer a detailed reading of his fatwa in defense of philosophy (called the Decisive Treatise). I conclude with some general remarks on the relationship between metaphysics and politics in Ibn Rushd’s works, drawing parallels to other thinkers both in the Islamic and in the Western tradition. The book ends with a selection of Danish-language translations of texts by Ibn Rushd that were translated into Latin during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (his Letter to a friend concerning God’s knowledge of singular things, the last chapter of the Incoherence of the Incoherence, and commenta 5 and 36 from the Commentary on De anima III).

ENGLISH SUMMARY. Baroque-age Scotist philosophy was, on the one hand, characterised by recourse to the Medieval philosopher-theologian John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and, on the other hand, by accommodation to trends in contemporary scholasticism, first of all that of the Jesuits. What kind of metaphysics did this particular constellation within the history of philosophy produce? In order to answer this question, the present book analyses the Disputations on Metaphysics by the most important representative of Early Modern Scotism, Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673). In addition, the book investigates a multitude of scarcely or never studied works on metaphysics from the Franciscan scholastic tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries. The peculiar profile of a forgotten philosophical tradition with its astonishing plurality becomes apparent. By focusing on a phenomenon from the history of philosophy outside the mainstream, this volume contributes to a markedly more differentiated view of the intellectual culture in Early Modern Europe than offered in most popular historiography of philosophy.

For more than four decades around the middle of the sixteenth century, Giacomino Malafossa from Barge held the Scotist chair of metaphysics at the University of Padua. In his A Question on the Subject of Metaphysics, in Which Is Included the Question, Whether Metaphysics Is a Science, he developed a remarkable stance on the subject matter of metaphysics. Metaphysics has two objects: being qua being and God. However, only when it deals with the latter object can it be said to be a science in a strict sense. The reason is that the strict Aristotelian notion of science presupposes that the object of any science has demonstrable properties, which is the case with God, but not with being as being. Although being qua being does have certain properties, namely the transcendentals, these cannot be truly demonstrated. Malafossa’s Quaestio bears witness both to the clash between Averroism and Scotism at the Italian Renaissance universities and to the complexity of the Scotist tradition itself. This introductory article highlights Malafossa’s sources and traces the critical reception of his views among later Scotist authors.