This paper provides an interpretation of the significance of the Eleatic Stranger’s systematic model of philosophy in Plato’s Sophist. While the Stranger and Socrates have been interpreted as opposing models of the philosopher, most scholars have taken Plato to advocate for one at the expense of the other. In opposition to this, I argue that Plato represents the Stranger and Socrates as two contrasting yet necessary models of the task of the philosopher. I argue that the Stranger’s value-neutral…
Read moreThis paper provides an interpretation of the significance of the Eleatic Stranger’s systematic model of philosophy in Plato’s Sophist. While the Stranger and Socrates have been interpreted as opposing models of the philosopher, most scholars have taken Plato to advocate for one at the expense of the other. In opposition to this, I argue that Plato represents the Stranger and Socrates as two contrasting yet necessary models of the task of the philosopher. I argue that the Stranger’s value-neutral method of division presupposes a Parmenidean identity between thought and being, which is threatened by the sophist’s expertise in antilogic. The Stranger justifies the intelligibility of being with his account of the combination of kinds. However, by drawing attention to the inability of the Stranger’s model of philosophy to account for evaluative commitment, Plato implies that this systematic method must be supplemented by the Socratic model of philosophy.
