•  2
    From November 5 to November 22, 2019, the University of Milan hosts an exhibition in which philosophy and its problems are staged in playful and interactive forms. Like any catalog, this volume also intends to document the objects and themes proposed to the visitor. But it also has a more ambitious goal: to imagine and design the spaces of that Museum of Philosophy which, we are sure, will be created here in Milan, starting from the experience of this exhibition--Translated, via Google, from pag…Read more
  •  307
    Mirrors, Windows, and Paintings
    Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 1 22-32. 2022.
    What do we see in a mirror? There is an ongoing debate whether mirrors present us with images of objects or whether we see, through the mirror, the objects themselves. Roberto Casati has recently argued that there is a categorical difference between images and mirror-reflections. His argument depends on the observation that mirrors, but not paintings, are sensitive to changes in the observer’s prospective. In our paper we scrutinize Casati’s argument and present a modal argument that shows that …Read more
  •  225
    In the last twenty years, beginning with a seminal paper by Dagfinn Follesdal published in 1969,1 analytic philosophy has shown a renewed and increasing interest in Husserl's phenomenology. 2 In Husserl and Inten- tionality, David Woodruff Smith and Ronald Mclntyre give an important contribution to this line of research. The book is written in the analytic tradition, and represents in part an attempt at making phenomenology palatable to those who look suspiciously at 'continental philos…Read more
  • Elisabetta ZAMBRUNO, 'La "Theologia Deutsch" o la via per giungere a Dio. Antropologia e simbolismo teologico' (review)
    Revue de Théologie Et de Philosophie 126 (n/a): 387. 1994.
  •  12
    Perceptual Illusions: Philosophical and Psychological Essays (edited book)
    Palgrave Macmillan. 2012.
    Although current debates in epistemology and philosophy of mind show a renewed interest in perceptual illusions, there is no systematic work in the philosophy of perception and in the psychology of perception with respect to the concept of illusion and the relation between illusion and error. This book aims to fill that gap.
  •  48
    Tip-of-the-tongue experiences have an intriguing and insidious character. Some philosophers have tried to reduce them to more common states, with some considering these experiences to be beliefs about one’s state of knowledge, and still others considering them feelings about one’s state of knowledge. These two latter views are not mutually exclusive; indeed, one might hold a mixed theory, according to which the TOT is a feeling that depends constitutively on a belief. In the paper I first argue …Read more
  •  9
    The Far Side of Things: Seeing, Visualizing and Knowing
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 335-346. 2015.
  •  528
    Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and th…Read more
  •  3
    Are Monads Intentional Systems?
    Studia Leibnitiana. Sonderheft 32. 2004.
  • Emozioni e causalità mentale
    Discipline Filosofiche 8 (2). 1998.
  •  13
    Leibnizian Pleasures
    Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 48 (2): 239. 1993.
  •  3
    The Choosing Mind and the Judging Will: An Analysis of Attention
    Lang, Peter, Gmbh, Internationaler Verlag Der Wissenschaften. 1994.
    Dans le cadre d'une analyse de la vie mentale selon laquelle, à certains égards, la "vie pratique" constitue le fondement de la "vie théorétique" et dans laquelle les émotions jouent un rôle central.