Colin Bodayle

This paper shows how Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit criticizes Kant for positing a realm beyond the scope of finite cognition, a “supersensible” realm of things in-themselves. Hegel not only rejects Kant’s attempt to ground the supersensible through his theoretical philosophy, but also criticizes Kant’s attempt to provide a practical basis for the sensible-supersensible divide. In the second Critique, Kant claims that practical reason extends theoretical reason by showing that the supersensible is more than a “merely problematic thought” since we can populate this realm with the moral postulates of God and the immortality of the soul. Hegel rejects Kant’s attempt to posit a realm beyond theoretical cognition. The moral postulates, Hegel claims, are an “unnecessary hypothesis.” Kant imagines [vorstellt] supersensible realm populated with moral postulates, yet Hegel argues this is a dissemblance [Verstellung] that hides a whole “nest of contradictions” by shifting thoughtlessly between a finite and infinite perspective.