Colin Heydt

In this chapter, I taxonomize early modern modes of relating self-interest and the common good. I discuss Protestant natural law theory, republicanism, utilitarianism, and—my main focus—Scottish social thought from Adam Smith and others. My aim is twofold. First, historically, I lay out the conceptual field for the early modern relation of self-interest and the common good while giving special attention to Scottish innovations. Second, from a philosophical point of view, I argue that the Scottish theory of the common good offers some of the best conceptual resources for considering the relation of individual and community in present-day large, industrial nation-states and empires. More specifically, I claim that the Scots develop a concept of the common good that is (1) more social and economic than its alternatives, (2) more systemic and less dependent on the psychology and intentions of individuals, and (3) less tied to thick notions of community (including the state) and more amenable to empire. I conclude by bringing out the significance of these claims for our thinking about self-interest, the common good, and community.

Paul Russell begins his book by rightly noting, “almost all commentators over the past two and a half centuries have agreed that Hume’s intentions in the Treatise should be interpreted in terms of two general themes: skepticism and naturalism” (vii). The skeptical reading interprets Hume’s principal aim as showing that “our ‘common sense beliefs’ (e.g. belief in causality, independent existence of bodies, in the self, etc.) lack any foundation in reason” (4). The naturalist reading interprets Hume’s aims according to the “science of man,” derived from experience and observation. As described in the Introduction to the Treatise, this science is meant to explain the “principles of human nature” and thereby put the other sciences “on a foundation entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security.” The “riddle” of the Treatise is how to understand the relationship between the skeptical and naturalistic dimensions of the work—dimensions that “seem to be equally essential to what [Hume] is trying to achieve,” but which nevertheless appear “inherently opposed and irreconcilable” (7). Russell puts forward a novel and challenging solution. He argues that the relationship of the skepticism and naturalism in the Treatise can be made intelligible when we see that “it is problems of religion broadly conceived, that hold the contents of the Treatise together as a unified work” (viii). “More specifically,” he goes on, “the direction and structure of Hume’s thought in the Treatise is shaped on one side by his attack on the Christian metaphysics and morals and on the other by his efforts to construct in its place a secular, scientific account of morality.” ...It is difficult to do justice in such a short review to the sophistication of Russell’s analyses. To take one of many examples, Russell explains how Hume’s theory of ideas, rather than something simply adopted from Locke and Berkeley, instead follows Hobbes and expresses irreligious intentions by defending skepticism about our knowledge of God. Russell shows how religious thinkers tried to respond to the claim made by Hobbes that we have no idea of God. Either they insisted that we have knowledge of God through reason rather than through the senses, or they defended the view that our idea of God comes from analogy with ideas of ourselves and of nature. Hume is largely silent about our idea of God, but it is clear, as Russell argues, that he is aware of these debates and that his theory knowingly undermines claims by religious thinkers to possess knowledge of God. We have no simple impressions from which we can derive the idea of God, nor do we have ideas of the divine attributes (power, unity, intelligence, etc.) sufficient to provide us with a clear idea of the divinity. ..... Any criticisms of The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise, however, must be placed within the broader take-away: this book is a triumph and a model for work in the history of philosophy. It offers a powerful reading of the Treatise and of Hume’s intentions in writing it, while also correct- ing common misunderstandings about Hume’s place in early modern thought. It deserves to be read by anyone interested in Hume or in early modern philosophy.

This chapter presents a general account of the speculative and practical moral philosophy of eighteenth-century Scotland. It gives particular attention to three topics: the Scottish insistence that moral philosophy is an empirical, or ‘experimental’, science, grounded in what might now be called a phenomenology of the moral life, and intimately connected with the other elements of the ‘science of man’; the project of combining Hutchesonian moral sense theory with a Butlerian faculty of conscience; and the attempt to combine an empirical and broadly anti-rationalist moral philosophy—a moral philosophy that had a central place for the concept of virtue, with a natural jurisprudence taken from Grotius and, especially, Pufendorf. Particular attention is paid to the practical moral philosophy which was the focus of much of the teaching of moral philosophy in Scotland.

The long eighteenth century is a crucial period in the history of ethics, when our moral relations to God, ourselves and others were minutely examined and our duties, rights and virtues systematically and powerfully presented. Colin Heydt charts the history of practical morality - what we ought to do and to be - from the 1670s, when practical ethics arising from Protestant natural law gained an institutional foothold in England, to early British responses to the French Revolution around 1790. He examines the conventional philosophical positions concerning the content of morality, and utilizes those conventions to reinterpret the work of key figures including Locke, Hume, and Smith. Situating these positions in their thematic and historical contexts, he shows how studying them challenges our assumptions about the originality, intended audience, and aims of philosophical argument during this period. His rich and readable book will appeal to a range of scholars and students.

John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism is a philosophical defense of utilitarianism, a moral theory stating that right actions are those that tend to promote overall happiness. The essay first appeared as a series of articles published in Fraser’s Magazine in 1861; the articles were collected and reprinted as a single book in 1863. Mill discusses utilitarianism in some of his other works, including On Liberty and The Subjection of Women, but Utilitarianism contains his only sustained defence of the theory. In this Broadview Edition, Colin Heydt provides a substantial introduction that will enable readers to understand better the polemical context for Utilitarianism. Heydt shows, for example, how Mill’s moral philosophy grew out of political engagement, rather than exclusively out of a speculative interest in determining the nature of morality. Appendices include precedents to Mill’s work, reactions to Utilitarianism, and related writings by Mill.

SummaryThis paper scrutinises early modern thinking about our moral relations to ourselves. It begins by reiterating the too-often-ignored point that full self-ownership was not a position defended in Britain—by Locke or anyone else. In fact, the actual early modern positions about the moral relations we have to ourselves have been obscured by our present-day interest in self-ownership. The paper goes on to organise the moral history of the self by examining the reasons available for prohibiting self-harm. Those reasons typically had their source in God, self, and others. Major divisions in the period arose over which kinds of reasons could be invoked and why. The defining feature of this intellectual landscape was the debate between ‘other-regarding’ and ‘dignity’ theorists, who differed over the moral status of the self and over its importance as a source of moral reasons. More dramatically and controversially, various freethinkers and sceptics questioned the importance of God as a source of prohibitions for self-harm. After offering an interpretation of this history, the paper concludes by noting some connections and contrasts between early modern and present-day moral and political philosophy on the moral status of the self.

: This paper shows how the ethical benefits of Mill's Religion of HumanityÑa life imbued with purpose, an improved regard for others, and greater happiness for oneself from the pleasures of fellow-feelingÑare to be actualized through the imagination's creation of compelling narratives about humanity. Understanding the ethical importance of the Religion of Humanity therefore implies understanding the central role of imagination in Millian ethical life. This investigation serves to articulate a feature of Mill's utilitarianism that differentiates it from Bentham's, namely his commitment to the importance of a religious sensibility in the moral agent. It also raises the broader philosophical issue of what narratives a psychologically tenable humanist world-view requires

This paper examines Hume's four essays on happiness: the "Epicurean," the "Stoic," the "Platonist," and the "Sceptic." I argue, first, that careful attention to how these essays are written shows that they do not simply argue for one position over others. They also elicit affective and imaginative responses in order to modify the reader's outlook and to improve the reader's understanding in service to moral ends. The analysis offers an improved reading of the essays and highlights the intimate connections between the purposes of philosophical writing and its manner of presentation. Secondly, I contend that appreciating how Hume's essays on happiness work on the reader demonstrates the insufficiency of Hume's categories of "anatomist" and "painter."

Given its initial form by Protestant natural lawyers such as Pufendorf, practical ethics figured prominently in the writings and lectures of university teachers like Hutcheson, Smith, Reid, and Paley, and it provided the most important shared background for philosophical views concerning how we ought to act and what dispositions we should cultivate. The core of practical ethics was a systematic presentation of our duties, rights, and virtues. This chapter analyzes the structure and discusses the purposes served by practical ethics. It then surveys philosophical opinion on our principal duties—those to God, to self, and to others—and examines debates on piety, suicide, and lying.