Colin Mangan

The problem of time—arising from inconsistencies in time’s role across classical, relativistic, quantum, and quantum gravity theories—remains a central challenge in physics. We propose a timeless, presentist framework where time is not a fundamental parameter but a derived unit from counting cycles of periodic three-dimensional (3D) motions in physical systems (e.g., atomic and quartz clocks). Gravitational time dilation is explained by stronger gravitational fields inducing greater 3D spatial curvature, slowing oscillations. Special relativistic time dilation results from absolute motion (binary yes/no, possibly universal) reducing cycle rates, with reciprocity unobservable as clocks require common-frame comparisons. Non-relative acceleration further affects cycles, resolving asymmetries. No absolute, preferred reference frame exists, but the Earth’s rest frame is operationally used for measurements, aligning with general relativity’s (GR) frame equivalence. This model achieves empirical equivalence with GR for time dilation, matches experimental tests (e.g., Hafele-Keating, GPS), and resolves the problem of time by treating time as an emergent, relational metric in a presentist universe without a universal present. It unifies relativistic, quantum, and quantum gravity perspectives, offering testable predictions and a novel reinterpretation of GR as 3D spatial dynamics.

Philosophical zombies—beings physically identical to us, with every neuron firing just so, yet devoid of consciousness—have posed a philosophical issue for proponents of physicalism since David Chalmers deployed them in his well-known Zombie Argument. The pitch is this: if you can conceive of a zombie without logical contradiction, consciousness must be more than physical, and materialism collapses. It’s a seemingly slick argument, but I want to outline why it amounts to little more than begging the question. Zombies aren’t necessarily conceivable—not when we examine what we’re actually talking about. To make the case, I’ll lean on a new tool, the Principle of Contradiction of Referents (PCR), and a playful analogy about “Schwales” and “cirtons.”

The fine-tuning argument asserts that the life-permitting values of the universe’s fundamental constants are so improbable under Naturalism (N) that they favor Theism (T). Proponents of the fine tuning argument contend that the multiverse hypothesis fails to explain why this universe is fine-tuned. This paper challenges their position with three arguments in a Bayesian framework: (1) a maximal multiverse actualizes all possible universes, including this one, addressing their "this universe" objection; (2) the ex nihilo nihil fit principle renders the constants necessary under N, not contingent or improbable; and (3) denying ex nihilo nihil fit justifies an uncaused multiverse, further supporting N. These arguments elevate ( P(E|N) ), undermining T’s probabilistic advantage.

This paper offers a defence of metaphysical naturalism, in the context of the Fine Tuning argument. Theistic objections to the Multiverse (MV) hypothesis are considered, specifically the claim that the MV hypothesis commits the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy (IGF) and, as per the This Universe Objection (TUO), that it violates the Requirement of Total Evidence. It is argued that the IGF claim moved the goalposts when it comes to assessing the validity of the MV hypothesis. The Cosmic Slot Machine analogy will be used to demonstrate how the This Universe Objection (TUO), fails to adequately account for the anthropic principle (or selection effect) and how the MV hyptothesis does satisfy the Requirement for Total Evidence. With respect to the Naturalistic Single Universe (NSU), the implications of the ex-nihilonihil- fit principle, for evaluating the epistemic probability of a Life Permitting Universe (LPU)under the NSU hypothesis, are considered. It is argued that the ex nihilo nihil fit principle entails that an LPU is not improbable under the NSU hypothesis.

This paper will attempt to offer a defence of to the Multiverse (MV) hypotheses, in the context of the theistic Fine Tuning Argument (FTA). It will be argued that theistic proponents of the FTA who argue that the MV hypothesis commits the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy (IGF) are, themselves, guilty of moving the goalposts when it comes to assessing the validity of the MV hypothesis. The Cosmic Slot Machine analogy will be used to demonstrate how the This Universe Objection (TUO), first outlined by White (2000) and further clarified by Draper et al (2007), fails to adequately account for the anthropic principle (or selection effect).

This paper examines what implications the ex-nihilo-nihil-fit principle has for the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) and how it constrains the type of universe which is compatible with the FTA. This constraint is considered in the context of the biblical account of creation and also considered against the different, possible models of universe which fall under the general category of “Naturalism”. Reasoning is outlined as to why proponents of the FTA should drop any reference to finely tuned initial conditions. Objections to the Multiverse (MV) hypothesis are discussed and an argument put forward as to why they fail to adequately consider the so-called selection effect and why they do not negate an eternal, cyclical model of the Universe.

The Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) is an argument put forward by proponents of theism, in which they attempt to make a case from Bayesian inference, that the [apparently] fine tuned constants of our universe is more likely given a theistic hypothesis, than a naturalistic one. Some naturalists argue that this is not the case given the Multiverse (MV) hypothesis (that our universe is one of a plurality in a broader multiverse). The MV hypothesis is rejected by theists who argue it commits what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. In this paper I will attempt to demonstrate [what I perceive as] the errors in logic made by theists first in positing that a life-permitting universe (LPU) is improbable under the naturalistic-single-universe (NSU) hypothesis, and subsequently the errors in arguing that the MV hypothesis commits what Ian Hacking (1987) referred to as “the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy”. First, I will attempt to demonstrate why an LPU is not improbable under the NSU. Second, I will attempt to demonstrate that if we ascribe a probability value to our LPU, we can directly infer either an MV or the existence of “Deeper Laws” (Barnes, 2020) from that probability value.