Colin Marshall

A guide to persuasion for people who want to change minds without manipulation or coercion. Most of us have given up on persuasion. We say our problems are too pressing, people are too polarized, and success is too dubious—and it’s true! After all, when was the last time you heard someone actually change their mind? Instead, if we want to improve our persuasive powers, self-help books often ask us to stoop to dishonest, manipulative tricks that rarely achieve lasting results. But perhaps there is a way to persuade people that is neither hopelessly misguided nor morally suspect. In Just Hear Me Out, philosopher Colin Marshall describes a persuasive method that is both effective and ethical. Rather than share a flurry of tips for how to win friends and influence people, Marshall invites us to take up persuasion as fundamentally civil work, good both for our conscience and our communities. Real-world persuaders such as Jane Addams, Daryl Davis, and Fred Rogers show us an ethical route, he argues, to changing hearts through patience, respect, and compassion. Accessible, practical, and buoyed by hope, Just Hear Me Out offers a powerful method for all who want to persuade others but aren’t interested in winning at any cost. When it works, people don’t just change their minds; they discover anew how to value our common humanity.

In this chapter, I argue that Kant can be read as holding that "ought" judgments follow from certain "is" judgments by mere analysis. More specifically, I defend an interpretation according to which (1) Kant holds that “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to “If, as it can and would were there no other influences on the will, S’s faculty of reason determined S’s willing, S would F” and (2) Kant’s notions of reason, the will, and freedom are all fundamentally non-normative. Not only does this reading have significant textual support, but, I claim, it also sheds light on why Kant takes freedom and morality to mutually imply one another. Moreover, while Kant does take there to be a gap between moral judgments and empirical descriptive statements, that gap is consistent with the analysis in question. I conclude by arguing that this rejection of the is-ought gap is not as philosophically implausible as it might seem, with a focus on G.E. Moore and Hume’s arguments for certain ‘gaps’ between the normative and the non-normative.

The one-world interpretation of Kant's idealism holds that appearances and things in themselves are, in some sense, the same things. Yet this reading faces a number of problems, all arising from the different features Kant seems to assign to appearances and things in themselves. I propose a new way of understanding the appearance/thing in itself distinction via an Aristotelian notion that I call, following Kit Fine, a ‘qua-object.’ Understanding appearances and things in themselves as qua-objects provides a clear sense in which they can be the same things while differing in many of their features