Connor John Leak

Does Benatar’s anti-natalism—the view that it is better never to have been—imply that death is better than continued living? This is known as the pro-mortalist question, a compelling, unresolved question surrounding anti-natalist discourse. In order to answer this question, I analyse two theories about the badness of death that Benatar uses to argue against the idea that anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism. The first is that death deprives one of the good things in life. The second is that death annihilates the person. However, I argue that these theories fail to block pro-mortalism. As such, I conclude that Benatar’s anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism, suggesting that if it is better never to have been, then it is better to cease to be.

This thesis explores key moral questions that are raised by anti-natalism. Collectively, thus far, most research on anti-natalism has focused on the arguments themselves, whether they are sound or unsound in demonstrating the moral impermissibility of reproducing. In this thesis, I explore how anti-natalism relates to our lives in other areas of moral significance, such as how anti-natalism relates to the value of death, the environment, food ethics (veganism), and extinction. These explorations are important because, first, they can affect the viability of any anti-natalist theory. That is, even if we suppose that an anti-natalist theory is sound, how such a theory relates to, for example, the value of death or how one ought to value the environment can provide further reasons to accept or reject anti-natalism. Moreover, besides affecting the viability of such anti-natalist theories, these explorations connect areas of our moral lives that are prevalent and affect who we are, how we act, and what we value. Moreover, the thesis does not focus on anti-natalism exclusively, and anti-natalism is not always the starting point in terms of argumentation. Instead, I also explore closely related concepts, such as death, in themselves and provide further context in terms of how such concepts can relate to anti-natalist theories. Thus, all things considered, I hope that this thesis provides original insights conducive to moral philosophy.

This paper explores anti-natalism and attitudes towards environmental preservation. Anti-natalisms of a certain kind, what I call “compassion-based anti-natalisms”, adhere to the principle of minimising suffering, and this goes hand-in-hand with the common belief that protecting the environment from destruction is the right thing to do. However, I argue that environmental preservation is, in fact, antithetical to the anti-natalist’s aims. This is because environmental preservation is, as I argue, primarily for future generations and has, therefore, pro-natalist attachments: environmental preservation promotes and enables future generations. As a result, environmental preservation conflicts with three of the anti-natalist’s fundamental values: the goal of extinction, an overall reduction in suffering, and adherence to a duty of non-procreation. Because of this, I discuss two possible attitudes the anti-natalist might take towards environmental preservation: Destruction and Apathy. Destruction involves the active degradation and destruction of the environment to bring about extinction as soon as possible. Apathy is to be “hands-off” towards preservation and degrade the environment more slowly. I state that Apathy is the most suitable attitude for the anti-natalist to take towards the environment because it ascertains a sensible balance within the anti-natalist’s values and does not introduce new, morally objectionable outcomes. Finally, I discuss some practical limitations to Apathy and how the anti-natalist might best act in the context of the real world. I conclude that anti-natalists might have to compromise on their values and, paradoxically, support environmental preservation.