Conrad Damstra

In his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant argues that divine assistance, or grace, may help a person transform his or her moral character. I argue that the possibility of divine assistance is compatible with Kant’s view that moral reform must be accomplished through a person’s own free activity. I argue, moreover, that Kant appeals to different concepts of grace in the Religion, which broadly correspond to the Protestant taxonomy of prevenient, sanctifying, and justifying grace. Examining the various arguments for these types of grace will reveal that grace has practical significance, for Kant. It will therefore yield a richer understanding about the nature and possibility of moral transformation in Kant’s Religion.

Kant's view that there is a propensity to evil in human nature has been thought to be both internally inconsistent and in tension with his other philosophical commitments. This essay provides an interpretation of the propensity to evil to defend Kant from these objections. I argue that the propensity to evil is the choice of the evil fundamental maxim. I then assess Kant's claims that the propensity to evil is universal and inextirpable given this interpretation. I conclude by proposing a new interpretation of why Kant deliberately employs religious language in developing his account of the propensity to evil.

I examine Kant’s claim in part one ofReligion within the Boundaries of Mere Reasonthat moral reform requires both a ‘change of heart’ and gradual reformation of one’s sense (R,6: 47). I argue that Kant’s conception of moral reform is neither fundamentally obscure nor is it as vulnerable to serious objections as several commentators have suggested. I defend Kant by explaining how he can maintain both that we can choose our moral disposition via an intelligible choice and that we become good through a continuous struggle. I then provide an interpretation of how moral reform occurs in the phenomenal realm.