Conrad Friedrich

We probabilify the scenario approach to legal proof. The scenario approach searches for the scenario that strikes the best balance in explaining the available evidence, in fitting to general background beliefs, and in its degree of internal coherence. Our account provides a unified measure of the three dimensions in terms of probabilities, and so is proof that the scenario approach can be probabilified. Indeed, our account can be summarized by a version of Bayes Theorem: the most likely scenario in light of the evidence is the best. We thereby provide a Bayesian justification for the scenario approach

Successful literal communication has a standard explanation in analytic philosophy, which requires some determinate proposition expressed by the speaker to be taken up by the audience. In this paper, I extend the standard explanation of communication to account for cases of indeterminacy. Unlike other proposals, the extension does not give up that a unique proposition is communicated. What the audience takes up is a coarse-grained proposition—a “good enough” answer to the question under discussion. I motivate this Coarse-Grained Model of communication from the central Gricean maxims.

This thesis asks a simple question. Why is it that communication between two people succeeds? In other words, what makes it so that one person can signify whatever thought they are entertaining to another person, and that person will understand what the first wanted to say? Consequently, what are the conditions for success, and when does communication fail? This thesis takes a stance on these questions, and develops a framework for systematically explaining communicative success. I discuss relevant accounts of communication in the history of philosophy and contemporary accounts, and their contribution to what amounts to the Classical Model. The Classical Model answers the central questions of the thesis convincingly for many cases. But it faces serious challenges from a range of cases in which it seems difficult to impossible to determine a single proposition communicated. I look at, and critically discuss, a variety of current accounts intended to determine the content of such utterances, all of which give up some aspect of the Classical Model. This discussion calls for a solution, and I develop such a solution in detail. The model developed extends the Classical Model and makes it possible to determine a single proposition for the utterance's content in all problematic cases. The thesis is maximally conservative w.r.t. the Classical Model. It explains communication with an explicit articulation of the Classical Model extended with a pragmatic way of determining truth conditions for utterances.