In this article, I propose a minimalist characterization of naturalism as the thesis that: 1) we must have a minimal, but not total, commitment to the ontology of our sciences, and 2) we must have a meta-methodological commitment to the use of methods that allow for justifications and claims that can be intersubjectively evaluated, such as formal and informal arguments, or the use of the methods of science themselves. In this way, I will first critique the classical definitions of naturalism und…
Read moreIn this article, I propose a minimalist characterization of naturalism as the thesis that: 1) we must have a minimal, but not total, commitment to the ontology of our sciences, and 2) we must have a meta-methodological commitment to the use of methods that allow for justifications and claims that can be intersubjectively evaluated, such as formal and informal arguments, or the use of the methods of science themselves. In this way, I will first critique the classical definitions of naturalism understood as a form of physicalism and as a restriction on the postulation of supernatural entities and explanations in science. Then I will defend the priority of this meta-methodology not only in science and philosophy, but in all intellectual endeavors of research. I conclude that if philosophy intends to be an intellectual enterprise of research, then it must be oriented according to this meta-methodology; that is, it must be naturalistic.
