Corrado Fumagalli

In the light of a study of the di erence between political actors and ordinary citizens as language users, and based on three moral arguments (consequence-based, recognition-based, and complicity-based), we propose that democratic representatives have an imperfect duty to use gender-fair-language in their public communication. In the case of members of the executive, such as ministries, prime ministries, and presidents, such an imperfect duty could also be justi ed on democratic grounds. Their choice of using a gender-unfair language, we argue, can cast doubts on the fundamental democratic commitment to respect the agency of all present and future citizens as potential participants in the law-making process.

Starting from the observation that the deterioration of democratic communication is a political problem that requires individual and collective, private and public, actions, I first defend a baseline duty to avoid using expressions that conventionally show a disrespectful attitude toward targeted groups. Then, I develop a set of guidelines that can guide political theorists in distributing additional duties that respect the situated agency of different individuals. I propose two normative constraints (capacity-to-act and influence) that should influence how theorists assign duties. Then, I present three criteria (pointless, antisocial, and lawfulness) to specify the content in a context-sensitive way.

In this article, we argue that a progressive approach to normative political theorizing should incorporate a conception of meaningful political change that is nonutopian (it conceives of advancements as gradual stages), large-scale (it involves the largest possible numbers of organized and unorganized social movements), and democratically emancipatory (it displays a commitment to breaking down the barriers that prevent individuals from feeling responsible for the direction of society). Bearing this in mind, such an approach should be organized around a cooperative effort between theorists and agents of change and should be oriented toward the collective construction of large-scale actionable proposals for social and political change here and now.

The literature on counterspeech has been debating how institutions and citizens should respond to offensive or dangerous communicative acts. This article identifies a gap in this debate, namely, the lack of attention paid to the individual vote in large-scale democratic elections as an effective act of distancing from candidates who use explicitly derogatory forms of expression to unify and mobilize supporters. In studying the place of voting in the ethics of counterspeech, this article investigates what counterspeakers can expect other counterspeakers to do in large-scale democratic elections framed as a vote for or against hateful representatives. I argue that even in large-scale elections, the individual act of voting, understood as a contribution to increasing the clarity of the indicators of force of a collectivized speech act, can be an effective form of counterspeech. Voting is one of the first forms of counterspeech that must be taken so that other, and perhaps more controversial, actions can stand criticism on moral grounds. For this reason, I also argue that counterspeakers can expect other counterspeakers to contribute to an electoral outcome that, under certain circumstances, can be received as a vote against representatives who use explicit derogatory forms of expression to gain consensus.

Despite the increasingly large number of philosophers working on the ethics of migration, no sustained attempt has been made to define the «migrant» in an analytic way. In their very sophisticated arguments, normative theorists tend to accept the language and pre-commitments shaping migration policy. This paper takes a more foundational approach to the study of migration. By drawing upon ongoing disputes about territorial rights, I construct a general and inclusive definition of «migrant» based on the normative claims stemming from the existence of a pre-institutional, universal, and individual residency right. According to this view, a migrant is an individual who should be able to claim for at least two distinct, yet compatible, residency rights namely, a residency right on the territory of origin, which is common to all human beings, and a residency right in the specific geographical unit where, here and now, she aims to purse her life plan.

Despite the importance of the requirement that all parties subject to a modus vivendi accept it, the philosophical basis of the all-subjected principle has been largely neglected in the realist literature on modus vivendi arrangements as responses to disagreements on issues of common concern. In this article, I argue that the inclusion of all-subjected parties should be understood as instrumental to justifying the presupposition that enough parties will have the motivation to comply with an arrangement that they grudgingly accept as a modus vivendi. I also argue that without accepting the democratic commitments implicit in the acceptance of the standard reading of the all-subjected principle, realist modus vivendi theorists should demonstrate that all those parties who are subjected to a modus vivendi arrangement have the capacity to voice their objection and to be heard for such a claim.

In this paper, I argue that citizens have an entitlement to sanction representatives, but representatives have tools to anticipate this sanction and reconstruct their views in order to anticipate the views of the people they are supposed to represent. I also argue that represented and representatives have an entitlement to sanction democratic representative institutions and practices, but, unless citizens across the spectrum of all representative relationships agree on many fronts, sanctions are likely to violate the democratic requirement that all subjected to a collective decision should not be mere objects of coercion.

We are often told that public hate speech is something that deviates from what is standard in contemporary liberal democracies. So far, much of the literature has focused on the allegedly bad effects of such deviations as well as on measures to bring liberal democracies back to the normal course of events. Less has been said on the fundamental assumption that at a certain moment in time, and within that political context, hate speech is out of the ordinary. In this paper, drawing upon pragmatics, I contend that often public hate speech responds to a supply-demand logic, where speakers fulfill expectations by attacking target groups. Within this scheme, hate speech would be an answer to what a certain audience is ready to listen. At that moment of time, and within that political context, therefore, I argue in this article, hate speech is ordinary.

This chapter delves into debates about time and democratic deliberation. Deliberative democrats have developed sequential models but tend to think of time mainly as a background variable. Critics have drawn attention to the inadequacy of deliberation in accelerated society but, in so doing, have conflated arguments about the pace of democratic deliberation with arguments about its durational time. Democratic deliberation may be slow and inconclusive, but one aspect does not necessarily entail the other. It is against this backdrop that the chapter sheds light on a diachronic reading of fallibilism in order to advance a more favorable reading of inconclusiveness.

In this article, I argue that stability is one of the enabling conditions for epistocratic arrangements to function well and justify their claim right to rule. Against this backdrop, I demonstrate that advocates of strategies to allocate exclusive decision-making power to knowledgeable citizens fail to demonstrate that in a context marked by the fact of pluralism, liberal epistocracies will be stable. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because epistocratic arrangements are better equipped than democratic decision-making bodies to produce outcomes that approximate the common good. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because there is a shared meritocratic set of values and ideas. Furthermore, they could opt for two standard liberal strategies, such as overlapping consensus and modus vivendi. Yet, in all cases, the argument for the stability of liberal epistocracies is not persuasive.

In this article, I argue that the experimentalist model of democracy can contribute to contemporary disputes about deliberation at the supranational level. The fundamental idea is that, in conditions of disagreement, for a decision to be legitimate, deliberative decision-making processes must be structured so as to allow the inclusion of affected interests before and after voting. I argue that there are three ways for a decision to be illegitimate: exclusion of affected interests from all deliberative phases, Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics. Captain Hook politics and garbage-time politics illuminate an important variable: in a deliberative process, some interests may enter deliberation too early, other interests too late. However, for a decision to be legitimate, it is not only important that all affected interests can have an influence on collectively binding decisions, but it is also important what moment in time such interests play a part in the deliberative process.

While most of the literature has attempted to justify harsh and soft containment given some fundamental commitments of political liberalism, I focus on how justified forms of containment can in themselves be deemed effective. This article shows that a reading of Rawls allows for a comparison of different containment practices based on their capacity to protect the stability of liberal democracies under serious threat. And, in making it possible to compare harsh and soft containment, I evaluate immediate stability gains against citizens’ judgements about their liberal democratic institutions.

This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies.

In the last two decades, an ever-increasing number of scholars have challenged the conceptual borders of political philosophy and the supposed universalism of its normative pre-commitments. Surprisingly enough, the normative underpinnings of this debate have had very little impact on contemporary disputes about pluralism. This article asks how contemporary disputes about the conceptual borders of political theory can help in constructing a more plural theory of pluralism. It shows that such contributions inspire three ways of constructing a more plural political theory of pluralism: a self-transformative approach, a dialogical approach and a pre-relational approach. While all three approaches progress towards less exclusionary theories of pluralism, I argue that a pre-relational approach can lead to a normative theory that is more plural than the alternatives.

In this article, I provide an argument against the idea that public hate-speech events are harmful because they cause a discrete, traceable and harmful change in one’s propositional attitudes. To do so, I identify the essential conceptual architecture of public hate-speech situations, I assess existing arguments for the direct and indirect harm of public hate speech and I propose a novel way to approach public hate-speech situations: a maieutic approach. On this perspective, public hate-speech events do not cause changes in propositional attitudes, but rather, if successful, either such events bring a person’s latent propositional attitudes into clear consciousness, or they play with propositional attitudes speakers and their audience had prior to the public hate-speech situation.

Central to the still-nascent normative literature on counterspeech is the widespread belief that citizens should engage discursively with haters and the effects of hate speech. It is also increasingly clear that discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be understood as a continuous and extended series of different and connected actions. Much less has been said about the ways that attempts in persuasion and direct responses to hate speech relate to one another and about when specific counterspeech actions should happen. This essay advances a more expansive and refined account of counterspeech, which is understood as a combination of continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society and acts of distancing from haters. After reconsidering discursive agency distribution around public hate speech, I show that continuous discursive engagement with intolerant members of society should be interrupted by visible acts of distancing when haters make hateful representative claims.