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21Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucibleRatio 34 (4): 261-276. 2021.Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 261-276, December 2021.
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23Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucibleRatio 34 (4): 261-276. 2021.Not only is the common‐law standard of proof of mere likelihood in ordinary civil cases justifiable, but its justifiability supports the conclusion that there is no general norm that one must assert that p only if p is known. An argument by Voltaire is formalized to show that the mere likelihood standard is rational. It is also shown that no applicable norm preempts the common‐law rule. An objection that takes the pertinent knowledge‐norm to be honoured in the breach is rejected by appeal to the…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Law |
Philosophy of Language |