Costantino Esposito

The thesis developed in this essay is that in the contemporary age nihilism acquires a meaning and constitutes an unprecedented challenge compared to its centuries-old history starting from the end of the 19th century. On the one hand, nihilism seems to be a thing of the past, since the phenomenon to which it refers seems to have definitively and widely established itself, both in the field of programmatic «nihilists» and, even more paradoxically, in the field of those who fight it, therefore without significant resistance or opposition. On the other hand, however, it is now once again becoming a problem, and therefore a possibility that is not yet prejudged, perhaps even open to unpredictable outcomes. Paradoxically, when the possibilities of explaining the world and justifying existence seemed exhausted, and an adequate response to the question of ultimate meaning proper to reason seemed impossible, the desire and restlessness constitutive of human experience are reawakened. This hypothesis is developed through two emblematic cases: the desire for happiness and the question of truth. The essay opens with a symbolic analogy between the concept of the «obscure» and its relationship with light in Caravaggio’s paintings, and closes with a depiction of the crisis of meaning of contemporary man as a state of «sonship» (and therefore indirectly of his «childhood») in the novels of Cormac McCarthy.

In this highly engaging book, Costantino Esposito argues that nihilism is not merely the loss of the classic values of the Western tradition--rather, it presents a critical opportunity to ask pertinent, timely questions about the meaning of self and the world. Nihilism is a problem that has troubled the culture, philosophy, and worldview of people and societies for more than a century--a problem that seemed, thanks to the advance of cultural relativism, to have become an obvious and globally shared condition. However, in recent years, the conversation around nihilism has begun to change. The questions that nihilism once declared impossible to answer--questions about the ultimate meaning of self and reality, the truth of the person and history, our desire to understand ourselves in relation to the infinite--are reemerging in today's culture and proving to be profound, reasonable, and of vital importance. In its classical form, nihilism is the loss of values and ideals, but its modern iteration manifests as an irreducible need: more basic but far more challenging. Esposito suggests that rather than being an obstacle, nihilism can become an opportunity to search for true meaning for our experiences in the world. With philosophical rigor, he intercepts and narrates this new phenomenon, focusing on social trends, poetic voices, philosophical and scientific visions, ethical problems, and aesthetic experiences. The New Nihilism unravels and makes sense of the real stakes of the existential crisis of our time.

The bibliographical history offers an interesting point of view for a better understanding of the rise and development of ontology, as an autonomous discipline, in early modern thought. After Luther’s interdict, the metaphysics was neglected in many protestant academies and excluded from the disciplinary classifications (§§ 1-2). The return of metaphysics, at the end of the 16thcentury, coincided, in many cases, with the affirmation of the new scholastic paradigm of ontology (§ 3). An illustrious precedent of this paradigm was constituted by the Jesuit Francisco Suárez and his Disputationes metaphysicae (§ 5). The Jesuit models - not only that by Suárez, but also those by Benet Perera and Pedro da Fonseca - represented the standard on which Calvinists and Lutherans built their own metaphysics in an ontological way. This paper provides a conspicuous number of case studies in which the passage from metaphysics to ontology becomes definitively clear: this debate takes place throughout the first handbooks, treatises, magisterial and doctoral disputations (§ 6) proposed by the Calvinist and Lutheran authors.

El opúsculo teológico De concursu et effi caci auxilio Dei ad actus liberi arbitrii necesario escrito por Suárez en Coimbra en 1599 en el contexto de la polémica de auxiliis es un ejemplo paradigmático de la concepción filosófico-teológica que Suárez tiene de la causalidad. Según esta concepción se conjuga la causa como necesidad de la acción eficiente de la naturaleza, la causa como acción voluntaria de la libertad y la causa como ayuda eficaz de la acción de la gracia divina sobre la voluntad libre del hombre. Este opúsculo se pone en relación con la doctrina de la disputación XIX, escrita tres años antes en Salamanca. Mediante esta comparación se concluye que la gracia no determina el acto de la voluntad sino que lo posibilita constituyendo así la raíz misma de la libertad.

The paper focuses on the problematic pattern of the Black Notebooks in a crucial and dramatic period of Heidegger’s course, that is the one between the thirties and the forties of the last century. In particular, Heidegger’s relationship with National Socialism will be outlined and the interpretation of World Judaism and modern Christianity as a figure of nihilism, namely that of fulfilled metaphysics. From the implication of these three elements, the fundamental feature of the Notebooks can thus be found. This critical reconstruction aims to survey the trend, which is widely present in the philosophical literature of the last decades of the XXth century, of a post-metaphysical and post-Christian image of Heidegger’s thought. The paper intends to replace the core of the unsolved tangle of his thought: the broken confrontation with modernity and his clinch with the Cristlichkeit. It could be said that what appeared to be solved to him was the possible future of his presence in the philosophy of our time.

Mi intervención desea verificar la posibilidad de delinear algunos rasgos característicos de un pensamiento “barroco”, sin limitarse por un lado a una analogía débil con el estilo arquitectónico y pictórico, y por otro lado sin tener la presunción de proponer una etiqueta historiográfica demasiado general e indistinta. La perspectiva escogida por el autor es la de centrase en algunos problemas que emergen en las obras de algunos teólogos y filósofos jesuitas operantes en la época posterior al Concilio de Trento. En particular, se afronta el problema de la relación entre “lo natural” y “lo sobrenatural”, en el intento de tomar distancias tanto de la solución luterana como de la solución “pelagiana”. Siguiendo a Bellarmino se saca a la luz la discusión sobre el estado de la naturaleza humana: si incluso después del pecado es posible rastrear en el hombre la justicia original, esto es, si el hombre pecador es todavía capax Dei. Siguiendo a Suárez se saca a la luz la tentativa de institucionalizar el nexo entre naturaleza/sobrenaturaleza mediante la relación circular entre metafísica y teología: por un lado la metafísica –la scientia transcendens que tiene como objeto propio el concepto generalísimo de ens ut sic y la essentia del ente como aptitudo ad existendum– es la condición de posibilidad noética de la teología ; de otra parte la teología es la secreta condición de posibilidad de la metafísica en su totalidad. En este plexo de problemas se delinea el posible carácter “barroco” de un pensamiento a la vez tardo-escolástico y moderno.

The paper aims at reopening a relevant issue into the actual debate about the ‘new realism’, with its critical taking distance from ‘hermeneutical’ perspective of the post-modernism. Against the predominance of the interpretations and socio-cultural constructions of the reality, the new realism strongly underlines the objective ‘truth’ of the world in its not amendable ontological character with respect to conceptual patterns of epistemology. This ‘return’ to the truth takes its distances from the experience of ‘certainty’, still seen as a pre-theoretical way, like a subjective faith as access to reality. Here, instead, I try to demonstrate the essential nexus occurring between truth and certainty, the last one intended as the necessary assent which allows us to perceive the true as it is, also through referring to some crucial moments within history of philosophy (from Augustine to Descartes, from Thomas Aquinas to Husserl, from Newman to Wittgenstein). In other words, it is about focusing on the very concept of reality as relationship between the ‘I’ and the world, between real data and our interpretations, avoiding that the firsts could be merely intended in an objectivist sense and the seconds left to the field of bare subjectivity.

Se nella verità c’è il riferimento a qualcosa di “assoluto” e di “intemporale”, nel relativismo si esprime la mutevolezza del contingente, di modo che la realtà oggettiva e il senso soggettivo risultino separati sin dall’origine. L’aspetto più inquietante della cultura contemporanea stà nell’inimicizia concettuale tra l’io e la verità, con delle conseguenze nella concezione della libertà. Questa, concepita come autonomia dell’individuo, si capovolge nella sottomissione degli individui allo Stato – visto come verità – che offre loro legittimità, dando loro letteralmente l’«essere». La verità dell’io si trasforma nella volontà generale e la libertà del singolo viene a coincidere con sua appartenenza al corpo dello Stato, di modo che il rapporto dell’io e della verità può e deve realizzarsi solo in forma politica. La permanenza di identità e comunità religiose all’interno di un’orizzonte culturale laico fa che il «discorso» religioso nel dibattito pubblico sia considerato una possibile proposta di razionalità. Più di una mera tolleranza dello Stato in ordine alla libertà religiosa, si tratta di un primo livello di integrazione cognitiva delle ragioni religiose nella razionalità laica, nell’ambito dell’etica. Quando si passa alla considerazione delle «verità» diverse, riguardo all’io e al mondo, c’è una asimmetria della verità metafisica e religiosa rispetto ad una semplice visione etica del mondo. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, Stato, Libertà, relativismo, fondamentalismo Resumo Se na verdade existe algo de absoluto e de intemporal, no relativismo expressa-se a mutabilidade do contingente, de modo que a realidade objetiva e o sentido subjetivo se tornam separados desde a origem. O aspecto mais inquietante da cultura contemporânea se encontra na inimizade conceitual entre o eu e a verdade, com conseqüências na concepção da liberdade. Esta, concebida como autonomia do indivíduo, se inverte na submissão dos indivíduos ao Estado – visto como verdade – que lhes oferece legitimidade, dando-lhes literalmente o “ser”. A verdade do eu se transforma na vontade geral e a liberdade do singular passa a coincidir com seu pertencimento ao corpo do Estado, de modo que a relação entre o eu e a verdade pode e deve se realizar apenas na forma política. A permanência de identidades e comunidades religiosas no interior de um horizonte cultural laico faz com que o discurso religioso no debate público seja considerado uma proposta possível de racionalidade. Mais do que uma mera tolerância do Estado com relação à liberdade religiosa, trata-se de um primeiro nível de integração cognitiva das razões religiosas na racionalidade laica, no âmbito da ética. Quando se passa a considerações de verdade diferentes, com relação ao eu e ao mundo, existe uma assimetria da verdade metafísica e religiosa em relação a uma simples visão ética do mundo. Palavras-chave : Multiculturalismo, Estado, Liberdade, relativismo, fundamentalismo. ABSTRACT If indeed there is something timeless and absolute, the mutability of the contingent is expressed in relativism, in a way that objective reality and subjective sense become separated from their origin. The most disturbing aspect of contemporary culture lays is in the conceptual enmity between the self and the truth, with consequences in the conception of freedom. When such freedom is taken as individual autonomy, it becomes itself in the submission of individuals to the state which is always seen as the truth that gives them legitimacy. The truth of the self becomes in the general will and the freedom of the individual happens to belong to the body of the state, so that the relationship between the self and the truth can and should be performed only in political form. The permanence of identities and religious communities within a secular cultural horizon makes the religious discourse in public debate a possible proposal of rationality. More than mere tolerance of the state relating to religious freedom, this is a first level of cognitive integration of religious reasons within secular rationality under ethics. When it comes to considerations other than truth, about the self and the world, there is an asymmetry of the metaphysical and religious truth with regard to a simple ethical vision of the world. Key words : Multiculturalism, State, Freedom, relativism, fundamentalism.

The paper deals with the doctrine of time exposed in the De communibus omium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus by Benet Perera. What is the nature and status of time? How does time belong or may it belong to the being? Answering these questions and referring to Aristotle, Augustine and Averroes, Perera remarks on the existence of two different traditions in the field of scholastic philosophy: the first tradition underlines the objective reality of time considering it extrinsically and identifying time with movement that is quantitatively measurable; the second tradition states the noetic reality of time considering it intrinsically, i.e. belonging to the mind and its operations. From his own point of view, Perera gives an “ontological” solution to these problems, thinking of the nature of time not only as duration of movement of beings in respect to before and after, but also as intrinsic duration of every existing thing. In this sort of “transcendental” meaning, time is..