Costanza Penna

In questo capitolo intendiamo approfondire la struttura delle azioni transgenerazionali per trarre alcune considerazioni sul loro carattere fondazionale-normativo. Le domande a cui vogliamo rispondere sono: cosa significa, dal punto di vista ontologico, agire in senso transgenerazionale? Come una generazione che compie un’azione transgenerazionale si lega alle altre che vi partecipano? Quali poteri deontici genera tale partecipazione e come questi intervengono sull’agency e sulla coscienza fenomenologica dei membri?

Aging has hitherto been overlooked by social ontologists. The article argues for its reconsideration advocating for a phenomenological shift from “aging” to “being aged” to address the major shortcomings of current approaches. Two key insights are revealed:(i) age discrimination arises from a standardized view of life that neglects the personal dimension of aging;(ii) phenomenology proves helpful in addressing qualitative assessments of aging and its social dimension while maintaining existential sensitivity. Within the proposed framework, it becomes possible to outline a theory of shared aging and transgenerationality, hinging on three main claims: a) aging unfolds as generational time shared in a transgenerational sense; b) it unites people in social wholes according to different modes and degrees; c) it inspires primary and secondary transgenerationality. All this lays the groundwork to understand generational temporality, sociality, and normativity beyond constructivism.

Transgenerational social actions are collective actions that endure over a considerable period of time and require the cooperation of multiple generations. Yet, it remains unclear what kind of obligations and rights, if any, allow actions to persist through the ages, binding future generations to be part of them. This paper proposes a way forward by considering transgenerational actions as a particular type of long-term joint commitments. Drawing on plural subject theory, I explore the conditions for membership, normativity, and justification of transgenerational joint commitments, while also amending the model to address classical issues of asymmetry, non-existence, and non-reciprocity of future generations. The proposed approach meets three desiderata: transgenerational actions do not rely on individual intentions but are collective in a strong sense, they are normative in a social sense but can encourage the development of a personal moral sensitivity to transgenerationality, and they are both stable over time and flexible enough to resist paternalism through the proxy acts of representatives of future generations.