• Desiderativity and temporality. Contribution to the naturalization of intentionality
    with Panos Theodorou, Anna Irene Baka, and Constantinos Picolas
    The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 23 519-542. 2023.
    Neurophenomenology maintains that the intelligent behavior we recognize in living beings is based on the fact that they are intentionally directed toward and are embodied and embedded in a world, which they actively constitute. This is the way in which it understands the intentionality of the mind and its meaning-making essence. Meaning-making, however, presupposes organization and synthesis of sensed reality elements within a horizon of temporality. But whence is the opening-up of this horizon …Read more
  •  167
    Pylyshyn restricts cognitively penetrable vision to late vision, whereas he does not make any distinction between different kinds of penetrating cognition. I argue that this approach disconnects early vision content from late vision content and blurs the distinction between the latter and the content of thought. To overcome this problem I suggest that we should not distinguish between different kinds of visual content but instead introduce a restriction on the kind of cognition that can directly…Read more
  •  648
    “Hallucination, Mental Representation, and the Presentational Character”
    In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination, Mit Press. pp. 361. 2013.
    In this paper, I argue that the indirect realists’ recourse to mental representations does not allow them to account for the possibility of hallucination, nor for the presentational character of visual experience. To account for the presentational character, I suggest a kind of intentionalism that is based on the interdependency between the perceived object and the embodied perceiver. This approach provides a positive account to the effect that genuine perception and hallucination are different …Read more
  •  312
    McDowell’s Transcendental Empiricism and the Theory-Ladenness of Experience
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1): 101-114. 2006.
    According to McDowell’s transcendental empiricism, the world view depends on experience, which in turn depends on the world view. This seems to be in accord with the thesis that experience is theory-laden, but it also seems to introduce a problem of vicious circularity. I argue that McDowell’s account has the resources to avoid the problem of vicious circularity by exploiting the idea of a wider circle that involves more relata and more kinds of rational dependence. But the acceptance of this id…Read more
  •  609
    From the pragmatics of classification systems to the metaphysics of concepts" (review)
    with Stella Vosniadou and Maria Deliyianni
    Journal of the Learning Sciences 14 (1): 115-125. 2005.
    Review of the books: Jerry A. Fodor. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science went wrong. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998, 174 pp., ISBN 0-19-823636-0. Geoffrey C. Bowker and Susan Leigh Star. Sorting things out: Classification and its consequences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999, 377 pp., ISBN 0-262-02461-6
  •  356
    The Sense of Agency and the Naturalization of the Mental
    with Spyros Petrounakos
    The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6 139-143. 2007.
    In this paper we examine whether the sense of agency represents an obstacle to the project of naturalizing the mental. On the basis of a thought experiment we suggest that the sense of agency is not an epiphenomenon. We also examine Frith's attempt to explain in functionalist terms the sense of agency through the comparator and metarepresentational mechanisms. Through a variety of arguments we try to show that explanation by recourse to these mechanisms is inadequate. We conclude by suggesting t…Read more