Craig K. Lehman

There is a well-known, superficially plausible argument which says that a game is defined by its rules, so that cheaters in that game can't possibly be winners, or even legitimate participants. The article critically examines this argument and provides counterexamples to its underlying assumptions. ================= This article originally appeared in Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, VIII, 1981, pp. 41-46. It has since been reprinted in Morgan, William and Meier, Klaus, eds, Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, and Vanderwerken, David and Wertz, Spencer, Sport Inside Out. 40 years later, I don't have an uploadable copy, but I don't understand why, if you have a new anthology that includes it, you can't simply generate an archive copy from it or one of the prior publications. Or, just cite the sources where it appears.

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states, as when people say "Admittedly I did X, but I wasn't conscious of it." It is argued that "unconscious" varieties of mental states, processes, or events---even perception---can be analyzed entirely in terms of the possession, exercise, acquiring, or loss, of dispositions, whereas conscious mental states involve the same dispositional items, temporally conjoined with at least one of a variety of appropriate experiences. The "temporal conjunction" relationship between behavior and "appropriate" experiences turns out to be much looser than recent causal or functional theories of mental concepts have allowed; the views of e.g., David Armstrong and Daniel Dennett are critically discussed.