•  28
    Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism
    Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9. 2014.
    This chapter explores the implications of moral vagueness for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. It characterizes non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to seven theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. It starts by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which “red,” “tall,” and “heap” are said to be. It …Read more
  •  755
    Translating Kripke's Pierre
    The Reasoner 1 (7): 5-6. 2007.
  •  2696
    Moral Vagueness: A Dilemma for Non-Naturalism
    In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 9, Oxford University Press. pp. 152-185. 2014.
    In this paper I explore the implications of moral vagueness (viz., the vagueness of moral predicates) for non-naturalist metaethical theories like those recently championed by Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and others. I characterise non-naturalism in terms of its commitment to 7 theses: Cognitivism, Correspondence, Atomism, Objectivism, Supervenience, Non-reductivism, and Rationalism. I start by offering a number of reasons for thinking that moral predicates are vague in the same way in which ‘red’, ‘t…Read more
  •  1134
    Vague Comparisons
    Ratio 29 (4): 357-377. 2016.
    Some comparisons are hard. How should we think about such comparisons? According to John Broome, we should think about them in terms of vagueness. But the vagueness account has remained unpopular thus far. Here I try to bolster it by clarifying the notion of comparative vagueness that lies at its heart.
  •  1453
    Value Incomparability and Indeterminacy
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1): 57-70. 2012.
    Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x is worse than y with respect to V and (i…Read more
  •  1137
    A Note on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief
    The Reasoner 1 (4): 8-9. 2007.