Cristian Iftode

„Studiind operele lui Aristotel, pare că eşti condus prin mai multe săli de expoziţie, fiecare ticsită cu probleme şi întrebări: acestea pot fi abordate dintr-un unghi sau din altul, preluate şi examinate, încercând analize diferite şi propunând diverse modalităţi de a le găsi o soluţie… Aristotel caută încă răspunsul–şi ne invită să-l căutăm împreună cu el”(Jonathan Barnes). De aproape 2400 de ani, filosofia lui Aristotel continuă să genereze dezbateri aprinse şi să inspire, în fiecare epocă, interpretări novatoare, într-un dialog neîntrerupt cu tradiţia intelectuală a Greciei antice. Reunind cercetători din toate generaţiile, cu abordări diferite şi variate subiecte de interes, editorii acestui volum speră să fi dovedit, încă o dată, caracterul complex şi inepuizabil al moştenirii aristotelice.

The Western philosophy depicts during the 80s a process that I would qualify as an authentic performative turn that regards the human subject as nothing more than the “vector” of its series of exercises, foldings, repetitions. The recent work of P. Sloterdijk is located in this framework of “antropotechnics”. I shall focus my attention on two of the texts where Sloterdijk is discussing Cioran. First, I shall do an assessment of the interpretation advanced by Sloterdijk of the notorious paragraph on “flesh” (Paleontology), a text by Cioran which seems at the same time phenomenological and anti-phenomenological, metaphysical and antimetaphysical. Then, I shall discuss Sloterdijk‟s understanding of Cioran‟s self-writing as a sui generis asceticism involving a daily exercise in erasing any “infection” epicenter of firm belief and commitment, any kind of faith in the future or in oneself, adding that it is also a paradoxical testimony for the “miracle” of every living moment. This way, Cioran as an ascetic, “autopatographer” and “hunger artist” becomes a key figure in this gallery of the new “arts of living”, an important link in the historical process of “the informalization of spirituality”. He is the “antistoic” and pseudo-Buddhist master of demobilization, “the first master of notgetting-anywhere”.

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism.

Motivational enhancement of any kind can be conceived of either as a way to reduce the need for effort, or as a change in the subjective perception of effort. However, in both cases, effort is not all that matters. In the evaluation of praiseworthy conduct, the practical goals pursued by the subject, their dedication, and the discernment they exercise are equally important. I further argue that not only in terms of the general purpose, but also in terms of the means employed for human enhancement, we cannot, in fact, establish significant differences between the traditional technology of the self and biomedical technologies for enhancing motivation. There are two key features they all share. The traditional techniques of the self also aim at the gradual reduction of effort through their steady practice, and they are all mental conditioning and self-conditioning techniques based on repetition and training.

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism.

In order to grasp the true ethical meaning of Foucault's aesthetics of existence, I begin by explaining in what sense he was an anti-normativist, arguing that the most important thing about the "final" Foucault is his strong emphasis on the idea of human freedom. I go on with a brief discussion about Foucault's sources of inspiration and a criticism of Rorty's kindred plea for "aesthetic life". I strongly reject the interpretation of Foucault's aesthetics of existence in terms of narcissistic individualism, arguing, on the contrary, that it has a definite communitarian dimension. I also claim that it is rooted in the Socratic and Stoic understanding of "care of the self," at the same time allowing new challenging developments fitted for our "post-duty" historical age, by way of analogy with the process of artistic making. I conclude with some short answers to a few questions regarding the status of this aesthetics of living.

El propósito de este artículo es analizar la noción de subjetivación, clave en el último Foucault, a la luz de la metáfora barroca del _pliegue_. Según Deleuze, hay dos fuentes distintas, la memoria del Ser de Heidegger y la monadología de Leibniz, que se reúnen en cierto sentido en esta noción foucaultiana. A este respecto, pretendo destacar la importancia del concepto de subjetivación en el contexto de un giro performativo en la filosofía contemporánea, así como diversas formas históricas de entender este concepto. Un aspecto técnico, pero crucial, que hay que subrayar es la compleja interacción y la mutua co-dependencia entre la subjetivación activa y la sujeción (_assujettissement_). La comprensión del «modo de la sujeción» en Foucault como uno de los «cuatro pliegues de la subjetivación» proporciona un argumento convincente para el pluralismo ético. Por último, esta perspectiva brinda una importante clave para revisar la interpretación de Deleuze de Foucault. Pues es la memoria violenta de Nietzsche, y no la memoria heideggeriana del Ser, la que se revela como decisiva en el proceso de subjetivación, y también como una vía de conversión necesaria de la libertad «negativa» en libertad positiva en el sentido de la autonomía y autodisciplina, en concordancia con el proyecto nietzscheano de hacer que el «ascetismo vuelva a ser natural».

The general idea of this investigation is to emphasize the elusiveness of the concept of terrorism and the pitfalls of the so-called “War on Terror” by way of confronting, roughly, the reflections made in the immediate following of 9/11 by Habermas and Derrida on the legacy of Enlightenment, globalization and tolerance, with Foucault’s concept of biopolitics seen as the modern political paradigm and Agamben’s understanding of “the state of exception” in the context of liberal democratic governments. The main argument will state that the modern Western individual and the modern terrorist are in a way linked together as products of the same biopolitical network. So I shall argue that religious fundamentalism and international terrorism are not external factors to the Western civilization, nor even some radical late forms of ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ threatening the Western ‘way of life,’ but phenomena revealing what we could call, borrowing J. Derrida’s biological metaphor, a “crisis of autoimmunization” of Western neo-liberal democracies. The only long-term solution to the threat of global terrorism would have to involve the “deconstruction” of our common notion of tolerance and the experience of an unconditional hospitality that is actually the inversion of the terrorist action that is threatening us “from within,” according to Derrida. But we cannot reasonably hope for this radical change in our relationship to others unless we aren’t really trying to modify the relationship to the self that is prevalent in contemporary Western societies: a vision of us as self-encapsulated monads or ‘nuclear’ selves, for whom genuine community life is, at the most, only a nostalgic evocation of a past long gone, and the respect for the others, a strategic name for moral indifference.

In this article, I draw attention to a different interpretation of bioethics as biopolitics, which does not appeal to the standard application of political theories to controversial practical issues. My objective is to make several suggestions for approaching bioethics from a Foucauldian perspective. I follow the three stages in Foucault’s intellectual trajectory (with a focus on the genealogy of power) and also analyze the way he reflected upon themes that are part of bioethical issues. The French philosopher is famous for his relentless investigations to uncover insidious forms of power and how scientific discourses can be used to reinforce or restructure social orders, highlighting the dangers of scientism while claiming to overcome the “critique of ideology” approach. Such an analysis is especially needed, as Foucault’s ideas are often linked to the field of bioethics in a rather distorted, incomplete, or fragmentary way, often as secondhand quotations, lacking a thorough and careful study of his understanding of power techniques, the human subject, personal freedom and society, medicine, and sciences of life.

This paper argues for a revised concept of authenticity entailing two demands that must be balanced. The first demand moves authenticity from the position of a strictly self-regarding virtue towards the position of a fully social virtue, acknowledging the crucial feature of steadiness, i.e. self-consistency, as being precisely what we ‘naturally’ lack. Nevertheless, the value of personal authenticity in a modern, open society comes from the fact that it brings about not only steadiness, but also the public development of a variety of existential options that can be understood as Millian ‘original experiments in living’. Thus the second demand of authenticity is a demand for ‘experimental’ authenticity which covers the whole spectrum of technologies of the self, from Nietzschean ‘brief habits’, to the use of enhancement technologies.

This article starts with a brief overview of well-known criticisms of modern democracy in order to suggest a different approach: reflecting on the principles of Western democracy in the basic horizon of the problematic of the self and wondering if the ‘multiple’ self should not be conceived as the single subjective correlate that is adequate to democratic pluralism and also as the only chance of curing ourselves of ‘fundamentalism’. I try to highlight the Derridian radical view of democracy as “always still to come”, placing it in the generic framework of ‘postmodern ethics’. I distinguish between two trends in postmodern ethics and also between three kinds or models of relationship to the self, in order to argue that the ‘multiple’ self, that is the self conceived as an irreducible multiplicity of voices, positions, tendencies, vocabularies, and characters, might claim the status of an ideal that needs to be fully embraced and understood in all its consequences – some of them profoundly disturbing for the old ‘images of the self’ consecrated by our tradition, on the one side Greek and Latin, on the other, Judeo-Christian –, if we want that democracy actually become a social and political reality. I conclude this paper with a plea for resistance to biopolitical normalization