Cristian Mihut

In this thesis I argue that there is no complete notion of epistemic justification that can be defined in terms of intellectual virtues. A complete notion of justification would have to capture both the idea that there are internally accessible grounds for holding a belief justified, and at the some time provide a reliable connection between our beliefs and the features of the external world. Some virtue theorists claim that a complete notion of justification can be derived from the exercise of intellectual virtues. I single out two strands of virtue-theories involved in this project. On the one hand, virtue-responsibilism construes intellectual virtues as ingrained habits necessarily connected with the desire for truth. On the other hand, virtue-reliabilism understands the intellectual virtues as faculties or cognitive mechanisms that are reliable in providing us with true beliefs. First, I argue that virtue-responsibilism cannot capture a sufficient measure of reliability, that increases the likelihood of a beliefs being true. Furthermore, I argue that virtue-reliabilism does not connect well with the notion of epistemic responsibility necessary of a complete notion of justification. Finally, I suggest that underlying the inability of virtue-responsibilism to capture reliability and virtue-reliabilism to accommodate responsibility is the old problem of specifying the connection between justification and truth

Danaher suggests that doxological justice, grounded in an acute receptivity of the generosity of God, can decenter our current notions of justice. Instead I focus on what might be called doxological forgiveness, that is, grace-responsive forgiveness. The first section argues that a conception of forgiveness which I dub repentance-responsive is compatible with and even requires holding punitive attitudes. The second section sketches the alternative account of grace-responsive forgiveness. Those who embody this virtue have epistemic and theological warrant to entirely disavow punitive emotions. The third section argues that God embodies a grace-responsive forgiveness that undermines retributivism and eclipses repentance-responsive forgiveness.

This paper proposes an answer to a puzzle regarding robust notions of forgiveness. Robust forgiveness occurs when victims extend grace to perpetrators in the absence of moral reparation or repentance. If unmerited grace is one of its necessary features, is robust forgiveness a moral and rational response to perpetrators? The paper sketches an empathetic model of forgiveness as a plausible candidate for answering this puzzle. However, this particular model must be refined to handle cases where resentment infiltrates and cements deeply in our motivational structures. Still working broadly within an empathetic framework, the paper proposes a modification aimed to alleviate worries about the dispersing and entrenchment of resentment.