Cristian Soto

The semantic view of scientific theories has been proposed as a more favorable framework for scientific realism compared to the syntactic view. However, Chakravartty argues that both views face equivalent difficulties when articulating realist commitments to unobservable entities. This paper examines Chakravartty’s challenge through an analysis of recent developments in the debate on models and scientific representation. While we acknowledge that adopting the semantic view does not resolve traditional realist problems by itself, we argue that the DEKI account (Frigg and Nguyen) offers promising conceptual tools for addressing the modelling and representation of unobservables. Our analysis reveals that, although theories of scientific representation are orthogonal to realist ontological commitments, contemporary model-theoretic developments provide new perspectives for assessing the viability of modeling unobservable entities and properties required by the defense of scientific realism.

In this chapter, we provide an analysis of Torretti’s main views in the general philosophy of science. I shall examine his Kantian take on objectivity (Sect. 2.2), the creative understanding thesis (Sect. 2.3), his critique of scientific realism (Sect. 2.4), his elaboration of mathematical fictionalism (Sect. 2.5), his analysis of physical laws (Sect. 2.6), and his examination of the contribution of philosophical reflection to scientific progress (Sect. 2.7). For this, I will consider Torretti’s publications from the late 1960s to the early 2010s in the hope of expounding some of his ideas that may not be well known to some of his readers coming exclusively from either the history and philosophy of physics and geometry, or from the history of philosophy. With this, we fill a gap in our understanding of Torretti’s views in various fields in the philosophy of science, assessing their motivations and arguing that they yield an attractive alternative for various issues in current debates.

From an empiricist perspective, we argue that physical modality best accounts for the modal status of laws (understood in empiricist terms as suitable empirical regularities). Nomic modality need not be construed in terms of metaphysical modal features. Rather, we submit, we live in a world full of physical possibilities and necessities that are investigated by such processes as gathering evidence, improving inferential practices, and undertaking theory and model construction. Empiricists can safely take distance from Humean accounts of nomic modality, hence maintaining that laws are not restricted to yielding summaries of actual phenomena but inform us about the range of physical possibilities and necessities in their domains. None of this requires the introduction of a metaphysical basis for nomic modality.

We present a definition of equilibrium for Boltzmannian statistical mechanics based on the long-run fraction of time a system spends in a state. We then formulate and prove an existence theorem which provides general criteria for the existence of an equilibrium state. We illustrate how the theorem works with toy example. After a look at the ergodic programme, we discuss equilibria in a number of different gas systems: the ideal gas, the dilute gas, the Kac gas, the stadium gas, the mushroom gas and the multi-mushroom gas.

Desde una perspectiva empirista, sostenemos que la modalidad física da cuenta de mejor manera del estatus modal de las leyes (entendidas en términos empiristas, como regularidades empíricas adecuadas). La modalidad nómica no tiene que ser construida en términos de propiedades modales metafísicas. En cambio, argumentaremos que vivimos en un mundo pleno de posibilidades y necesidades físicas que son investigadas por procesos tales como acumulación de evidencia, refinamiento de prácticas inferenciales y procesos de construcción de teorías y modelos. El empirismo puede, sin problemas, tomar distancia de las teorías humeanas de modalidad nómica, defendiendo que las leyes no se restringen a ofrecer resúmenes de fenómenos actuales, sino que nos informan acerca de rangos de posibilidades y necesidades físicas en sus dominios. Nada de esto requiere que introduzcamos un fundamento metafísico para la modalidad nómica.

Contamos con diversas estrategias para explicar el problema de Wigner, el cual se relaciona con la efectividad incomprensible (unreasonable effectiveness) de las matemáticas en la formulación de leyes físicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, reconstruiré el problema de Wigner señalando que una lectura cuidadosa de su obra filosófica nos ofrece razones para disipar los aires de misterios y milagros que parecen rodear la efectividad de las matemáticas. Para enfatizar la relevancia de las matemáticas en la formulación de leyes físicas, abordaré críticamente la tesis de que las leyes físicas son enunciados puramente matemáticos y la concepción algorítmica que sostiene que las leyes de la naturaleza son el software del universo. Avanzando más allá de tales propuestas, sugeriré reinterpretar el problema de Wigner en términos de la aplicación de estructuras matemáticas a la estructura relevante de dominios físicos en la formulación de leyes científicas. Tal reinterpretación nos permitirá proponer una aproximación empirista ampliamente deflacionaria al problema de Wigner, sistematizando brevemente diversas estrategias para explicar la efectividad de las matemáticas en la formulación de leyes.

Desde sus inicios en 1949, la REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA de la Universidad de Chile ha jugado un rol crucial en la formación y consolidación de la filosofía, como disciplina, en nuestro país, consagrándose como el órgano de publicaciones más antiguo y relevante en el contexto nacional, y contribuyendo de manera indispensable a la difusión del conocimiento filosófico en el mundo hispanoamericano. La REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA es retrato de los modos en que profesoras y profesoras de nuestra comunidad han generado encuentro y reflexión en torno a temas propios de la disciplina y su vínculo con nuestro contexto social, político y cultural. Su historia y trayectoria son un archivo vivo de la configuración de diversos conocimientos y debates de la filosofía en el siglo XX. En este contexto, quisiéramos especialmente agradecer el trabajo fundamental que cumplieron los profesores Marcos García de la Huerta (como Director) y Alan Martin (como Secretario de Redacción), quienes estuvieron a cargo de la REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA hasta abril de 2024, así como al Consejo Consultivo y Editorial que desempeñan una función activa para el buen desarrollo de ésta.

This article derives some morals from the examination of the physico-mathematical view of scientific laws and its place in the current debate. After revisiting the expression scientific law, which appears in scientific practice under various names (laws, principles, equations, symmetries, and postulates), I briefly assess two extreme, opposite positions in the literature on laws, namely, full-blown metaphysics of laws of nature, which distinguishes such laws from the more mundane laws that we find in science; and the no-laws thesis, which ultimately contends that we should dispense with laws in science altogether. I argue that both positions fail to make sense of the laws that we find in scientific practice. For this, I outline the following twofold claim: first, most laws (in physics) are abstract mathematical statements; and second, they express some of the best physical generalisations achieved in this branch of science. Thus understood, a minimal construal of laws suggests that they are in principle intended to refer to those features of phenomena whose salience and stability are relevant for specific scientific tasks.

Resumen:Elaboramos una versión del disposicionalismo experimental que esclarece la relación entre capacidades y leyes fenomenológicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias (1), presentamos el disposicionalismo experimental en vistas de las nociones de modalidad física y ambiente de estímulo (2). Trazamos las líneas generales para una epistemología experimentalista de las capacidades (3) y esclarecemos la modalidad física e invariancia de las leyes fenomenológicas (4). Luego examinamos las generalizaciones físicas y extrapolaciones de las leyes fenomenológicas (5) y exponemos el caso de la ley de Fresnel, que ilustra aspectos de nuestro argumento (6). Concluimos con algunas consideraciones sobre los límites del disposicionalismo experimental.Palabras clave: Disposicionalismo experimental; Capacidades; Leyes fenomenológicas; Modalidad física; Invariancia; Extrapolación.

La investigación sobre leyes de la naturaleza constituye una de las aventuras del intelecto humano en su esfuerzo primigenio por entender la realidad y nuestro lugar en ella. En la primera parte del libro expondremos la aproximación biográfica que motiva nuestra investigación (capítulo 1). La segunda parte examina los orígenes históricos del imaginario de leyes de la naturaleza que se remontan a la filosofía natural de la época de Descartes y Newton (capítulos 2 y 3). La tercera parte sistematiza el debate estándar en filosofía de las leyes de la naturaleza, que se ha consagrado en las concepciones humeanas y anti-humeanas, en donde las primeras sostienen que las leyes son meros enunciados de regularidades (capítulo 4), mientras que las segundas afirman que ellas corresponden a alguna clase especial de necesidades naturales (capítulos 5 y 6). En la cuarta parte propondremos nuevas perspectivas sobre las leyes de la naturaleza que escapan al debate estándar. Examinaremos el problema de Wigner acerca de la efectividad de las matemáticas en la formulación de leyes físicas (capítulo 7), elaborando la concepción inferencial de las leyes que ofrece una respuesta al problema wigneriano (capítulo 8). Asimismo, indagaremos el carácter modal de las leyes de la naturaleza (capítulo 9) y el supuesto metafísico que afirma que la realidad tiene una estructura, que ha sido asociada a las leyes (capítulo 10). Finalmente, en la quinta parte del libro cerraremos nuestra investigación elaborando el eliminativismo nómico, que nos insta a abandonar el imaginario de leyes de la naturaleza tanto en ciencias como en nuestra interpretación filosófica de las mismas (capítulos 11 y 12).

We routinely speak of Newton’s laws in classical mechanics without really knowing how Newton understood such laws. This article clarifies some of the ontological, epistemological, and theological presuppositions underpinning his conception of the laws of nature. After introducing the Cartesian background (2), we examine the Newtonian view of laws of nature in three respects, namely: the character of laws of nature in the context of the rules for natural philosophy (3); the emanative conception of space and time in _De Gravitatione_; (4); and the interpretation of laws of nature in terms of Leibnizian mechanisms or Berkeleyan principles (5). Our analysis highlights crucial philosophical elements of Newton’s view of laws of nature, which contributed to shape the directions that predominated in successive investigations (6).

In this chapter, we provide an analysis of Torretti’s main views in the general philosophy of science. I shall examine his Kantian take on objectivity (Sect. 2.2), the creative understanding thesis (Sect. 2.3), his critique of scientific realism (Sect. 2.4), his elaboration of mathematical fictionalism (Sect. 2.5), his analysis of physical laws (Sect. 2.6), and his examination of the contribution of philosophical reflection to scientific progress (Sect. 2.7). For this, I will consider Torretti’s publications from the late 1960s to the early 2010s in the hope of expounding some of his ideas that may not be well known to some of his readers coming exclusively from either the history and philosophy of physics and geometry, or from the history of philosophy. With this, we fill a gap in our understanding of Torretti’s views in various fields in the philosophy of science, assessing their motivations and arguing that they yield an attractive alternative for various issues in current debates.

This volume collects previously unpublished contributions to the philosophy of science. What brings them together is a twofold goal: first and foremost, celebrating the name of Roberto Torretti, whose works in this and other areas have had – and continue to have – a significant impact on the international philosophy of science community; and second, the desire of advancing novel perspectives on various issues in the philosophy of science broadly construed. In what follows, I firstly offer a brief biographical note on Roberto Torretti; second, I suggest considering Torretti’s philosophical production as belonging to the tradition of natural philosophy; and third, I provide an outline of what is to come in the rest of the book.

This volume collects previously unpublished contributions to the philosophy of science. What brings them together is a twofold goal: first and foremost, celebrating the name of Roberto Torretti, whose works in this and other areas have had –and continue to have– a significant impact on the international philosophy of science community; and second, the desire of advancing novel perspectives on various issues in the philosophy of science broadly construed. Roberto Torretti has made substantial contributions to current debates in the history and philosophy of science, the general philosophy of science, and the philosophy of physics and geometry. Among his landmark contributions, we find his investigations in the history and philosophy of geometry, as well as his systematic studies of Einstein's relativity theory. This volume convenes leading philosophers and early-career scholars compiling a fine collection of chapters addressing recent debates on Kantian philosophy of science, the general philosophy of science, and the history and philosophy of physics and mathematics.

Nomological dispositionalism has occupied a center stage in contemporary metaphysics about laws, holding the view that laws of nature derive from an ontology of intrinsically modal dispositional properties. This view faces, though, various challenges, some of which are worth revisiting. Among them, dispositionalism about properties condemns laws to ontological redundancy; its reconstruction of properties does not seem to fit with experimentalism; it introduces a view of metaphysical modality that ambiguously moves between (_de dicto_) logical modality and (_de re_) physical modality; and it assumes fundamentalist meta-metaphysical presuppositions. Rather than dismantling nomological dispositionalism –quite the contrary, we believe it is a valuable theory–, we aim at identifying those nodes where alternative strategies could be followed in a theory of laws.

Nomological Humeanism has developed into a research program encompassing several variations on a single theme, namely, the view that laws are statements about regularities that we find in nature. After briefly revisiting an early form of nomological Humeanism in Hume’s critique of the idea of necessary connection, this article critically examines Lewis’ two-fold approach based on Humean supervenience and the best system account. We shall point out three limits of nomological Humeanism, which are widely recognized in the literature: its inadequacy in view of physical theories, its explanatory circularity, and its purported anthropomorphism, all of which advocates of nomological Humeanism have attempted to overcome Humeanism. Lastly, we will argue that nomological Humeanism fails to provide a suitable notion of modality for laws of nature. This latter issue continues to represent a live challenge for empiricism in the philosophy of physical laws.

We advance a framework for an inferential conception of physical laws, addressing the problem of the application of mathematical structures to the relevant structure of physical domains. Physical laws, we argue, express generalizations that work as rules for deriving physically informative inferences about their target systems, hence guiding us in our interaction with various domains. Our analysis of the application of mathematics to the articulation of physical laws follows a threefold scheme. First, we examine the immersion of the relevant structure of physical domains into mathematical structures. Second, we assess the inferential power of laws resulting from the mathematical formalism employed in the immersion step. And third, we provide a suitable physical interpretation for the extant mathematical structures obtained from the inferential step. We demonstrate that a deflationary, empiricist framework for an inferential conception of physical laws delivers both an understanding of the mathematical character of physical laws, and a way of responding to some of the standard philosophical riddles associated with laws.

This article elaborates local selective realism in view of the shifting from classical to quantum electrodynamics. After some introductory remarks, we critically address what we call global selective realism, hence setting forth the background for outlining local selective realism. When examining the transition from classical to quantum electrodynamics, we evaluate both continuities and discontinuities in observational features, mathematical structures, and ontological presuppositions. Our argument leads us to criticise the narrow understanding of limiting-case strategies, and to reject the claim that we need a fully coherent theoretical framework to account for the transition from one theory to its successor in the case of electrodynamics. We close with a few remarks on the scope of local selective realism.

Elaboramos una versión del disposicionalismo experimental que esclarece la relación entre capacidades y leyes fenomenológicas. Tras algunas consideraciones introductorias, presentamos el disposicionalismo experimental en vistas de las nociones de modalidad física y ambiente de estímulo. Trazamos las líneas generales para una epistemología experimentalista de las capacidades y esclarecemos la modalidad física e invariancia de las leyes fenomenológicas. Luego examinamos las generalizaciones físicas y extrapolaciones de las leyes fenomenológicas y exponemos el caso de la ley de Fresnel, que ilustra aspectos de nuestro argumento. Concluimos con algunas consideraciones sobre los límites del disposicionalismo experimental.

RESUMEN La sección 1 introduce lo que llamo la tesis del colapso de las estructuras matemáticas y las estructuras físicas. La sección 2 examina si acaso la indispensabilidad de las matemáticas para la física fundamental involucra la adopción del platonismo matemático, en este caso acerca de estructuras matemáticas, como argumenta el realismo estructural óntico. La sección 3 muestra que la adopción de la tesis del colapso arriesga introducir la hipótesis del universo matemático. Desde la perspectiva de la concepción inferencial en filosofía de las matemáticas aplicadas, la sección 4 examina aspectos epistémicos del rol de las matemáticas en la teorización científica, derivando distinciones entre estructuras matemáticas y estructuras físicas. El argumento concluye en la sección 5 indicando algunos límites para la presente estrategia. ABSTRACT Section 1 introduces what I call the collapse thesis, which holds that the boundaries of mathematical and physical structures blur or even vanish in certain areas of fundamental physics. Section 2 examines the claim that the indispensability of mathematics to fundamental physics requires the adoption of mathematical Platonism, this time concerning the reality of mathematical structures, as ontic structural realism contends. Section 3 demonstrates that the collapse thesis introduces the threat of the mathematical universe hypothesis. Then, from the perspective of the inferential conception in the philosophy of applied mathematics, section 4 examines epistemic features of the role of mathematics in scientific theorizing, drawing distinctions between mathematical and physical structures. Lastly, the argument closes in section 5 pointing out some of the limits of the proposed strategy for a distinction.

ABSTRACT This article addresses the prospects of applied naturalistic metaphysics from both a global and a local perspective. Adopting a broad Sellarsian approach, I look into whether metaphysics has a place and role in the overall scientific image and assess whether it has its own subject matter as a first- or second- order discipline. After outlining the general argument in section 1, section 2 examines our construal of science and metaphysics, drawing some considerations for restating the question about the viability of naturalistic metaphysics. Sections 3 and 4, in turn, suggest two styles of naturalistic metaphysics that can be respectively applied on a global and on a local basis. I briefly outline their respective goals, problems and categories. I argue, in particular, that globally applied naturalistic metaphysics deals with issues about the fundamental structure of reality, whereas locally applied naturalistic metaphysics tackles riddles arising from the examination of specific unobservable posits in the frontiers of scientific ontology. Section 5 closes with concluding remarks that put metaphysics within the scientific image.

This article elaborates the epistemic indispensability argument, which fully embraces the epistemic contribution of mathematics to science, but rejects the contention that such a contribution is a reason for granting reality to mathematicalia. Section 1 introduces the distinction between ontological and epistemic readings of the indispensability argument. Section 2 outlines some of the main flaws of the first premise of the ontological reading. Section 3 advances the epistemic indispensability argument in view of both applied and pure mathematics. And Sect. 4 makes a case for the epistemic approach, which firstly calls into question the appeal to inference to the best explanation in the defense of the indispensability claim; secondly, distinguishes between mathematical and physical posits; and thirdly, argues that even though some may think that inference to the best explanation works in the postulation of physical posits, no similar considerations are available for postulating mathematicalia.

We argue that the distinction between framework and interaction theories should be taken carefully into consideration when dealing with the philosophical implications of fundamental theories in physics. In particular, conclusions concerning the nature of reality can only be consistently derived from assessing the ontological and epistemic purport of both types of theories. We put forward an epistemic form of realism regarding framework theories, such as Quantum Field Theory. The latter, indeed, informs us about the general properties of quantum fields, laying the groundwork for interaction theories. Yet, concerning interaction theories, we recommend a robust form of ontological realism regarding the entities whose existence is assumed by these theories. As an application, we refer to the case of the Standard Model, so long as it has proved to successfully inform us about the nature of various sorts of fundamental particles making up reality. In short, although we acknowledge that both framework and interaction theories partake in shaping our science-based view of reality, and that neither would do by itself the work we expect them to accomplish together, our proposal for a coherent ontology of fundamental entities advances a compromise between two forms of realism about theories in each case.

Expondré las líneas generales de una teoría de la verdad evolucionaria con tres objetivos principales: primero, mostrar que ella da cuenta de la teoría de la verdad pragmatista de Peirce, reuniendo la convergencia y la correspondencia; segundo, evidenciar que involucra compromisos metafísicos realistas a partir de la relación entre evolución, verdad y realidad; y, tercero, arrojar luz sobre un aspecto importante de la discusión contemporánea sobre teorías de la verdad, a saber, su carácter eminentemente metafísico.