•  51
    On knowing one's own resistant beliefs
    Philosophical Explorations 18 (2): 212-225. 2015.
    Influential views on self-knowledge presuppose that we cannot come to know a resistant belief in a first-personal way. Two theses support this supposition: if a belief self-ascription is grounded in the evidence of the person holding the belief, it is third-personal and we cannot have first-personal knowledge of beliefs we do not control. I object to both of these theses and argue that we can introspect on beliefs of which we lack control even though we cannot assent to their content
  •  58
    In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while his/her overall automatic behavior suggests that he/she believes that not-P. According to Schwitzgebel, this is a case of in-between believing. This article raises several concerns about Schwitzgebel's account and proposes an alternative view. I argue that the in-between approach yields incorrect results in belief self-ascriptions and does not capture the psychological conflict underlying the individual's dissonan…Read more
  •  1
    En casa, en el mundo: el externismo global constitutivo
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 151-172. 2009.
  • Cuando el externalismo y el auto-conocimiento privilegiado son compartibles o no
    Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 29 (1): 1-34. 2009.
  •  100
    Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 827-842. 2015.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I examine three ob…Read more
  •  38
    Dissonance and Moorean Propositions
    Dialectica 69 (1): 107-127. 2015.
    In a dissonance case, a person sincerely and with conviction asserts that P, while her overall automatic behaviour suggests that she believes that not-P. In contrast with several mainstream views, this paper defends the contradictory-belief view of some relevant dissonance cases and explores its consequences regarding Moorean propositions. The paper argues that in relevant cases, the dissonant person is justified in asserting a Moorean proposition on the grounds of her explicit view on the subje…Read more
  •  1
    El origen de lo mental: la percepción como género psicológico
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 30 (3): 135-148. 2011.
  •  79
    Basic self-knowledge and transparency
    Synthese 195 (2): 679-696. 2018.
    Cogito-like judgments, a term coined by Burge, comprise thoughts such as, I am now thinking, I [hereby] judge that Los Angeles is at the same latitude as North Africa, or I [hereby] intend to go to the opera tonight. It is widely accepted that we form cogito-like judgments in an authoritative and not merely empirical manner. We have privileged self-knowledge of the mental state that is self-ascribed in a cogito-like judgment. Thus, models of self-knowledge that aim to explain privileged self-kno…Read more
  •  36
    Davidson's externalisms
    Universitas Philosophica 26 (53): 65-87. 2009.
  •  41
    Interpretando la Paradoja de Moore
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (2): 145-161. 2008.
    RESUMEN: Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos…Read more
  •  46
    Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance
    Erkenntnis 80 (5): 957-974. 2015.
    This paper focuses on the puzzling situation of having beliefs that are resistant to one’s own critical reasoning. This phenomenon happens, for example, when an individual does not succeed in eliminating a belief by evaluating it as false. I argue that this situation involves a specific type of irrationality—not yet properly identified in the literature—which I call ‘critical doxastic resistance’. The aim of this paper is to characterize this type of irrationality. Understanding such a phenomeno…Read more
  •  63
    Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning
    Philosophical Studies 174 (4): 877-886. 2017.
    There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist …Read more