Cristina Ionescu

One of the most puzzling aspects of the portrait of the philosopher in the Theaetetus is that the depiction of this disengaged and aloof character is odds with the depiction of Socrates himself both in this dialogue and in others. In this paper I follow thinkers like Dorter, Sedley, and Blondell, who argue that the philosopher-leader is an abstract ideal that is not meant to be understood as a character in flesh and blood, but I aim to go beyond what they have done so far by enlarging the scope of the question and elaborating on it. More specifically, I want to explore the significance of this double-tiered assessment of the philosopher in terms of the philosopher in flesh and blood as philosopher of the chorus (οῖ ἐν τῶ τοιῶδε χορεθύοντες, 173c1-2) and this abstract image of the idealized philosopher-leader of the chorus (οῖ κορμφαίοι, 173c6-7). I ask specifically why we need such an idealized figure as a model to emulate especially in a context in which Plato’s Socrates is offering us God as ultimate model to follow (“becoming as like God as possible” 176a-b). Whom is a philosopher like Socrates supposed to be taking as model: the idealized figure of the philosopher-leader, the god, or both? And, if both, then isn’t the figure of the idealized philosopher redundant? Do we need the image of the idealized philosopher at all?

Sanday reads the Statesman as intertwining images with dialectical thinking. On the one hand, we advance from opinions to knowledge by gradually turning away from images and embracing rational arguments instead; on the other, dialectical knowledge must rely on images in order to be effective for the political community. My present comments come not to challenge, but rather to complement, and perhaps refine, Sanday’s account. I begin by highlighting the distinction that the Stranger draws between types of images, namely as perceptible likenesses and as likenesses in account respectively, and then reflect on how this distinction helps in leading the interlocutor’s search for the nature of statesmanship as well as in implementing insights in the practical life of the city. All of this supports the view that Plato has never had a problem with imitation or images as such, but only with our ignorance vis-à-vis our engagement with imitation and usage of images, and with our ignorance as to what are the objects that we imitate, in other words, figuring out whether they are images of Forms or of sensible things.

Charles E. SCOTT, Susan M. SCHOENBOHM, Daniela VALLEGA-NEU, Alejandro VALLEGA, Companion to Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, IndianaUniversity Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 2001 ; Gernot BÖHME, Aisthetik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München, 2001 ; Dean KOMEL, Osnutja k Filozofski in Kulturni Hermenevtiki [Outlines to Philosophical and Cultural Hermeneutics], Nova revija, Ljubljana, 2001 ; Marc RICHIR, L’institution de l’idéalité. Des schématismes phénoménologiques, Association pour la promotion de la Phénoménologie, Paris, 2002 ; Fred EVANS & Leonard LAWLOR, Chiasms. Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh, State University of New York Press, 2000 ; Udo TIETZ, Ontologie und Dialektik. Heidegger und Adorno über das Sein, das Nichtidentische, die Synthesis und die Kopula, Passagen Verlag, Wien, 2003 ; Etienne FERON, Phénoménologie de la mort. Sur les traces de Levinas, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 1999

The unity of the Philebus: metaphysical assumptions of the good human life -- The placement of pleasure and knowledge in the fourfold articulation of reality -- Hybrid varieties of pleasure: true mixed pleasures and false pure pleasures -- The nature of pleasure: absolute standards of filling or replenishment and due measure -- Pleasures of learning and the role of due measure in experiencing them -- Plato's conception of pleasure confronting three Aristotelian critiques -- The Philebus' implicit response to the aporiai of participation from the Parmenides.

The Meno is often interpreted as an illustration of Plato’s decision to replace elenchus with recollection and the method of hypothesis. My paper challenges this view and defends instead two theses: that far from replacing elenchus, the method of hypothesis incorporates and uses elenctic arguments in order to test and build its own steps; and that recollection is not a method of search on a par with elenchus and the method of hypothesis, but is rather primarily a theory that accounts for the metaphysical horizon within which the method of hypothesis, coupled with elenchus and perhaps other dialectical methods, can lead us from opinions to knowledge.

In this paper I explore the relevance of due measure for the dialectical method of division in Plato’s Statesman, and I argue that due measure is the unifying thread of the dialogue insofar as it guides the application of the dialectical method throughout the conversation. I defend this view by showing (a) that due measure accounts for the Stranger’s shift from bisective and value-neutral divisions to non-bisective divisions that identify the essence of statesmanship and situate this art hierarchically in relation to other arts needed in the polis; (b) that due measure accounts for the transition from the paradigm of the shepherd to the paradigm of the weaver, and finally (c) that due measure is also intimately related to the myth, insofar as the myth provides the metaphysical horizon in which natural joints of division and due measure itself are to be discerned.

Plato’s definition of pleasure as perceptible replenishment of a lack has been criticized as too narrow and incapable of accounting for some of the corporeal and all the non-corporeal pleasures. Plato’s suggested reply, based on objective standards in relation to which we are to estimate the reality and degree of replenishment we experience, seems to give rise to another difficulty, concerning the legitimate diversity of our natural inclinations and tastes. I argue that Plato’sdefinition of pleasure makes perfect sense when integrated in the horizon of his metaphysical presuppositions and that he is successful in reconciling the diversity of subjective tastes with his view of an ultimate objective hierarchy of value by appeal to the notion of the mean.

ABSTRACT: In the Symposium Socrates shows how Diotima initiated him into the mysteries of love in two stages. Yet, at first sight, the teachings offered at the two stages seem divergent and discontinuous. In this article I argue that we can understand the continuity between them if we regard Diotima’s notions of spiritual pregnancy and birth-giving as metaphors suggesting that the metaphysical horizon looming in the background of her teaching is that of Plato’s theory of recollection.RÉSUMÉ: Socrate explique dans le Banquet comment Diotime l’a initié aux mystères de l’amour en suivant deux niveaux. Pourtant, de prime abord, les enseignements dispensés à ces deux niveaux semblent divergents et séparés par une solution de continuité. Je soutiens dans cet article qu’il est possible de comprendre la continuité entre ces deux niveaux si on considère les notions de grossesse spirituelle etd’enfantement avancées par Diotime comme des métaphores qui laissent entrevoir la théorie de la réminiscence à l’horizon métaphysique de cet enseignement.

ABSTRACT: This article addresses two main concerns: first, the relation between the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria as applied to pleasure, and, second, the status of our pleasures of learning. In addressing the first, I argue that Plato keeps the truth/falsehood and purity/impurity criteria distinct in his assessment of pleasures and thus leaves room for the possibility of hybrid pleasures in the form of true impure pleasures and false pure pleasures. In addressing the second issue, I show that Plato's view is perfectly able to accommodate an understanding of our pleasures of learning as pure pleasures even if such pleasures are preceded by awareness of a lack (ignorance).RÉSUMÉ: Cet article aborde deux concepts principaux: premièrement, la relation entre les critères de vérité/fausseté et de pureté/impureté appliqués au plaisir, et deuxièmement, le statut de notre plaisir d'apprendre. En abordant le premier concept, j'argumente que Platon tient distincts les critères de vérité/fausseté et de'pureté Iimpureté dans son évaluation du plaisir, laissant ouverte la possibilité de plaisirs hybrides sous forme de vrais plaisirs impurs et faux plaisirs purs. En abordant le deuxième concept, je montre que le point de vue de Platon est parfaitement capable d'accommoder la compréhension de nos plaisirs d'apprendre comme plaisirs purs si de tels plaisirs sont précédés par la conscience d'un manque (ignorance)

Plato’s Philebus develops an ontological model in four terms to account for “all the things that are now in the all”. The fourfold model consists of Limit, the Unlimited, the Mixture of these two, and the Cause of the mixture. Traditional interpretations place pleasure in the class of the Unlimited and knowledge either in that of Limit or, sometimes, in that of the Cause of mixtures. The aim of my paper is twofold: it challenges the received interpretation and defends instead the view that pleasures, insofar as they are true, are placed in the class of Mixtures, while knowledge and its cognates are among Causes of mixtures, and it explores some of the major implications of the right placement of pleasure and knowledge on the metaphysical map. In particular, I argue that Socrates’ identification of pleasure as a Mixture and of knowledge as Cause of mixtures accounts for the fact that we witness throughout the dialogue a gradual progression from the initial absolutely unbridgeable distance between pleasure and knowledge to an intimate collaboration between them. I suggest that this shift reflects a transition from the Phileban conception of pleasure as thoughtless thrill or sensation to the Platonic understanding of pleasure as cognitively structured experience that depends on our beliefs not only about factual situations, but also about the meaning and value of such situations for life generally.

When dealing with the metaphysical and epistemological implications of the Phaedrus, scholars have had the tendency to focus either on recollection or on discerning the methodological articulations of dialectical rhetoric. The present paper explores the relation between recollection and the dialectical method, and argues that recollection and the method of collection and division are complementary aspects of dialectical investigation, the method providing a strategy of reasoning, while the theory of recollection provides the metaphysical horizon within which collection and division can lead to successful results

This essay explores the relevance of Socrates’ mythical introduction of recollection in the Meno. I argue that the passage at 81a5–e2 addresses different levels of understanding, a superficial and a deeper one, corresponding to a literal and a metaphorical reading respectively. The major themes addressed in this passage—the immortality of the soul, transmigration, rewards and punishments in the after-life, Hades, the kinship of all nature and anamnesis—have distinct meanings depending on whether we approach them with a Platonic or an Orphico-Pythagorean eye. The literal understanding is appealing to Meno and is offered in reply to his challenge in order to persuade him to continue the investigation of virtue. It is, however, the deeper sense that Plato’s Socrates intends for a more philosophically attuned audience.