Cristóbal Orrego

This paper proposes extending New Classical Natural Law Theory to the theory of virtues. After a brief personal recollection, the paper begins, in section II, by presenting some of John Finnis’s ideas on the relationship between natural law and the virtues. Section III suggests that there is an incipient theory of virtue in Finnis’s highly developed work on moral principles and human action. The main part of the paper, section IV, aims to explain why a developed theory of virtue is needed in order to supplement New Classical Natural Law Theory. The reasons are: first, to explain both moral good and evil in general and the specification of human actions as good or evil and as different kinds of human actions in genere moris; and, second, to supplement the methodology of moral reasoning, based on first principles of natural law and the requirements of practical reasonableness, with a way of reasoning about good and evil actions by relating specific act-types to certain kinds of virtues and vices.

Tras un breve recuerdo del debate centenario sobre la filosofía cristiana, el autor discute la nueva propuesta de Alasdair MacIntyre de mejorar una «filosofía católica» en el contexto de nuestra moderna crisis en la relación entre fe y razón. El autor comparte el diagnóstico sobre nuestra situación presente en las universidades de investigación y sobre su exclusión pragmática de la filosofía y la teología, las cuales, en el mejor caso, son reducidas a disciplinas especializadas sin relevancia para otras disciplinas, y, en la mayoría de los casos, son simplemente expulsadas del ámbito de la investigación científica. La propuesta dialéctica de MacIntyre en Tres versiones rivales de la ética y en Dios, Filosofía, Universidades, aparte de otras obras menores, se examina críticamente y se presenta como una forma nueva de comprometer a los pensadores católicos y no católicos en una confrontación abierta y fructífera, en lugar de nuestro confinamiento actual en mundos cerrados de investigación falsamente científica. After a brief recollection of the century long debate about Christian philosophy, the author discusses Alasdair Maclntyre’s new proposal to enhance a «Catholic philosophy» in the context of our modern crisis of the relationship between faith and reason. The author shares the diagnosis about our present daj situation of research universities and their pragmatic exclusion of philosophy and theology, which, in the best case, are reduced to specialized disciplines with no import for other disciplines, and, in most cases, are just expelled from the realm of scientfic research. Maclntyre’s dialectical proposal in «Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry» and in «God, Philosophy Universities», and in some other minor works, is critically examined and presented as a new way to engage Catholic and non Catholic thinkers in an open and fruitful confrontation, in stead of our present confinement in closed worlds of falsely scientific research

This paper shows how the republican model of Cicero has been transmitted fragmentarily, through the Italian civic humanist tradition (Maquiavelo), the English republican humanism of XVI, XVII and XVIII centuries, and the republicanism of the American patriots, ("neo-republicanism"). The proposals of Pettit and Brugger are analyzed, and a great variety of positions that some consider "republican" are summarily reckoned. Finally, it is maintained that the classic republican model is present in a very fragmented way in contemporary political theories, for these theories are incapable to accept some strong anthropological, ethical and metaphysical theses. Cicero's model of republicanism appears to us like in a large scale copy or replica, precisely in the political and legal reality of the contemporary world, in its practices and institutions, and in the political function of its theoretical reflections

The article examines H.L.A. Hart's most important texts on classical natural law theory in order to assess his understanding of that theory. The author considers first the way of presenting the two meanings of the theory of natural law (namely, moral objectivity and the union of law and morals). Afterwards, he analyzes Hart's thought on the first thesis, especially on the teleology of human nature; then on the second one, especially on the meaning of the invalidity of unjust laws. In both cases, the author compares Hart's understanding with the self understanding of natural lawyers, referring preferably to Aquinas and Finnis. The conclusion is that Hart misunderstood classical natural law theory in such a way that it warranted the suspicion that he did not have a first hand acquaintance with that theory

Neil MacCormick says that his "version of institutional theory" about the law 'is "non positivist", or, if you wish, "post-positivist"'. He is aware, however, that his work could be perfectly labelled, from the point of view of the history of legal and moral thought, as a form of natural law theory, at least by those who adhere to some version of natural law. It is an important merit of MacCormick that, rising above the label walls and wars, his theory of law has taken into account the main insights of the great authors belonging to both traditions, such as Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart, on the so-called "positivist" side, and some authors in the Thomistic tradition, particularly John Finnis, as well as "the writings of seventeenth and eighteenth century jurists concerning natural jurisprudence and the law of nature", on the so-called "natural law" side. Writing with such openness to all sources and insights, Neil MacCormick, one of the most eminent legal philosophers of our time, does not surprise us when he chooses to end his lifetime's work with an attempt to dig into the ethical foundations of all that he has written on law and politics. Practical Reason in Law and Morality is, in a way, his most significant book. He tackles here the deeper issues that he himself realised were left open and uncertain in his salient works on legal theory. He considered this book as the last one in a quartet on "Law, State, and Practical Reason". The quartet itself has become the culmination of a life devoted to the common good, in academia and in politics, among many other endeavours. Notwithstanding its flaws, I am convinced that Neil MacCormick's last book can be illuminating for all those students, and even professors, who go about doing legal philosophy without ever reading anything antedating Hart's Concept of Law. They tend to be confused by sophisticated forms of scepticism, luxurious discussions on law and morality and metaethics, and all sorts of distrust of truth in practical matters. Hence they will surely benefit from reading how a great legal philosopher of our time, once equally confused but always honestly open to rational deliberation and fair discussion, freed himself of at least half of his misunderstandings, and learned a lot by reading some natural law theorists old and new