Supersubstantivalists identify material objects with regions of spacetime. Accordingly, they take their view to be both more ideologically parsimonious than other substantivalists (dualists) because they can reduce location to identity with a region and they can explain why the mereological structure of objects mirrors the mereological structure of their locations (henceforth, “harmony”). However, I argue that these motivations for supersubstantivalism don’t hold water. Specifically, I argue tha…
Read moreSupersubstantivalists identify material objects with regions of spacetime. Accordingly, they take their view to be both more ideologically parsimonious than other substantivalists (dualists) because they can reduce location to identity with a region and they can explain why the mereological structure of objects mirrors the mereological structure of their locations (henceforth, “harmony”). However, I argue that these motivations for supersubstantivalism don’t hold water. Specifically, I argue that supersubstantivalists can only claim the aforementioned advantages just so long as they stand in a unique position to reduce location. But this depends on the illicit assumption that no possible spacetime structures have co-located regions – something falsified by the possibility of merely pseudo-metric spaces. Further, any alternative reduction is equally available to the dualist. Accordingly, this allows dualists to have the same explanation of harmony as the supersubstantivalist. As such, these considerations level the dialectical playing field between dualists and supersubstantivalists.