Cynthia Freeland

_The Plague_ is a record of great suffering. Children thrash with painful buboes, families are separated, and victims cough up clots of blood. Horrors proliferate, from the initial rat invasions and deaths to burial pits emitting the putrid smoke of human cremations. Here nature is indifferent at best. Camus describes natural phenomena as portents of doom: especially the relentless winds buffeting the town. My chapter places Camus’s novel within the context of what I have elsewhere called “natural horror,” a genre with no identifiable monster but suffused with dread. I discuss how rats and bats function in horror works like _Dracula_ and in _The Plague_, as well as in our current pandemic, as “zoonotic villains,” symbols of malevolence. Finally, I assess the response Camus recommends to what his narrator Dr. Rieux calls the “ridiculous and hideous injustice” of the world.

This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ‘literalist’ view of the nature of sensory representation, according to which an organ literally becomes ‘like’ the said object. It suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s defence of the objectivity of tactile representation, which shows a deep and complex link between his theory of sense-knowledge and his project of scientific explanation.

This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ‘literalist’ view of the nature of sensory representation, according to which an organ literally becomes ‘like’ the said object. It suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s defence of the objectivity of tactile representation, which shows a deep and complex link between his theory of sense-knowledge and his project of scientific explanation.

"Orientalism" is a term made prominent by critic Edward Said in his 1978 book of that title. . . . Said specifically used the term to designate a field of self-constituted experts who proposed to explain the Orient to the West. . . . This essay explores the visual artwork of Soody Sharifi who left Iran before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, but returns to photograph women and girls. After a trip back to Iran in 1999, she began a self-portrait series exploring how she felt about being a Muslim woman in a hijab for the first time.

Feminist philosophy of film is a young field that is rapidly growing but that has as yet no distinct disciplinary presence within philosophy. Articles by feminist philosophers on film began appearing in aesthetics journals and anthologies in English only in the late 1980s and 1990s. In film studies, as in aesthetics more generally, disciplinary boundaries are fluid. Writers from many fields – literature, art, communications, cultural studies – make critical contributions on film, addressing philosophical issues and drawing upon philosophical theories. Many questions discussed in the general field of film theory are philosophical ones, and among these are topics important for feminist philosophy and aesthetics: Is film an art, and if so why? What is the essence of film? How does film depict subjectivity? What is the nature of our emotional reactions to and interest in film? How is the photographic nature of film used in constructing realistic or other forms of representations of the world? How is ideology at work in the Hollywood production system and in the circulation of filmic images in the popular culture industry? It would be not only difficult, but arbitrary and misleading, to restrict the label or practice of “feminist philosophy of film” to professional philosophers. It is best to approach this subject, then, by situating it in relation to other fields, including feminist film theory, film theory in general, philosophical work on film, and feminist aesthetics. Feminist philosophy of film is rapidly expanding as philosophers with diverse interests turn their attention to film. The inclusion of feminist essays by philosophers in two anthologies on film in the mid‐1990s, together with the appearance of the first issue of the journal Film and Philosophy, suggest that this field is on the brink of a period of rapid growth and change. I will discuss possible new directions of growth, and connections with feminist philosophy broadly considered in the conclusion.

Near the end of the Protagoras there is a famous argument in which Socrates appears to deny the possibility of weakness of will. The passage is part of a longer examination of whether virtue can be taught and of the unity of the virtues. Socrates and Protagoras discuss whether it makes sense to say, as people commonly do, that they sometimes choose to do things they know are not best for them because they are “overcome by pleasure.” Supposedly “the many” hold that the good is pleasure, and that one chooses what is less good because it is most pleasant. Socrates takes Protagoras through a kind of elenctic examination that purports to show that the many’s claim to being overcome by pleasure in akrasia is absurd or ridiculous. They can’t really do what they claim to do, choose the less good for the more good; thus, and the claim that they do is a misdescription of what really happens. People act in these cases due to ignorance of what is truly the most good. In order to prevent people from choosing things that are not best for them, or to save them, Socrates says that what is needed is an art or science of measurement. In this paper I want to focus on the idea of such an art or science of measurement.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines Mohan Matthen's account of aesthetic pleasure. The first part explores implications of Matthen's notion of ‘fit’ between features of art objects and our pleasurable contemplation of them. Through historical comparisons with Plato and Dewey, I challenge his claim not to be offering a theory of aesthetic norms. The second part of my paper sketches how Matthen might address two important problems of contemporary aesthetics: the first concerning interpretation, and the second concerning genres of art that evoke negative or painful emotions such as tragedy, melodrama, and horror.