D. J. Murphy

Isocrates is usually excluded from histories of philosophy. Two likely reasons are his tendency not to formulate rigorously structured arguments and his tendency not to deploy such arguments in support of universalizing positions that he takes – for example, about virtue or the good life. Nonetheless, Isocrates does come close to performing these functions, typical of what we expect from philosophers today, in Against the Sophists, written in the late 390s. In this work Isocrates criticizes, among others, educators who, he says, ‘involve themselves in disputations’. It is clear that these include followers of Socrates – at the least, Antisthenes and perhaps Plato. The disputers, Isocrates says, claim to teach a knowledge, ἐπιστήμη, that tells us what to do and thereby guarantees happiness. Against this claim, Isocrates does formulate a structured argument in service of universalizing claims, viz., his argument from Foreknowledge. He argues that the disputers’ purported knowledge requires that we foreknow outcomes of the actions about which we deliberate, if we are to attain happiness as promised. But humans do not have foreknowledge. Therefore, the disputers’ claims are false, and the cognitive attitude that we need for a happy life is not knowledge. Isocrates does not invent his rivals’ Foreknowledge premise, for Antisthenes, Plato and Xenophon present versions of it. As I ‘steelman’ and analyze Isocrates’ Foreknowledge argument, I find it sound if happiness consists in enjoying external goods, as in some Socratic dialogues, but not sound if genuine happiness is immune to fortune, as later in Plato and certain works of Antisthenes. I argue for dating those Antisthenic works later than Against the Sophists. Although certainty is elusive, it is attractive to think that Isocrates’ Foreknowledge argument played some role in pushing Plato, and perhaps Antisthenes, to seek to inoculate happiness and the good against fortune and to bring the virtuous one close to the divine.

Against prevailing interpretations, this article contends that Plato's Sophist and Statesman accord the sophist a kind of ‘knowing-how’ (epistêmê). In Soph. 233c10‒d2, the Visitor and Theaetetus agree that the sophist has not truth but a δοξαστικὴ ἐπιστήμη. This phrase cannot mean ‘a seeming knowledge’, for –ικός adjectives formed from verbs express the ability to perform the action denoted by the verb—here, δοξάζω. Although not a first-order, subject-area knowledge, sophistry is a second-order knowledge of how to form and use judgements (doxai). Other acknowledgements of the sophist's epistêmê and the ascription to him of τέχνη, ‘craft/expertise’, confirm that the Visitor's conclusion is not to be dismissed as irony. To critics who argue from the Gorgias and from other works that Plato must consider the Visitor's conclusion an error, the author replies: 1) other dialogues do not control the Visitor dialogues; 2) the Visitor does not validly demonstrate that the sophist lacks all knowledge; 3) by admitting sensibles into Being, the Visitor and Theaetetus allow the objects of epistêmê to include things in the embodied world, even likenesses. Non-philosophers’ epistêmê in the Visitor dialogues is not implicated in the difficulties that critics have raised about epistemology in the so-called Two Worlds dialogues. On this new ontology, even the sophist, if guided by philosophical rulers, can benefit citizens by employing his elenctic expertise as Socrates did, aiding their growth toward virtue.

People with anorexia nervosa commonly exhibit social difficulties, which may be related to problems with understanding the perspectives of others, commonly known as Theory of Mind processing. However, there is a dearth of literature investigating the neural basis of these differences in ToM and at what age they emerge. This study aimed to test for differences in the neural correlates of ToM processes in young women with AN, and young women weight-restored from AN, as compared to healthy control participants. Based on previous findings in AN, we hypothesized that young women with current or prior AN, as compared to HCs, would exhibit a reduced neural response in the medial prefrontal cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the temporo-parietal junction whilst completing a ToM task. We recruited 73 young women with AN, 45 WR young women, and 70 young women without a history of AN to take part in the current study. Whilst undergoing a functional magnetic resonance imaging scan, participants completed the Frith-Happé task, which is a commonly used measure of ToM with demonstrated reliability and validity in adult populations. In this task, participants viewed the movements of triangles, which depicted either action movements, simple interactions, or complex social interactions. Viewing trials with more complex social interactions in the Frith-Happé task was associated with increased brain activation in regions including the right TPJ, the bilateral mPFC, the cerebellum, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. There were no group differences in neural activation in response to the ToM contrast. Overall, these results suggest that the neural basis of spontaneous mentalizing is preserved in most young women with AN.

A Scientific Integrity Consortium developed a set of recommended principles and best practices that can be used broadly across scientific disciplines as a mechanism for consensus on scientific integrity standards and to better equip scientists to operate in a rapidly changing research environment. The two principles that represent the umbrella under which scientific processes should operate are as follows: Foster a culture of integrity in the scientific process. Evidence-based policy interests may have legitimate roles to play in influencing aspects of the research process, but those roles should not interfere with scientific integrity. The nine best practices for instilling scientific integrity in the implementation of these two overarching principles are Require universal training in robust scientific methods, in the use of appropriate experimental design and statistics, and in responsible research practices for scientists at all levels, with the training content regularly updated and presented by qualified scientists. Strengthen scientific integrity oversight and processes throughout the research continuum with a focus on training in ethics and conduct. Encourage reproducibility of research through transparency. Strive to establish open science as the standard operating procedure throughout the scientific enterprise. Develop and implement educational tools to teach communication skills that uphold scientific integrity. Strive to identify ways to further strengthen the peer review process. Encourage scientific journals to publish unanticipated findings that meet standards of quality and scientific integrity. Seek harmonization and implementation among journals of rapid, consistent, and transparent processes for correction and/or retraction of published papers. Design rigorous and comprehensive evaluation criteria that recognize and reward the highest standards of integrity in scientific research.

De Haan has provided a novel and distinctly enactivist solution to the problem of integrating the physiological, experiential, social and existential. We admire her articulation of her fourth "existential" dimension. Not only does it represent a real attempt to bridge, as she says, enactivism's explanatory gap, it is also a potentially useful construct for conceptualizing the way that self-reflexivity seems to go astray in much psychopathology. We think that pinpointing this phenomenon is something that phenomenological accounts excel at. We have, however, two key reservations about her account, which we outline.To begin with, we are unsure that there is any particular scientific research program that derives from...

In this critical notice I review the main ideas presented in Peyman Vahabzadeh's thought-provoking investigation into the genesis of new social movements, Articulated Experiences: Towards a Radical Phenomenology of Contemporary Social Movements. I examine two central features of Vahabzadeh's work: (i) its notion of ?ultimate referentiality;? and (ii) the centrality of the role accorded to language in Vahabzadeh's overall theory. I argue that in his stipulation that language is the most fundamental mediating factor in articulation and acts of identification, Vahabzadeh implicitly characterizes language as precisely the sort of privileged essential universality that his theory seeks to avoid. The repercussions of this criticism are not only relevant to the thesis of Articulated Experiences, they are also relevant to the thesis Vahabzadeh defends in his contribution to the present volume