D. Robinson

The rivalry between Animalist and Psychological views of human persons interweaves with some much-discussed technical disputes in metaphysics, many involving the “constitution” relations which Psychological views typically invoke. They include debates over four-dimensionalism, modality, the ontological grounding of sortal kinds and persistence-conditions, and the nature of constitution itself. By exploring the resources available using a minimalist notion of constitution, this chapter attempts to sidestep or defer some of those disputes. The overall goal is to defend the plausibility of Psychological views as naturalistic competitors to Animalism, by showing how they can dovetail naturally with a suitable conception of the generic ontology of material entities. The chapter ends by sketching some elements of that ontology, trying to illuminate and improve some crucial views and concepts relevant to it, and finishing with some brief thoughts about how to handle some of the thornier technical issues.

Reviews the book, Philosophy and ordinary language: The bent and genius of our tongue by Oswald Hanfling . This book is in the Routledge Series in 20th Century Philosophy and it is a distinguished contribution to that series. It is in its own way an exemplary exercise in philosophical acumen and clarity. In thirteen chapters the reader is paced carefully through what are often the tares and snares of contemporary analytical philosophy, but for the express purpose of defending "ordinary language" philosophy against charges of inadequacy. As the expression goes, if you have time to read only one book this year on the vexed question of meaning, this is the one. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

How should a prize be awarded after a horse race? Should it go to the best rider, the best person, or the one who finishes first? To what extent are bystanders blameworthy when they do nothing to prevent harm? Are there any objective standards of moral responsibility with which to address such perennial questions? In this fluidly written and lively book, Daniel Robinson takes on the prodigious task of setting forth the contours of praise and blame. He does so by mounting an important and provocative new defense of a radical theory of moral realism and offering a critical appraisal of prevailing alternatives such as determinism and behaviorism and of their conceptual shortcomings.The version of moral realism that arises from Robinson's penetrating inquiry--an inquiry steeped in Aristotelian ethics but deeply informed by modern scientific knowledge of human cognition--is independent of cognition and emotion. At the same time, Robinson carefully explores how such human attributes succeed or fail in comprehending real moral properties. Through brilliant analyses of constitutional and moral luck, of biosocial and genetic versions of psychological determinism, and of relativistic-anthropological accounts of variations in moral precepts, he concludes that none of these conceptions accounts either for the nature of moral properties or the basis upon which they could be known. Ultimately, the theory that Robinson develops preserves moral properties even while acknowledging the conditions that undermine the powers of human will.

Part 1 of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement—in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism—and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely cognitivist account of moral judgments. Such a conclusion could be staved off if it could be held that a sufficient condition for commonality of cognitive content in moral judgments could consist, despite the presence of radical moral disagreement, in the parties’acceptance of a common set of fundamental moral principles. Part 1 begins, and Part 2 further develops, a destructive critique of that idea, leading thereby to a skeptical appraisal of the important role sometimes assigned, in metaethical theorizing, to moral rules. Inter alia the paper is intended to suggest the possibility of overlap between relativist and particularist agendas.

Creating an inclusive environment where different software developers can feel welcome and leverage their talents is an ethical imperative no company can ignore. Indeed, software organizations have in the last decade been trying to make changes for a more diverse and inclusive software development environment. The push for increased diversity in software has been a public one, from annual diversity reports by some of the worlds’ most visible companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Facebook, to large projects such as Linux Foundation’s Software Developer Diversity and Inclusion project that explores, evaluates, and promotes best practices from research and industry to increase diversity and inclusion in software engineering. Despite these many efforts, diversity remains low. Numbers from the software industry show that less than 25% of software engineers are women. Diversity is also low in regards to many other facets of diversity. This book provides an overview of research into the different aspects of diversity and inclusion in software engineering, as well as the tools, methods, and practices proposed to foster diversity and to build inclusive software teams and development environments. It describes research challenges in studying diversity and inclusion in software. Readers will be challenged to consider how they are contributing to a lack of inclusion and what they can do to improve inclusion in the software industry. What You Will Learn Aspects of diversity (e.g., age, culture, gender, race) and relationship to software engineering activities and outcomes How to measure diversity Investigations of intersectionality in software engineering Research methods for the study of diversity and inclusion in software engineering Empirical studies of effective practices to foster diversity and inclusion in software engineering Interventions and programs that have been used to successfully support retention in software engineering Software engineering education for diverse and inclusive software engineering, and proven teaching methods/environments that support diverse and inclusive software engineering Who This Book Is For For Researchers, the book presents a state-of-the-art collection of existing studies into many aspects of diversity, methods, and tools proposed and tried out in practice, challenges in research, and contributing to a research agenda on this topic for future studies. For Industry practitioners, the book describes efforts to investigate diversity in software teams, whether in corporate or open source environments. It also describes empirical evidence about effectiveness of certain methods and approaches to foster diversity and inclusion in software development. For Educators, the book describes practices and effective changes in Computer Science/Software Engineering curricula that were found as effective in engaging learners from minoritized groups, creating inclusive software teams that are diverse, and which relate to educational material useful for training for diversity, equity, and inclusion.

How is Nature Possible?: Kant's Project in the First Critique presents a clear and systematic appraisal of what is perhaps the most difficult treatise in the philosophical canon. Daniel N. Robinson situates Kant's undertaking in the First Critique within the context of the history of philosophy and as a response to the challenges of scepticism. Kant's central task in the First Critique is to tie his metaphysical analysis to the very possibility of nature itself. Where others assumed the validity or the weakness of perception and reason, Kant presents a critical appraisal of both, thereby establishing the very limits of sense and reason as instruments of discovery. Ideal for students at all levels, this fascinating introduction clarifies the aims and significance of Kant's project, locates its place within the history of philosophy and identifies the strengths and weaknesses reasonably attributed to this most significant contribution to the history of philosophical reflection.

After sketching some aspects of truthmaker doctrines and "truthmaker projects", and canvassing some prima facie objections to the latter, I turn to an issue which might seem to involve confusion about the nature of character of truthmakers if such there be, viz for statements of identity and (specially) distinctness. The real issue here is versions of the Identity of Indiscernibles. I discuss ways of discriminating versions, which are almost certainly true but trivial, which almost certainly substantive but false, and explore an interesting intermediate possibility which might if developed yield a plausibly true yet not-entirely-trivial version of the doctrine: it is equivalent to what I call "the Denial of Bare Distinctness".

This paper explores a variety of kinds of apparent disagreement of which it may be held that they involve failure to disagree in that, at least in some broad sense, the disputants use the same words to express different meanings or concepts. It is argued that it is hard to rebut the claim that some apparent disagreements about personal identity fall into a particular sub-category of this broad type. I conclude both that a "constrained" relativism which I call "quasi-relativism" is appropriate in regard to some central personal-identity debates, and also that, in order to avoid the lamentable conclusion that there is no real disagreement at all in these debates, we should embrace the idea that there is a non-cognitive element in personal identity claims, in virtue of the tight conceptual relations between personal identity claims and value claims of various kinds.

The general narrative of international criminal law (ICL) declares that the system adheres in an exemplary manner to the fundamental principles of a liberal criminal justice system. These fundamental principles distinguish a liberal system of criminal justice from an authoritarian system. However, recent scholarship has increasingly questioned the adherence of various ICL doctrines to such principles. The object of inquiry in this article is the discourse in ICL: the assumptions and forms of argumentation that are regarded as sound reasoning with appropriate liberal aims, and how these forms of reasoning in fact engender contradictions with the liberal values proclaimed by the system. This article argues that, in drawing (as it necessarily did) on national criminal law as well as international human rights and humanitarian law, ICL absorbed contradictory assumptions and methods of reasoning. These contradictions in reasoning lead to contradictions in doctrine and departures from the stated principles of the system. The article explores three modes by which the assumptions of human rights liberalism subtly undermine the criminal law liberalism to which the system aspires. These modes include: interpretive approaches, substantive and structural conflation and ideological assumptions. The identity crisis theory helps explain how a liberal system of criminal justice - one that strives to serve as a model for liberal systems - has come to embrace illiberal doctrines. The article argues that we need to critically examine not only what we think, but how we think, in order to advance ICL as a coherent discipline.

“FITNESS FOR THE RULE OF LAW” lends itself to a variety of treatments. I should make clear at the outset one treatment that I do not intend to provide under this heading, even if it is implicitly represented here and there in this essay. I will not examine psychological or psychiatric conceptions of “fitness” as these are featured in, for example, the “insanity defense” or in tests of testamentary capacity. A recent book of mine explores these issues in some historical and analytical detail, but this is a vast and complex subject falling beyond the scope of what I hope to clarify here. I shall assume throughout that the minimal conditions by which one becomes fit for the rule of law are satisfied, and will focus then on how one’s potentialities for life within such a context are realized.

Studies of Witherspoon's influence as an educator and as a pivotal figure in the American founding tend to neglect his earlier part in controversies among the Scottish Moderates and Evangelicals. By the time he answered the summons from the College of New Jersey, his position on church-state relations was thoroughly developed as was his understanding of the nature and the sources of rights, both alienable and unalienable. Nor were there ‘two Witherspoons’, the earlier one in Scotland opposed to the academic world of intellectuals and a later American version suddenly committed to the progressive ethos of the Enlightenment. There was but one Witherspoon, clear on the several missions required by the times

"An American psychologist, Daniel N. Robinson, traces the development of the insanity plea...[He offers] an assured historical survey." Roy Porter, The Times [UK] "Wild Beasts and Idle Humours is truly unique. It synthesizes material that I do not believe has ever been considered in this context, and links up the historical past with contemporaneous values and politics. Robinson effortlessly weaves religious history, literary history, medical history, and political history, and demonstrates how the insanity defense cannot be fully understood without consideration of all these sources." Michael L. Perlin, New York Law School "Daniel N. Robinson has written a graceful history of insanity and the law stretching from Homer to Hinckley. He attempts no final theory as to how the law should cope with the insane; he seeks, rather, to use the shifting notions of when madness exculpates criminal activity to illuminate the core self-perceptions of the cultures developing ever-evolving resolutions of the problem...[T]he grandeur of the theme...commands attention and respect." --Neal Johnston, The Nation